50-State Surveys › Prenuptial Agreement Requirements by State
Prenuptial Agreement Requirements by State
What does this state require to make a prenuptial agreement valid and enforceable, and what can the agreement not waive?
51 of 51 jurisdictions verified
every entry statute-checked, oldest 2026-07-27
What this survey covers
A prenuptial agreement changes rights that would otherwise arise from marriage, death, separation, or divorce. Every state recognizes some form of agreement, but the path to enforceability is not uniform. Some states use a version of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act or Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act. Others use a narrower statute plus a court-developed fairness test.
This survey separates execution from enforcement. A signed writing can satisfy the basic form rule and still fail because disclosure was inadequate, counsel or timing protections were missing, the agreement was involuntary, or a particular term cannot be waived.
How to read the table
Start with the writing and execution columns. They answer whether both parties must sign and whether a notary, acknowledgment, witnesses, or a pre-wedding period is part of the state's legal formality.
Then read disclosure, counsel, and fairness together. Disclosure may be waivable in a signed writing, replaceable by adequate knowledge, or completely nonwaivable. Counsel may be optional for the agreement generally but mandatory for a spousal-support waiver. The fairness column always identifies its source: “Statute” for a codified test or “Case law” with the leading case named.
Finally, treat the support and child/public-policy columns as limits on subject matter, not drafting suggestions. A state may permit property terms while forbidding an adverse spousal-support term, and no private agreement conclusively controls a child's support or custody.
What the completed table shows
The finished survey divides into 33 statute-led jurisdictions and 17 case-law jurisdictions. Most statutory states use a version of the UPAA or UPMAA, but the same label does not produce the same enforcement rule. Original-UPAA states commonly require execution-time unconscionability together with all three disclosure failures. Iowa, Nevada, Connecticut, Colorado, North Dakota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island depart from that familiar structure in different ways. Case-law states vary even more: some test only formation, while Alaska, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Carolina, and West Virginia preserve some form of later changed-circumstances, hardship, or fairness review.
The majority rule is a signed writing without a prenup-specific notary or witness. The principal execution-formality outliers are Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, and New York. Counsel and timing are usually part of voluntariness rather than a fixed formality, but California, Colorado, Minnesota, North Dakota, and several case-law states attach distinct consequences to counsel access, waiver, or meaningful review time.
Support terms form a separate fault line. Iowa and New Mexico bar an adverse spousal-support term, South Dakota bars a premarital support waiver, and Louisiana does not permit advance waiver of interim support. Many UPAA states instead use a public-assistance floor; California counsel-gates support and tests the term at enforcement. Child support and custody remain judicial matters everywhere.
After marriage, the plurality rule is a both-signed writing without new consideration. Louisiana requires a court-supervised matrimonial-regime change, Minnesota routes the change through a specially protected postnuptial agreement, New Mexico recognizes a consistent mutual course of conduct, and several case-law states require fresh postmarriage consideration.
Why the dimensions stay separate
California uses a modified Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. It requires a signed writing, permits a written disclosure waiver, protects a party with a seven-day final-agreement review period, separately requires the counsel advisement at least seven days before signing, and makes a spousal-support term unenforceable against an uncounseled party. Cal. Fam. Code §§ 1611-1615.
Iowa also uses a uniform-act framework, but Iowa Code § 596.5(2) says a prenup may not adversely affect the right of a spouse or child to support. That is a substantive bar, not merely an execution defect. Iowa Code chapter 596.
Minnesota's state-specific statute requires full and fair disclosure that may not be waived, a meaningful opportunity for independent counsel, two witnesses, acknowledgment before an oath-authorized person, and signing at least seven days before marriage. It also tests substantive fairness for unconscionability caused by drastically changed, unforeseen circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 519.11.
Massachusetts illustrates the case-law lane. General Laws c. 209, § 25 supplies a written-property-contract statute, while DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. 18 (2002), applies the leading execution-time fairness inquiry and an enforcement- time “second look” for unconscionable hardship. DeMatteo v. DeMatteo.
These contrasts freeze the nine dimensions above. The table reports the rule and its source without pretending that every state has the same statutory architecture or that a facially complete form is automatically enforceable.
Get this answered for your state
This survey compares every state side by side. Ezel applies your state's law to your specific situation and answers with citations to the statutes.
Scroll sideways in the table to see all columns →
| State | Governing law and framework | Writing, signature, and effect | Execution formalities | Financial disclosure and waiver | Independent counsel and timing | Fairness standard and source | Spousal-support limits | Child and public-policy limits | Amendment and revocation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama verified 2026-07-30 | Ala. Code §§ 8-9-2, 30-4-9, and 43-8-72 plus the Allison/Barnhill case-law test; no comprehensive UPAA or UPMAA |
Agreement or memorandum expressing consideration must be written and subscribed by the party to be charged; both signatures support mutual enforcement; marriage supplies consideration (§ 8-9-2; Barnhill) |
No universal prenup-specific notary, acknowledgment, witness, oath, or recording requirement in the governing statutes or Allison/Barnhill cases |
Barnhill's second alternative requires knowledge of the estate interest and approximate value; general knowledge may suffice on the facts. A death-right waiver separately requires fair disclosure; no statutory written disclosure-waiver substitute (§ 43-8-72; Lemaster) |
Competent independent advice is an element of Barnhill's second alternative, not the first; no fixed statutory review period or wedding countdown (Brown) |
Case law — Allison/Barnhill: proponent must prove either adequate consideration plus an entirely fair, just, and equitable transaction, or voluntary execution with competent independent advice and full knowledge of the estate interest and approximate value; the tests are separate (Brown) |
A valid agreement may waive alimony and support, subject to the Allison/Barnhill test; Alabama has no statutory public-assistance override in these governing provisions (Barnhill; Brown) |
A child's support right cannot be waived by the parents; custody remains for the court under the child's best interests (Willis; § 30-3-152) |
A substantive oral modification has no effect when §§ 8-9-2 and 43-8-72 require writing; Harrison requires proof of mutual rescission and left open whether Barnhill always governs a postnuptial rescission (Lemaster; Harrison) |
| Alaska verified 2026-07-28 | Case-law framework under Brooks, Andrew B., and Kilkenny, plus Alaska's marriage-agreement Statute of Frauds; Alaska has not adopted UPMAA (AS § 09.25.010(a)(5)) |
Writing subscribed by the party charged; marriage itself supplies consideration; the contemplated marriage activates the bargain (AS § 09.25.010(a)(5); Andrew B.) |
No prenup-specific notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, or recording requirement for basic inter-party enforcement; writing and subscription are the statutory form rule (§ 09.25.010(a)) |
Material nondisclosure can defeat enforcement; no UPAA-style general prenup waiver checklist. A surviving-spouse rights waiver separately permits written waiver or adequate knowledge within § 13.12.213's combined test |
No fixed statutory review period or mandatory actual counsel; review time, meaningful ability/opportunity to consult independent counsel, and ability to understand are essential voluntariness factors (Andrew B.; Kilkenny) |
Case law — Andrew B. and Kilkenny require voluntary execution and examine procedural and substantive fairness, execution-time unconscionability, and changed circumstances making enforcement unfair/unreasonable; affected terms may be selectively struck |
A prenup may address prospective support, but the restriction remains subject to fairness review; Kilkenny upheld striking a support bar where domestic violence and changed circumstances made enforcement unfair/unreasonable |
Child support and custody remain with the court under just-and-proper support and best-interest statutes; domestic violence can make enforcement of otherwise valid terms unfair or unreasonable (§§ 25.24.150-.160; Kilkenny) |
No prenup-specific change statute; a later change is analyzed as a postnuptial contract under ordinary contract rules. Estate-right changes require a signed writing, and Lampert recognized a jointly made written amendment while treating material unilateral breach as rescission grounds (§ 13.12.213; Lampert) |
| Arizona verified 2026-07-27 | Arizona Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, A.R.S. §§ 25-201 to 25-205 |
Writing signed by both; no consideration; effective on marriage (§§ 25-201, 25-202(A)-(B)) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement for basic validity (§ 25-202(A)) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver or adequate knowledge can defeat the cumulative disclosure challenge (§ 25-202(C)(2)) |
No express independent-counsel, counsel-waiver, final-draft review, or pre-wedding waiting-period rule in §§ 25-201 to 25-205 |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; so does execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures; court decides unconscionability (§ 25-202(C), (E)) |
May modify or eliminate support; court may order enough support to avoid public-assistance eligibility at separation or dissolution (§§ 25-202(D), 25-203(A)(4)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; legal decision-making and parenting time remain court best-interest determinations; other terms cannot violate public policy or a criminal statute (§§ 25-203(A)(8), (B), 25-403) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both; no consideration; no notary or witness stated (§ 25-204) |
| Arkansas verified 2026-07-28 | Arkansas Premarital Agreement Act, Ark. Code §§ 9-11-401 to 9-11-412; uniform-act framework with state-specific acknowledgment options |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 9-11-402, 9-11-404) |
Both must acknowledge: authorized-officer declaration, respective-attorney sworn affirmations, notary-witnessed statutory counsel/understanding statement, or 2 disinterested witnesses (§ 9-11-402) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; written waiver only after consulting legal counsel, or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge, within the combined test (§ 9-11-406(a)(2)) |
No universal separate-counsel mandate or fixed review period; counsel is required for a disclosure waiver and built into 2 of 4 acknowledgment alternatives (§§ 9-11-402(b), 9-11-406(a)(2)(ii)) |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; alternatively, execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures defeats it; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 9-11-406) |
May modify or eliminate support, but the court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility (§§ 9-11-403(a)(4), 9-11-406(b)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; personal terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law, and custody remains a court best-interests decision (§§ 9-11-403, 9-13-101) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both parties; amendment or revocation needs no consideration (§ 9-11-405) |
| California verified 2026-07-27 | California Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, with state-specific counsel, timing, and support rules (Cal. Fam. Code §§ 1600-1617) |
Writing signed by both; no consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 1611, 1613) |
No notary or witnesses for basic validity; an agreement affecting real property may be acknowledged/proved and recorded (§§ 1611, 1502) |
Fair, reasonable, full disclosure; written express waiver or adequate knowledge can defeat the disclosure-based challenge (§ 1615(a)(2)) |
Counsel or separate written waiver; counsel advisement ≥7 days before signing; final agreement ≥7 days before signing regardless of counsel; extra writing for an unrepresented party (§ 1615(c)) |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; unconscionability at execution plus all three disclosure failures also defeats it; court decides unconscionability (§ 1615) |
Support term, including waiver, cannot be enforced against an uncounseled party and fails if unconscionable at enforcement (§ 1612(c)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; custody/visitation remain subject to court-determined best interests; no term may violate public policy or a criminal statute (§§ 1612, 3011, 3020) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both; no consideration required (§ 1614) |
| Colorado verified 2026-07-28 | Colorado Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (UPMAA), C.R.S. §§ 14-2-301 to -313; applies to agreements signed on/after July 1, 2014 (§§ 14-2-301, -303) |
Record signed by both parties; enforceable without consideration; effective on marriage (§§ 14-2-306, -307). A record may be tangible or retrievable electronic information (§ 14-2-302(7)-(8)) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or general recording requirement in the UPMAA; signed record by both parties is the form rule (§§ 14-2-306, -309(8)) |
Reasonably accurate description and good-faith value estimate of property, liabilities, and income, or adequate knowledge/reasonable basis for it. No financial-disclosure waiver; the separate conspicuous notice concerns waived marital rights (§ 14-2-309(3)-(4)) |
Access to independent representation is mandatory: reasonable time to decide, locate, obtain, and consider advice, plus ability to hire or other-party payment where the other party has counsel. No fixed day count; an unrepresented signer needs conspicuous waiver notice or plain-language explanation (§ 14-2-309(1)-(3)) |
Statute — involuntary consent/duress, no counsel access, missing unrepresented-party notice/explanation, or inadequate disclosure defeats enforcement; no general property-term unconscionability defense, but support/fee terms are tested for unconscionability at enforcement (§ 14-2-309) |
May modify or waive maintenance, but the term is unenforceable to the extent unconscionable when enforced; the court decides unconscionability as law. The same limit covers attorney-fee waiver/allocation (§§ 14-2-302(4), -309(5)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support, restrict domestic-violence remedies, change dissolution grounds, penalize filing, or violate public policy; custody/parenting terms do not bind the court (§ 14-2-310) |
Before marriage, an amendment remains a premarital agreement effective on marriage; after marriage, amendment/revocation is a marital agreement effective on both signatures. Signed record by both, no consideration, and full enforcement safeguards apply (§§ 14-2-302(1)-(2), (5), -306 to -309) |
| Connecticut verified 2026-07-28 | Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-36a to 46b-36j, applicable to agreements executed on or after October 1, 1995 |
Writing signed by both parties; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage unless the agreement provides otherwise (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-36c, 46b-36e) |
No statutory notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement; the Act's stated form is the signed writing (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36c) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure of the amount, character, and value of property, financial obligations, and income is independently required; the Act provides no waiver or adequate-knowledge substitute (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36g(a)(3)) |
A reasonable opportunity to consult independent counsel is required, but actual consultation is not; no fixed review or pre-wedding period applies (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36g(a)(4); Friezo) |
Statute — involuntary execution, unconscionability when executed or enforced, inadequate disclosure, or no reasonable counsel opportunity independently defeats enforcement; court decides unconscionability as law (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36g) |
May modify or eliminate support, but the term remains subject to enforcement-time unconscionability and a court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-36d(a)(4), 46b-36g(a)(2), (b)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; all child care, custody, visitation, and other child terms remain judicially reviewable/modifiable; no term may violate public policy or a criminal statute (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36d(b)-(c)) |
After marriage, only by a written agreement signed by the parties; amendment or revocation is enforceable without consideration (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36f) |
| Delaware verified 2026-07-28 | Delaware Premarital Agreement Act, 13 Del. C. §§ 321-330; UPAA-based Subchapter II enacted by 70 Del. Laws ch. 462 |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (13 Del. C. §§ 321-322, 324) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in Subchapter II; the statutory form is the signed writing (§ 322) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure, a voluntary express written waiver, or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge defeats the conjunctive disclosure challenge (§ 326(a)(2)) |
No statutory separate-counsel mandate, counsel waiver, final-draft review period, or pre-wedding countdown; voluntary execution remains independently required (§ 326(a)(1)) |
Statute — involuntary execution, or execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures, defeats enforcement; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 326) |
May modify or eliminate support or alimony; Subchapter II states no public-assistance override or separate enforcement-time support review (§§ 323(a)(4), 326) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; other terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law; custody remains for the court without a parental presumption (§§ 323, 701) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both parties; amendment or revocation needs no consideration and no statutory notary (§ 325) |
| District of Columbia verified 2026-07-28 | Uniform Premarital Agreement Act of 1995 for agreements executed on or after February 9, 1996 (D.C. Code §§ 46-501 to -510) |
Writing signed by both; no consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 46-501(3), 46-502, 46-504) |
No statutory notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, or recording requirement; writing and both signatures are the formalities (§ 46-502) |
Fair and reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge are alternatives within the combined unconscionability test (§ 46-506(a)(2)) |
No statutory independent-counsel/advisement requirement and no fixed final-draft or pre-wedding period; voluntary execution remains required (§§ 46-502, 46-506(a)(1)) |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures also defeats it; the court decides unconscionability (§ 46-506) |
May modify or eliminate support; court may order only enough support to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by the term at separation or dissolution (§§ 46-503(a)(4), 46-506(b)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; custody stays with the court under best interests; other terms cannot violate public policy or a criminal statute (§§ 46-503(a)(8), (b), 16-914) |
After marriage, only by a written agreement signed by both; amendment or revocation needs no consideration (§ 46-505) |
| Florida verified 2026-07-27 | Florida Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (Fla. Stat. § 61.079), with a 2026 constitutional floor for foreign/religious law and contract clauses (§ 2.05) |
Writing signed by both; marriage is the consideration; effective upon marriage (§ 61.079(3), (5)) |
No notary, witnesses, acknowledgment, or recording required by the UPAA; separate Probate Code formalities are preserved (§ 61.079(3), (10)) |
Fair and reasonable disclosure; written express waiver or adequate knowledge can defeat the disclosure-based challenge (§ 61.079(7)(a)3.) |
No express counsel, counsel-waiver form, review period, or pre-wedding waiting period; voluntary execution still required (§ 61.079(3), (7)) |
Statute — involuntary execution; fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; or unconscionability at execution plus all three disclosure failures defeats enforcement (§ 61.079(7)) |
May establish, modify, waive, or eliminate support; court may order enough support to avoid public-assistance eligibility (§ 61.079(4)(a)4., (7)(b)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; parenting remains court-best-interest work; terms cannot violate public policy/criminal law, and choice-law/forum clauses cannot infringe constitutional rights (§§ 61.079, 61.13, 2.05) |
After marriage, amendment, revocation, or abandonment only by a writing signed by both; no consideration required (§ 61.079(6)) |
| Georgia verified 2026-07-27 | State-specific O.C.G.A. §§ 19-3-60 to 19-3-66 plus the Scherer case-law enforceability test; not UPAA |
Writing signed by both; entered before marriage; marriage is valuable consideration; no separate effective-on-marriage clause (§§ 19-3-60, 19-3-62) |
At least 2 attesting witnesses; 1 must be a notary public; no recording requirement in current Article 3 (§ 19-3-62) |
Full and fair disclosure of material assets, income, and liabilities; actual familiarity may satisfy on the facts; no statutory written-waiver substitute (Blige; Dodson) |
Actual separate counsel is not mandatory, but the opposing party must have an opportunity to consult independent counsel and understand the terms; no fixed day count (Blige) |
Case law — Scherer/Dodson: no fraud, duress, mistake, material misrepresentation, or nondisclosure; not unconscionable; no changed circumstances making enforcement unfair and unreasonable |
Support may be waived; an enforceable waiver bars alimony and support, subject to the Scherer test (Vakharwala) |
Child support cannot be waived; custody remains a judge's best-interest decision; agreement cannot disable payment of existing just debts (§§ 19-3-60, 19-9-3; Swanson) |
No express amendment or revocation procedure in current Article 3 (§§ 19-3-60 to 19-3-66) |
| Hawaii verified 2026-07-28 | Hawaii Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, HRS ch. 572D; applies directly to current agreements and preserves otherwise-valid pre-July 1, 1987 writings (§§ 572D-10, 572D-11) |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (HRS §§ 572D-1, 572D-2, 572D-4) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in ch. 572D; the stated form is the signed writing (§ 572D-2) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver, or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge, within the combined test (§ 572D-6(a)(2)) |
No counsel mandate or fixed review period; counsel opportunity, wedding proximity or surprise, bargaining power, disclosure, and understanding are voluntariness factors (LO v. NO) |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; alternatively, execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures defeats it; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 572D-6) |
May modify or eliminate support, but the court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility (§§ 572D-3(a)(4), 572D-6(b)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; personal terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law, and custody remains a court best-interests decision (§§ 572D-3, 571-46) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both parties; no notary is stated, and amendment or revocation needs no consideration (§ 572D-5) |
| Idaho verified 2026-07-28 | Idaho Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Idaho Code §§ 32-921 to 32-929, incorporating marriage-settlement §§ 32-917 to 32-919 |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 32-921, 32-922, 32-924) |
Initial agreement must be acknowledged or proved like a land conveyance; record if it grants or affects real estate (§§ 32-917 to 32-919, 32-922) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver, or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge, within the combined test (§ 32-925(1)(b)) |
No separate-counsel mandate, counsel advisement/waiver form, final-draft review period, or fixed pre-wedding signing period in the Act |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; alternatively, execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures defeats it; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 32-925) |
May modify or eliminate support, but the court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility (§§ 32-923(1)(d), 32-925(2)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; personal terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law, and custody remains a court best-interests decision (§§ 32-923, 32-717) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both parties; no repeat acknowledgment is stated, and amendment or revocation needs no consideration (§ 32-924) |
| Illinois verified 2026-07-27 | Illinois Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), 750 ILCS 10/1-11 |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (750 ILCS 10/2-5) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, or recording requirement in 750 ILCS 10/3 |
Unconscionability challenge also requires no fair/reasonable disclosure, no express voluntary written waiver, and no actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge (750 ILCS 10/7(a)(2)) |
No express independent-counsel, counsel-waiver, final-draft review, or pre-wedding waiting-period rule in the Act |
Statute — involuntary execution, or execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures; unconscionability is for the court (750 ILCS 10/7(a), (c)) |
May modify or eliminate support, but court may order enough to avoid undue hardship caused by unforeseeable circumstances (750 ILCS 10/4(a)(4), 10/7(b)) |
Cannot adversely affect a child's support; other terms cannot violate public policy or a criminal-penalty statute; parental decisions remain child-best-interest matters (750 ILCS 10/4; 750 ILCS 5/602.5) |
After marriage, only by a written agreement signed by both; no consideration required (750 ILCS 10/6) |
| Indiana verified 2026-07-28 | Indiana Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, with a state-specific two-ground enforcement test (Ind. Code ch. 31-11-3) |
Writing signed by both; no consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 31-11-3-4, -6) |
No notary, witness, acknowledgment, or recording formality in Chapter 3 for basic inter-party enforceability (§ 31-11-3-4) |
No statutory fair-disclosure, written-waiver, or adequate-knowledge checklist; financial knowledge and bargaining conditions may bear on unconscionability (§ 31-11-3-8; Harrill) |
No statutory counsel or fixed review/pre-wedding period; counsel, review time, and bargaining conditions are case factors (Harrill) |
Statute — challenger must prove involuntary execution or unconscionability when signed; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 31-11-3-8) |
Maintenance may be modified/eliminated, but court may award only what avoids extreme hardship from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at signing (§§ 31-11-3-5, -8(b)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; custody remains a court best-interests decision; other terms cannot violate public policy or a criminal statute (§§ 31-11-3-5, 31-17-2-8) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both; no consideration required (§ 31-11-3-7) |
| Iowa verified 2026-07-28 | Iowa Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Iowa Code ch. 596; applies to agreements executed on or after Jan. 1, 1992 (§§ 596.3, 596.12) |
Writing signed by both prospective spouses; marriage is the only consideration required; effective upon marriage (§§ 596.4, 596.6) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in chapter 596; the stated form is the signed writing (§ 596.4) |
Fair/reasonable property-and-obligation disclosure or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge; chapter 596 provides no disclosure-waiver substitute (§§ 596.7(2)(c), 596.8(1)(c)) |
No statutory separate-counsel mandate, counsel waiver, final-draft review period, or pre-wedding countdown; voluntariness remains independently required (§ 596.8) |
Statute — involuntary execution, execution-time unconscionability, or inadequate disclosure plus no adequate knowledge independently defeats enforcement; court decides unconscionability as law (§§ 596.8-596.9) |
A prenup may not adversely affect a spouse's right to support; a waiver or limitation is ineffective to the extent it does so (§ 596.5(2)) |
May not adversely affect a child's support right; personal terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law, and custody remains a court best-interests decision (§§ 596.5, 598.41) |
Current chapter 596 states no amendment mechanism; after marriage, mutual revocation requires both spouses' signed writing, while unilateral revocation requires proof of a § 596.7 ground (§ 596.7) |
| Kansas verified 2026-07-28 | Kansas Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, K.S.A. §§ 23-2401 to 23-2411; uniform-act framework |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 23-2402, 23-2403, 23-2405) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, or recording requirement in the Act (§ 23-2403) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver, or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge, within the combined test (§ 23-2407(a)(2)) |
No separate-counsel mandate, counsel advisement/waiver form, final-draft review period, or fixed pre-wedding signing period in the Act |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; alternatively, execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures defeats it; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 23-2407) |
May modify or eliminate support, but the court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility (§§ 23-2404(a)(4), 23-2407(b)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; other personal terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law, and custody remains a court best-interests decision (§§ 23-2404, 23-3201) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both parties; amendment or revocation needs no consideration (§ 23-2406) |
| Kentucky verified 2026-07-28 | Case-law framework, not UPAA/UPMAA: Statute of Frauds KRS 371.010(5), valid-agreement property exclusion KRS 403.190(2)(d), and Gentry/Edwardson |
Writing signed by the party to be charged; both signatures for mutual enforcement. Made in consideration of marriage and enforced at death or dissolution according to its terms (KRS 371.010(5); Gentry) |
No universal notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording step; the baseline form is the signed writing required by KRS 371.010 |
Full disclosure free of material omission or misrepresentation; the agreement's proponent bears the disclosure burden. No statutory disclosure-waiver substitute (Edwardson; Lawson) |
No codified separate-counsel, advisement, waiver, final-draft, or pre-wedding waiting period; voluntariness, fraud, duress, and understanding remain fact-specific under Gentry/Edwardson |
Case law — Gentry asks fraud/duress/mistake or material misrepresentation/nondisclosure, execution-time unconscionability, and changed circumstances making enforcement unfair/unreasonable; Lane applies the enforcement-time second look |
Property and maintenance may be covered, but a court may modify or invalidate a maintenance waiver that is unconscionable in application after changed circumstances (Edwardson; Lane) |
Child support, custody, and visitation are not controlled by a prenup; support remains guideline/court controlled and custody remains a best-interests decision (Edwardson; KRS 403.211, 403.270) |
No prenup-specific Kentucky amendment/revocation statute or UPAA no-consideration shortcut; post-marriage changes require separate contract and family-law analysis |
| Louisiana verified 2026-07-28 | Louisiana Civil Code matrimonial-agreement scheme, not UPAA/UPMAA: arts. 2328-2332, with ordinary contract rules |
Written nominate contract executed by both prospective spouses; all required signing and acknowledgment must be perfected before marriage to have prenuptial effect (arts. 2328, 2331; Acurio) |
Either authentic act (notary + 2 witnesses + all signatures) or private act duly acknowledged before a court/notary/authorized officer in 2 witnesses' presence; complete before wedding (arts. 1833, 1836, 2331) |
No prenup-specific disclosure schedule or waiver in arts. 2328-2332; ordinary error/fraud/duress and free-consent rules remain available (arts. 1948, 2031; McAlpine) |
No independent-counsel mandate, advisement, fixed review period, or minimum wedding interval; Acurio requires every form step, including acknowledgment, before marriage |
Case law — McAlpine applies ordinary contract rescission grounds: capacity, consent, error, fraud, and duress. Louisiana has no separate UPAA unconscionability or enforcement-time changed-circumstances test |
Final support may be waived by authentic act or acknowledged private act (art. 116; McAlpine); interim support may not be waived or contractually capped (art. 98; Hall/Holliday) |
Custody remains a best-interest decision and child support remains modifiable (arts. 131, 142). Terms also cannot violate public policy or alter the marital portion, succession order, or specified third-person community rights (arts. 2329-2330) |
After marriage, use art. 2331 form plus a joint petition and court finding of best interests and informed understanding to modify/terminate the regime; limited art. 2329 exceptions apply for returning to the legal regime and a new Louisiana domicile's first year |
| Maine verified 2026-07-28 | Maine Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19-A M.R.S. §§ 601-611; official chapter current through Oct. 1, 2025 |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (19-A M.R.S. §§ 602-603, 605) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in chapter 21; the statutory form is the signed writing (§ 603) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure, a voluntary express written waiver, or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge defeats the conjunctive disclosure challenge (§ 608(1)(B)) |
No statutory separate-counsel mandate, counsel waiver, final-draft review period, or pre-wedding countdown; voluntary execution remains independently required (§ 608(1)(A)) |
Statute — involuntary execution, or execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures, defeats enforcement; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 608) |
May modify or eliminate support, but the court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility (§§ 604(4), 608(2)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; other terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law; custody remains a best-interests decision (Riemann; §§ 604, 1653) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both parties; amendment or revocation needs no consideration and no statutory notary (§ 607) |
| Maryland verified 2026-07-28 | Case-law framework, not UPAA/UPMAA: Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-901, Family Law §§ 8-101 and 8-103, Estates & Trusts § 3-406, and Cannon v. Cannon as applied in Stewart v. Stewart |
Writing signed by the party to be charged; both signatures for mutual enforcement. Marriage itself is sufficient consideration and supplies the contemplated transaction (§ 5-901; Stewart/Cannon) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or general recording requirement in the governing prenup rules. A death-right waiver must be written and signed by the waiving party (Est. & Trusts § 3-406) |
Full, frank, truthful disclosure or adequate knowledge of the assets and their aggregate worth can establish no overreaching. No statutory disclosure-waiver form; if both disclosure and knowledge are lacking and the bargain is disproportionate, the proponent must pass Cannon's two-prong test |
Separate counsel is not mandatory and Maryland rejects a bright-line counsel rule; a meaningful opportunity to seek counsel without discouragement favors enforcement. No fixed final-draft or pre-wedding period; Stewart upheld a four-day signing on its facts, not as a safe harbor |
Case law — Cannon/Stewart: proponent must show no overreaching in the presumed confidential relationship; absent disclosure/knowledge, ask whether the benefit was commensurate and the challenger signed freely and understandingly. Unconscionability requires procedural and substantive unfairness and is measured at execution |
May expressly waive alimony/spousal support or make it nonmodifiable; § 8-103 otherwise permits modification. No statutory public-assistance or enforcement-time hardship override, but the agreement and term remain subject to execution-time validity and public-policy review |
Court may modify any agreement term on a minor child's care, custody, education, or support when modification serves the child's best interests; courts retain custody, visitation, and support jurisdiction (§§ 8-103(a), 1-201) |
No prenup-specific change statute. A post-marriage change enters the marital-agreement lane under § 8-101 and separate postnuptial validity review; any continued elective-share waiver must be in a signed writing under Est. & Trusts § 3-406 |
| Massachusetts verified 2026-07-27 | Narrow property-contract and Statute of Frauds provisions plus DeMatteo case law; Massachusetts has no comprehensive UPAA (G.L. c. 209, §§ 25-26; c. 259, § 1) |
Written; signed by the party to be charged; made in consideration of marriage; statutory property limitations take effect at marriage (c. 209, § 25; c. 259, § 1) |
No notary or witness for basic inter-party enforcement; property schedule plus recording before marriage or within 90 days is required for effect beyond parties, heirs, and personal representatives (c. 209, § 26) |
Full/fair disclosure sufficient for an informed decision, or actual/constructive independent knowledge; waiver of marital rights must be set forth; no UPAA-style disclosure-waiver rule (DeMatteo, 436 Mass. at 26-29) |
No fixed counsel or waiting-period statute; DeMatteo treats independent counsel and adequate review time as meaningful-waiver factors; Austin enforced an agreement signed 2 days before marriage |
Case law — DeMatteo requires fair/reasonable terms, disclosure or knowledge, and stated waiver at execution, then a second-look unconscionability test at divorce (436 Mass. 18) |
Alimony waiver is permitted, but the second look bars enforcement if later circumstances leave the spouse without sufficient property, maintenance, or suitable work for support (Austin, 445 Mass. 601) |
Child support remains guideline- and best-interest-controlled and modifiable despite an agreement; custody remains for the court under child welfare and best interests (G.L. c. 208, §§ 28, 31) |
No prenup-specific change statute; a post-marriage change must qualify as an enforceable marital agreement under Ansin's counsel-opportunity, no-fraud/coercion, full-disclosure, written-waiver, and fairness criteria |
| Michigan verified 2026-07-27 | Narrow MCL 557.28 and 566.132 statutes plus Benker/Reed/Allard case law; not UPAA or UPMAA |
Writing signed by the party to be charged; marriage is sufficient consideration; a contemplated-marriage property contract remains in force after marriage (MCL 566.132(1)(c), 557.28; Benker) |
No universal notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in the governing statute or Reed test |
Fair disclosure and informed understanding are required; material nondisclosure can void; no UPAA-style statutory waiver or adequate-knowledge substitute (Benker; Reed; MCL 700.2205 for surviving-spouse waivers) |
Independent counsel is not required if the fairness rules are satisfied; its absence can matter to disclosure and understanding; no fixed review or pre-wedding period (Reed; Benker) |
Case law — Reed/Rinvelt: fraud, duress, mistake, material misrepresentation or nondisclosure; unconscionability when executed; or unforeseeable changed circumstances making enforcement unfair and unreasonable; challenger bears the burden |
May be addressed as a property-related term, but cannot deprive the court of equitable discretion under MCL 552.23(1); a contrary restraint is void against statute and public policy (Allard) |
Parents cannot bargain away child support or the court's custody authority; formula deviations need statutory findings and custody uses court-determined best interests; MCL 552.23/552.401 equitable authority also cannot be stripped (MCL 552.605, 722.23; Allard) |
No express prenup-specific amendment or revocation procedure in MCL 557.28 or 566.132; the original remains in force, while a surviving-spouse-rights waiver may be signed before or after marriage after fair disclosure (MCL 700.2205) |
| Minnesota verified 2026-07-28 | State-specific Minn. Stat. § 519.11, not UPAA/UPMAA; current rewritten framework applies to agreements executed on/after Aug. 1, 2024 (§ 519.11, subds. 1, 6) |
Written antenuptial agreement made before marriage; marriage is adequate consideration. Both parties execute under the two-witness/acknowledgment rule; marital rights operate through the ensuing marriage (§ 519.11, subds. 1(a), 1(c), 1b(b)(3)) |
Writing; executed in presence of 2 witnesses; acknowledged by both parties before an oath-authorized person. Power of attorney cannot satisfy execution; no general recording requirement (§ 519.11, subd. 1b(b)(3), (d)) |
Full and fair disclosure of each party's current income and property: material income facts, good-faith property-value estimates, and the basis. Disclosure may not be waived (§ 519.11, subd. 1b(a)-(b)(1)) |
Meaningful opportunity for independent counsel of each party's choosing; actual retention not required for the prenup. Procedural-fairness floor is 7 days: at least 7 days creates an enforceability presumption; less shifts the burden to the proponent (§ 519.11, subd. 1b(b)(2), (5), (c)) |
Statute — procedural fairness under subd. 1b plus substantive unconscionability from the terms or drastically changed, originally unforeseen circumstances that defeat reasonable expectations; deviation from ordinary property/support law alone is insufficient (§ 519.11, subd. 1c) |
May provide for maintenance, including a waiver, but the term remains subject to execution- and enforcement-time substantive-fairness review; no separate statutory public-assistance override (§ 519.11, subds. 1(b)(2), 1c) |
Section 519.11 authorizes property, maintenance, and estate terms, not binding child terms. Court determines custody, parenting time, and support, with custody/parenting governed by the child's best interests (§§ 519.11, subd. 1(b); 518.17, subds. 1, 3) |
After marriage, only through a valid postnuptial agreement: prenup formalities/fairness except the 7-day wedding rule, actual separate counsel for each spouse, and a 2-year dissolution/separation presumption. Later postnup needed for further change (§ 519.11, subds. 1d, 2a) |
| Mississippi verified 2026-07-28 | Miss. Code § 15-3-1 plus Sanderson case law; Mississippi has no comprehensive UPAA or UPMAA |
Writing or memorandum signed by the party to be charged; both signatures support mutual enforcement; marriage supplies consideration and the contemplated bargain operates upon marriage (§ 15-3-1; Estate of Bell) |
No universal notary or witness rule; acknowledgment/proof and recording protect a marriage settlement against creditors and later purchasers, but an unrecorded instrument remains binding between the parties and heirs (§ 89-5-3) |
Full financial disclosure, or independent knowledge of the other's financial state; no UPAA-style written waiver route is stated (Sanderson I, 170 So. 3d at 435) |
No mandatory separate counsel or fixed review period; counsel opportunity, review time, education, explanation, and understanding are procedural-fairness factors (Sanderson I; Farris) |
Case law — Sanderson requires voluntary execution and disclosure or independent knowledge, plus substantive-unconscionability review of the terms and circumstances when made, not changed results at divorce (170 So. 3d 430; 245 So. 3d 421) |
A mutual support or alimony waiver may be enforced; it remains subject to the same execution-time procedural and substantive conscionability rules, not a general enforcement-time hardship rewrite (Sanderson II) |
Parents cannot contract away a child's vested support rights; custody remains for the court under the child's best interests (Calton; §§ 43-19-101, 93-5-24) |
No prenup-specific change statute; because the prenup is a contract, a change or cancellation requires mutual assent, and a signed writing avoids the statute-of-frauds defect that defeats an oral prenup (Estate of Bell; § 15-3-1; Hankins) |
| Missouri verified 2026-07-28 | No UPAA; marriage-contract statutes plus Missouri's case-law validity/conscionability test (Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 451.220-.240; Penrod) |
Writing signed by the party charged—both signatures for mutual enforcement; made in consideration of and conditioned on the contemplated marriage (§ 432.010) |
Acknowledge by each party OR prove by ≥1 subscribing witness; record with certificate in each county containing affected property for third-party notice (§§ 451.220-.240) |
Full disclosure of nature/extent sufficient for a meaningful waiver; exact-to-the-penny detail unnecessary; knowledge can support an acknowledged waiver (Penrod; McMullin) |
No mandatory counsel or fixed review/pre-wedding period; access to counsel, revision time, and relative bargaining positions are factors (Penrod) |
Case law — free, fair, knowing, understanding, good-faith execution with full disclosure; procedural and substantive unconscionability, including no total deprivation of presumed marital-property rights (Penrod) |
Maintenance may be waived if the agreement passes Missouri's validity and conscionability tests; no separate statutory counsel or public-assistance exception (Gould; Penrod) |
Child support remains a court order based on statutory factors; custody remains a court best-interests decision (§§ 452.340, 452.375) |
No prenup-specific change statute; a post-marriage property change is tested as a postnuptial agreement under the same validity rules and fair-consideration requirement (Bell; §§ 451.220-.240) |
| Montana verified 2026-07-28 | Montana Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, MCA §§ 40-2-601 to 40-2-610; current Montana Code Annotated 2025 |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (MCA §§ 40-2-603, 40-2-604, 40-2-606) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in part 6; the statutory form is the signed writing (§ 40-2-604) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure, a voluntary express written waiver, or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge defeats the conjunctive disclosure challenge (§ 40-2-608(1)(b)) |
No statutory separate-counsel mandate, counsel waiver, final-draft review period, or pre-wedding countdown; voluntary execution remains independently required (§ 40-2-608(1)(a)) |
Statute — involuntary execution, or execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures, defeats enforcement; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 40-2-608) |
May modify or eliminate support, but the court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility (§§ 40-2-605(1)(d), 40-2-608(2)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; other terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law; the court sets parenting by the child's best interest (§§ 40-2-605, 40-4-212) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both parties; amendment or revocation needs no consideration and no statutory notary (§ 40-2-607) |
| Nebraska verified 2026-07-28 | Nebraska Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-1001 to 42-1011; applies to agreements executed on or after July 16, 1994 |
Writing signed by both; made in contemplation of marriage and effective upon marriage; § 42-1003 has no express no-consideration clause (§§ 42-1002, 42-1003, 42-1005) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in the Act; the stated form is the signed writing (§ 42-1003) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver, or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge, within the combined test (§ 42-1006(1)(b)) |
No counsel mandate or fixed review period; counsel opportunity and wedding proximity or surprise are voluntariness factors (Mamot annotation to § 42-1006) |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; alternatively, execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures defeats it; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 42-1006) |
May modify or eliminate temporary and permanent support; public-assistance floor applies, and litigation-funding authority remains (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-1004, 42-1006; Edwards) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; personal terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law, and custody remains a court-approved best-interests decision (§§ 42-1004, 42-364) |
No Act provision creates an amendment or revocation route; ordinary postnuptial property agreements not concurrent with separation or divorce are void (Devney) |
| Nevada verified 2026-07-28 | Nevada Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, NRS ch. 123A; current official text remains the 1989 enactment |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (NRS 123A.040, 123A.060) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in ch. 123A; the statutory form is the signed writing (NRS 123A.040) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge can defeat the three-part disclosure challenge (NRS 123A.080(1)(c)) |
No statutory separate-counsel mandate, counsel waiver, final-draft review period, or pre-wedding countdown; voluntary execution remains independently required (NRS 123A.080(1)(a)) |
Statute — involuntary execution, execution-time unconscionability, or all three disclosure failures independently defeats enforcement; court decides unconscionability as law (NRS 123A.080) |
May modify or eliminate alimony/support, but the court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility (NRS 123A.050(1)(d), 123A.080(2)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; personal terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law, and physical custody remains a court best-interests decision (NRS 123A.050, 125C.0035) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both parties; amendment or revocation needs no consideration (NRS 123A.070) |
| New Hampshire verified 2026-07-28 | State-specific written-contract statute, RSA 460:2-a, plus Hollett-Wilber case law; not a UPAA framework |
Written interspousal contract made in contemplation of marriage; RSA 460:2-a states no signature, separate-consideration, or effective-upon-marriage formula |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement stated in RSA 460:2-a |
Material misrepresentation or nondisclosure can invalidate; no separate disclosure document is automatically required, and independent knowledge may matter (Hollett; Wilber) |
No fixed statutory period or universal counsel mandate; Wilber permits contracting without counsel, but Hollett requires meaningful time and held one day insufficient on its facts |
Case law — presumed valid unless fraud/duress/mistake or material misrepresentation/nondisclosure, unconscionability, or substantially changed facts make enforcement improper (Yannalfo; Hollett; Wilber) |
Alimony waivers are reviewed under the full case-law test, including voluntariness, material disclosure, unconscionability, and changed circumstances (Hollett) |
May not abrogate minor children's statutory or common-law rights; support agreements remain under guidelines and court findings, and parenting remains a best-interests decision (RSA 460:2-a; RSA 458-C:4; RSA 461-A:6) |
After marriage, use an enforceable postnuptial agreement; Wilber requires contract formation and fairness, while RSA 460:2-a supplies no prenup-specific notary formula |
| New Jersey verified 2026-07-27 | Uniform Premarital and Pre-Civil Union Agreement Act, N.J.S.A. 37:2-31 to 37:2-41; New Jersey's modified UPAA |
Writing with an attached statement of assets, signed by both; no consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 37:2-33, 37:2-36) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement; the attached asset statement is mandatory (§ 37:2-33) |
Attached asset statement plus full/fair disclosure of earnings, property, and financial obligations; further disclosure may be expressly waived in writing, and adequate knowledge is separately relevant (§§ 37:2-33, 37:2-38(c)) |
Independent counsel or a voluntary express written waiver of the opportunity; no fixed final-draft review or pre-wedding waiting period (§ 37:2-38(c)(4)) |
Statute — clear-and-convincing proof of involuntary execution or execution-time unconscionability tied to § 37:2-38(c)'s disclosure/knowledge/counsel failures for agreements entered or revised on/after June 27, 2013; older agreements retain enforcement-time unconscionability |
May modify or eliminate support; post-June 27, 2013 agreements have no general enforcement-time hardship/public-charge override in the Act, but remain subject to execution-time § 37:2-38 and public policy (§ 37:2-34(d), (h)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; custody remains governed by the child's best interests; other personal terms cannot violate public policy (§§ 37:2-34(h), 37:2-35; Sacharow) |
After marriage, only by a written agreement signed by both; no consideration; no notary, witness, or attached-statement requirement stated for the change document (§ 37:2-37) |
| New Mexico verified 2026-07-28 | New Mexico Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, NMSA 1978 §§ 40-3A-1 to 40-3A-10; modified uniform-act framework |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 40-3A-2, 40-3A-3, 40-3A-5) |
Both parties must acknowledge the agreement; the Act states no witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement (§ 40-3A-3) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver, or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge, within the combined test (§ 40-3A-7(A)(2)) |
No separate-counsel mandate, counsel advisement/waiver form, final-draft review period, or fixed pre-wedding signing period in the Act |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; alternatively, execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures defeats it; court decides both voluntariness and unconscionability as law (§ 40-3A-7) |
A prenup may not adversely affect a spouse's right to support; Rivera invalidated a support waiver as contrary to § 40-3A-4(B)'s public policy |
May not adversely affect child support, custody or visitation, either party's choice of abode, or career freedom; other terms cannot violate public policy (§ 40-3A-4; § 40-4-9.1(D)) |
After marriage, by a writing signed and acknowledged by both or by a consistent mutual course of conduct evidencing the change; no consideration (§ 40-3A-6) |
| New York verified 2026-07-27 | State-specific agreement statute, not UPAA: N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(3) |
Writing subscribed by both; may be made before marriage; no separate consideration or effective-on-marriage rule stated (§ 236(B)(3)) |
Deed-style acknowledgment or proof required; notary is one authorized officer, and a premarriage acknowledgment may be before an authorized marriage solemnizer; no separate witness count (§ 236(B)(3); R.P.L. § 298) |
No express premarital disclosure or disclosure-waiver formula in § 236(B)(3); statutory fairness and final-judgment unconscionability govern covered relationship terms |
No express independent-counsel, counsel-waiver, final-draft review, or pre-wedding waiting-period rule in § 236(B)(3) |
Statute — maintenance and other marriage-relationship terms must be fair and reasonable when made and not unconscionable at final judgment (§ 236(B)(3)) |
May set maintenance amount and duration; term must be fair/reasonable when made and not unconscionable at final judgment (§ 236(B)(3)) |
Custody, care, education, and child-maintenance terms are subject to § 240; court considers the child's best interests (§§ 236(B)(3), 240(1)(a)) |
Modification or discharge only by a writing subscribed and acknowledged/proved with the same deed-recording formality (§ 236(B)(3)) |
| North Carolina verified 2026-07-27 | Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 52B |
Writing signed by both; no consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 52B-2, 52B-3, 52B-5) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement for basic validity (§ 52B-3) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver or adequate knowledge can defeat the cumulative disclosure challenge (§ 52B-7(a)(2)) |
No express independent-counsel, counsel-waiver, final-draft review, or pre-wedding waiting-period rule in Chapter 52B |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; so does unconscionability at execution plus all three disclosure failures; court decides unconscionability (§ 52B-7) |
May modify or eliminate support; court may order enough support to avoid public-assistance eligibility if dependency and support statutes are met (§§ 52B-4, 52B-7(b)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; custody remains a court best-interest decision; other terms cannot violate public policy or a criminal statute (§§ 52B-4, 50-13.2) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both; no consideration required (§ 52B-6) |
| North Dakota verified 2026-07-28 | Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act for agreements signed after July 31, 2013; earlier agreements keep prior law (N.D.C.C. ch. 14-03.2) |
Record signed by both; no consideration; effective upon marriage; electronic records/signatures recognized (§§ 14-03.2-01, -05, -06, -11) |
No notary, witness, acknowledgment, or recording requirement; a record and both signatures are the formation rule (§ 14-03.2-05) |
Reasonably accurate description + good-faith value estimate; separate signed waiver or adequate knowledge is an alternative (§ 14-03.2-08(4)) |
Access to independent representation required: reasonable time to decide, locate counsel, get and consider advice; uncounseled party also needs conspicuous waiver notice or plain-language explanation (§ 14-03.2-08(1)-(3)) |
Statute — involuntary consent/duress, no counsel access, missing uncounseled notice/explanation, or inadequate disclosure defeats enforcement; term-level unconscionability at signing or substantial hardship after material change (§ 14-03.2-08) |
May modify or eliminate support; court may order enough to avoid public-assistance eligibility, and term remains subject to unconscionability/hardship review (§ 14-03.2-08(5)-(7)) |
Cannot harm child support, bind parenting decisions, restrict domestic-violence remedies, change dissolution grounds, or penalize filing (§ 14-03.2-09) |
Modification or revocation is an amendment; after marriage it is a marital agreement requiring a record signed by both, without consideration (§§ 14-03.2-01, -05) |
| Ohio verified 2026-07-27 | Case-law framework: Gross v. Gross and Fletcher v. Fletcher; writing under R.C. 1335.05; not UPAA |
Agreement or memorandum must be written and signed by the party to be charged; made upon consideration of marriage; no separate statutory effective-on-marriage clause (R.C. 1335.05) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, or recording requirement in R.C. 1335.05 or the Gross/Fletcher validity test |
Full disclosure OR full knowledge/understanding of nature, value, and extent; no statutory written-waiver formula; disproportion shifts disclosure burden to proponent (Gross; Fletcher) |
Meaningful opportunity for independent counsel required when agreement is disproportionate; no fixed day count, but eve-of-wedding timing can presume overreaching if postponement would cause significant hardship, embarrassment, or emotional stress (Fletcher) |
Case law — Gross/Fletcher: free of fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; full disclosure/knowledge; terms cannot promote divorce or profiteering by divorce |
Support term may be challenged as unconscionable at divorce based on materially changed circumstances, guided by R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) factors (Gross; Vanderbilt) |
Court allocates parental rights by the child's best interests and calculates child support under Chapter 3119; prenup terms also cannot promote divorce (R.C. 3109.04; 3119.02; Gross) |
After marriage, spouses may modify or terminate only by both-signed writing, free execution, full disclosure/knowledge, and no divorce promotion; consideration unnecessary (R.C. 3103.06(A)(2), 3103.061) |
| Oklahoma verified 2026-07-28 | Case-law framework, not UPAA/UPMAA: 15 O.S. § 136 writing rule, 43 O.S. § 121 property recognition, and the Burgess/Griffin enforceability cases |
Writing subscribed by the party to be charged; both prospective spouses should sign for mutual enforcement. Marriage ordinarily supplies consideration, and the agreement operates if the contemplated marriage occurs (15 O.S. § 136; Burgess; Meyers) |
No universal notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement for the ordinary prenup; the baseline is the subscribed writing in 15 O.S. § 136 |
Disjunctive Burgess alternatives: fair/reasonable provision, full/fair/frank disclosure, or the challenger’s generally accurate knowledge. No statutory disclosure-waiver form substitutes for that test |
No codified separate-counsel mandate, written counsel waiver, final-draft review period, or pre-wedding countdown; voluntariness, knowledge, fraud, duress, coercion, and overreaching remain fact-specific |
Case law — Burgess requires at least one of fair/reasonable provision, full/fair/frank disclosure, or generally accurate knowledge, and permits avoidance for fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; Griffin applies the disjunctive test and burden rules |
A valid agreement may waive alimony or support; Griffin reversed support and property awards that contradicted an enforceable waiver. Oklahoma has no UPAA public-assistance or enforcement-time support override |
Child support remains subject to the statutory guideline presumption and custody to the court’s best-interests decision. Probate-homestead and family-allowance waivers require Meyers specificity/voluntariness conditions and cannot prejudice minor or dependent children |
No Oklahoma prenup-specific amendment/revocation statute or UPAA no-consideration shortcut; a post-marriage change requires separate contract/family-law analysis under 43 O.S. §§ 204-205 and the agreement’s terms |
| Oregon verified 2026-07-28 | Oregon Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (ORS 108.700-108.740) |
Writing signed by both; no consideration; effective upon marriage (ORS 108.705, 108.715) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in the Act; basic validity is the signed writing (ORS 108.705) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure; voluntary express written waiver or adequate knowledge can defeat the disclosure-based challenge (ORS 108.725(1)(b)) |
No statutory separate-counsel, counsel-waiver, final-draft, or pre-wedding waiting period; voluntariness remains independently required (ORS 108.725(1)(a)) |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; alternatively, execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures defeats it; court decides unconscionability as law (ORS 108.725) |
May modify or eliminate support, but a court may order enough support to avoid resulting public- or medical-assistance eligibility at separation/dissolution (ORS 108.710(1)(d), 108.725(2)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; personal-rights terms cannot violate public policy or a criminal statute; custody remains a court best-interests decision (ORS 108.710, 107.137) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both; no consideration required (ORS 108.720) |
| Pennsylvania verified 2026-07-27 | State-specific enforceability statute, not a complete UPAA enactment: 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3105-3106 |
Effective upon marriage; § 3106 assumes execution but states no general signed-writing or extra-consideration formula; a disclosure waiver must be in writing (§ 3106(a)(2)(ii), (b)) |
No express notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, or recording requirement in § 3106 |
Fair/reasonable disclosure OR adequate knowledge defeats the cumulative nondisclosure challenge; waiver must be express, voluntary, and written (§ 3106(a)(2)) |
No express independent-counsel, counsel-waiver, final-draft review, or pre-wedding waiting-period rule in § 3106 |
Statute — challenger must prove by clear and convincing evidence either involuntary execution or the cumulative disclosure failure (§ 3106(a)) |
Alimony and alimony-pendente-lite provisions generally are not court-modifiable unless the agreement says otherwise; § 3106 adds no support-specific safeguard (§ 3105(c)) |
Child support, visitation, and custody terms remain court-modifiable; support follows the statewide guideline and custody follows the child's best interests (§§ 3105(b), 4322, 5328) |
No express prenup amendment or revocation form in §§ 3105-3106 |
| Rhode Island verified 2026-07-28 | Rhode Island Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-17-1 to 15-17-11; original 1987 state-specific UPAA wording |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 15-17-1, 15-17-2, 15-17-4) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in chapter 15-17; the statutory form is the signed writing (§ 15-17-2) |
Clear-and-convincing challenge requires no fair disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver, and no actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge, plus the other § 15-17-6(a) elements |
No statutory separate-counsel mandate, counsel waiver, final-draft review period, or pre-wedding countdown; involuntary execution is one required element (§ 15-17-6(a)-(b)) |
Statute — clear and convincing proof of involuntary execution AND execution-time unconscionability plus all three disclosure failures; court decides unconscionability as law (§ 15-17-6) |
May modify or eliminate support, but the court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility (§§ 15-17-3(a)(4), 15-17-6(c)) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; other terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law; custody remains a court best-interests decision (§§ 15-17-3, 15-5-16) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both parties; amendment or revocation needs no consideration and no statutory notary (§ 15-17-5) |
| South Carolina verified 2026-07-28 | Case-law framework, not UPAA/UPMAA: Statute of Frauds § 32-3-10(3), property exclusion/presumption § 20-3-630(A)(4), and Hardee v. Hardee's enforceability test |
Writing signed by the party to be charged; both signatures for mutual enforcement. Marriage itself is consideration, and the agreement becomes effective only upon marriage (§ 32-3-10(3); Holler/Lawton) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or general recording requirement in the governing statute/cases; the baseline form is a signed writing (§ 32-3-10) |
Full disclosure of income, debts, and assets supports § 20-3-630(A)(4)'s property-exclusion presumption; Hardee separately tests misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts. No statutory disclosure-waiver form |
No fixed review or pre-wedding period. Separate counsel for both is required for § 20-3-630(A)(4)'s property presumption; otherwise independent advice remains a significant voluntariness/understanding fact under Hardee and Holler, not a universal bright-line formality |
Case law — Hardee asks (1) fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or material nondisclosure; (2) unconscionability; and (3) changed circumstances making enforcement unfair/unreasonable. Unconscionability is measured at execution; the third prong is the enforcement-time second look |
May waive alimony, support, and attorney fees; Hardee says those waivers are not per se unconscionable or against public policy. They remain subject to the three-part test, with no statutory public-assistance override |
Custody/parenting remain best-interest decisions, and family court retains authority to set and modify child support for changed circumstances (§§ 63-15-230, 63-17-310). Hardee's ordinary public-policy review still applies |
No prenup-specific change statute. A post-marriage change leaves the premarital lane and must stand as a separate enforceable marital contract; family court may review support agreements and has jurisdiction over property contracts (§§ 20-3-130(G), 20-3-690) |
| South Dakota verified 2026-07-28 | Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, with South Dakota's support-waiver omission and case-law bar (SDCL §§ 25-2-16 to -25; Sanford) |
Writing signed by both; no consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 25-2-17, -19) |
No statutory notary, acknowledgment, witness, or recording requirement for basic validity (§ 25-2-17) |
Fair and reasonable disclosure; express written waiver or adequate knowledge can defeat the disclosure-based challenge (§ 25-2-21(a)(2)) |
No statutory counsel/advisement requirement and no minimum review or pre-wedding period; voluntary execution still required (§§ 25-2-16 to -25) |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; unconscionability at execution plus all three disclosure failures also defeats it; court decides unconscionability (§ 25-2-21) |
A premarital provision limiting or waiving spousal support is void and unenforceable, but may be severed (Sanford v. Sanford, 2005 SD 34, ¶ 38) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; custody remains with the court under best interests; other terms cannot violate public policy or a criminal statute (§§ 25-2-18, 25-4-45) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both; no consideration required (§ 25-2-20) |
| Tennessee verified 2026-07-28 | State-specific enforcement statute plus Randolph and Cary; not UPAA (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-3-501 to -502) |
Writing signed by the party to be charged; marriage supplies consideration; property terms enforceable through contract remedies (§§ 29-2-101(a), 36-3-501; Bratton) |
No universal notary or witness for inter-party validity; separate registration statutes apply to specified personal-property and wife-property marriage settlements (§§ 66-24-105 to -106) |
Full/fair disclosure of nature, extent, and value, or independent knowledge of all three; no express written disclosure-waiver substitute (Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815) |
Counsel is not mandatory; counsel opportunity and signing-to-wedding timing are knowledge factors; no fixed review or pre-wedding period (Randolph) |
Statute — freely, knowledgeably, and in good faith, without duress or undue influence; Randolph adds disclosure or independent knowledge; no general later-unconscionability test (§ 36-3-501) |
Voluntary, knowing alimony waiver is enforceable unless it would make the deprived spouse a public charge; then the court applies the alimony statute (Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777) |
Child support remains within court control and guideline-based; custody turns on best interests; creditor protections also limit marriage settlements (§§ 36-5-101, 36-6-106, 36-3-502) |
No prenup-specific change statute; a post-marriage change is a postnuptial agreement requiring new bilateral consideration, knowledge, no fraud/coercion/duress, and fair/equitable scrutiny (Bratton) |
| Texas verified 2026-07-27 | Texas Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (Tex. Fam. Code ch. 4, subch. A, §§ 4.001-4.010) |
Writing signed by both; no consideration; effective on marriage (§§ 4.002, 4.004) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witnesses, or recording required by the UPAA for basic validity (§ 4.002) |
Fair and reasonable disclosure; written express waiver or adequate knowledge can defeat the disclosure-based challenge (§ 4.006(a)(2)) |
No express counsel, counsel-waiver form, review period, or pre-wedding waiting period; voluntary signing still required (§§ 4.002, 4.006) |
Statute — involuntary signing defeats enforcement; unconscionability at signing plus all three disclosure failures also defeats it; statutory remedies/defenses are exclusive (§ 4.006) |
May modify or eliminate spousal support; no counsel gate or enforcement-time second look in the UPAA, but the general § 4.006 test applies (§§ 4.003(a)(4), 4.006) |
Cannot adversely affect child support; custody/access remain subject to court-determined best interests; no term may violate public policy or a criminal statute (§§ 4.003, 153.002) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both; no consideration required (§ 4.005) |
| Utah verified 2026-07-28 | Utah Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Utah Code Title 30, Chapter 8; current sections were renumbered September 1, 2024 |
Writing signed by both; enforceable without consideration; effective upon marriage (Utah Code §§ 30-8-2(1), 30-8-3, 30-8-5(1)) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement in the Act; the statutory form is the signed writing (Utah Code § 30-8-3) |
Reasonable disclosure insofar as possible; voluntary express written waiver of further disclosure or actual/reasonably available adequate knowledge can defeat the fraud/disclosure challenge (Utah Code § 30-8-6(1)(b)) |
No statutory separate-counsel mandate, counsel waiver, final-draft review period, or pre-wedding countdown; voluntary execution remains independently required (Utah Code § 30-8-6(1)(a)) |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; alternatively, execution-time fraud plus all three disclosure failures defeats it, and the court decides fraud as law (Utah Code § 30-8-6) |
May modify or eliminate support, but a court may order enough support to avoid resulting public-assistance eligibility at separation or dissolution (Utah Code §§ 30-8-4(1)(d), 30-8-6(2)) |
Cannot affect child support, health/medical-provider expenses, medical insurance, or child-care coverage; personal terms cannot violate public policy or criminal law, and custody remains a court best-interests decision (Utah Code §§ 30-8-4, 81-9-204) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by the parties; amendment or revocation needs no consideration (Utah Code § 30-8-5(2)) |
| Vermont verified 2026-07-28 | Case-law framework under Lacroix and Bassler plus Vermont's marriage-agreement Statute of Frauds; no comprehensive UPAA (12 V.S.A. § 181) |
Writing signed by the party charged; marriage is the consideration, and the prenup governs if the contemplated marriage occurs (§ 181(3); Bassler) |
No prenup-specific notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, or recording requirement; writing and the charged party's signature are the statutory form rule (§ 181) |
Each spouse must make fair and reasonable financial disclosure; Vermont's controlling test does not supply an UPAA-style written-waiver or adequate-knowledge substitute (Lacroix ¶ 12; Bassler) |
No fixed counsel or pre-wedding period; voluntariness is fact-specific. Lacroix upheld the voluntary finding where the signer had counsel, negotiations, disclosure, and signed one day before the wedding |
Case law — Lacroix requires fair disclosure, voluntary assent, substantively fair terms, and no unconscionability measured at execution; public-charge review remains a separate divorce-time public-policy limit |
May waive maintenance, but enforcement is barred if the agreement leaves a spouse a public charge or close to it at divorce; no broader enforcement-time unconscionability test applies (Bassler; Lacroix) |
Child support remains guideline-controlled and parental rights remain for the court under the child's best interests; public policy also bars a prenup that creates public-charge dependency (§§ 654, 665; Bassler) |
No prenup-specific amendment statute; ordinary contract rules apply. Parties remain free to modify despite no change clause, and a later inconsistent instrument or conduct may supersede a term (Gamache ¶¶ 13, 16-18) |
| Virginia verified 2026-07-27 | Premarital Agreement Act, Va. Code §§ 20-147 to 20-155; Virginia's modified UPAA framework |
Writing signed by both; no consideration; effective upon marriage (§§ 20-148, 20-149) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording requirement for basic validity (§ 20-149) |
Fair/reasonable disclosure of property or financial obligations; a voluntary express written waiver of further disclosure defeats the disclosure branch; no adequate-knowledge alternative (§ 20-151(A)(2)) |
No express independent-counsel, counsel-waiver, final-draft review, or pre-wedding waiting-period rule in Chapter 8 |
Statute — involuntary execution defeats enforcement; otherwise challenger must prove both execution-time unconscionability and the two cumulative disclosure failures; court decides unconscionability and recitals are prima facie correct (§ 20-151) |
May contract about spousal support; no public-assistance or enforcement-time hardship override appears in the Act; term remains subject to § 20-151 and public-policy/criminal-statute limits (§ 20-150(4), (8)) |
Parents cannot contract away child support or the court's support power; custody/visitation remains a court best-interest decision; other terms cannot violate public policy or a criminal statute (§ 20-150(8), Kelley, § 20-124.3) |
After marriage, only by a writing signed by both; no consideration; no notary or witness stated (§ 20-153) |
| Washington verified 2026-07-27 | RCW 19.36.010(3) writing rule plus Bernard/Matson two-prong case law; not UPAA or UPMAA |
Marriage-consideration agreement must be written and signed by the party to be charged; made before marriage and operative upon marriage; marriage supplies the stated consideration (RCW 19.36.010(3)) |
No universal notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or recording rule for an ordinary divorce-focused prenup; RCW 26.16.120's deed formalities govern a different spouses' death-effective community-property agreement |
If substantively unfair, enforcement requires full disclosure of the amount, character, and value of property; no statutory written-waiver or adequate-knowledge substitute (Bernard; Matson) |
Not universal for a substantively fair bargain; a substantively unfair agreement requires independent advice and full knowledge, with timing and meaningful opportunity reviewed case by case; no fixed day count (Bernard; Matson) |
Case law — Bernard/Matson: enforcement proponent must show either substantively fair and reasonable provision or, if substantively unfair, procedural fairness through full disclosure plus free, voluntary execution on independent advice with full knowledge of rights; execution-time test |
May address maintenance, but a waiver is part of substantive-fairness review and, if unfair, must survive procedural review; no statutory public-assistance or enforcement-time hardship override (Bernard) |
Child support remains a court order under the support schedule, and parenting provisions remain subject to court statutory factors and the child's best interests (RCW 26.09.100, 26.09.187) |
No prenup-specific statute; an amendment is reviewed under the same Bernard/Matson fairness framework and marriage-consideration writing rule as applicable; RCW 26.16.120 is only the separate death-effective community-property route (Bernard) |
| West Virginia verified 2026-07-28 | State-specific statutes plus case law: W. Va. Code §§ 48-1-203, 48-6-101, 48-6-201, and 55-1-1; Gant, Ware, and Owen |
Writing signed by the party to be charged; consideration need not be recited; agreement is made before and in contemplation and generally consideration of marriage (§§ 48-1-203, 55-1-1) |
No general prenup notary or witness rule; record marriage-consideration contracts affecting realty or goods to protect against creditors/purchasers (§§ 40-1-8 to 40-1-10) |
Confidential relationship requires full disclosure and fair dealing, but no bank-style written schedule; no statutory disclosure-waiver safe harbor (Pajak; Gieseler) |
Actual separate counsel is not always mandatory, but each must have a real opportunity; one lawyer cannot counsel both, and counsel controls the validity presumption and burden; no fixed review period (Ware; Owen) |
Case law — Gant, as modified by Ware and Owen: voluntary, knowledgeable procurement free of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation; unconscionability and a second look for circumstances roughly foreseen; divorce terms also face § 48-6-201 review |
May set or waive support, subject to valid procurement, unconscionability, the Gant second look, and court approval as fair/reasonable; no UPAA public-assistance formula (§ 48-6-201; Gant) |
Child support always remains judicially modifiable; parenting law's primary objective is the child's best interests (§§ 48-6-201(b), 48-9-102) |
No prenup-specific statute prescribes a universal change route; current statutes do not require every amendment or revocation to be notarized |
| Wisconsin verified 2026-07-28 | Wisconsin Marital Property Act, Wis. Stat. § 766.58, plus divorce property-agreement review under § 767.61(3)(L) and Button v. Button; state-specific, not UPAA/UPMAA |
Document signed by both prospective spouses; enforceable without consideration; effective only upon marriage (§ 766.58(1), (5)) |
No notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, oath, or mandatory recording. Either or both may record the agreement with a county register of deeds (§ 766.58(11)) |
Fair and reasonable disclosure of property and financial obligations, or notice of them. No express written disclosure-waiver mechanism; § 766.58(6)(c) requires both inadequate disclosure and lack of notice for this defense |
No mandatory separate counsel or fixed review/pre-wedding period. Shared counsel or one unrepresented party does not by itself defeat enforcement (§ 766.58(8)) |
Statute — §§ 766.58(6), (8) test when-made unconscionability, voluntariness, and disclosure/notice; § 767.61(3)(L) presumes equity but permits divorce-time rejection when terms are inequitable, including significant unanticipated changes under Button |
May modify or eliminate support, but during marriage a spouse must retain necessary and adequate support; at dissolution or death the court may order enough support to avoid public-assistance eligibility (§ 766.58(3)(d), (9)) |
May not adversely affect a child's support; custody and placement remain best-interest decisions. Property terms may not violate public policy or a criminal-penalty statute (§§ 766.58(2), (3)(h), 767.41(5)(am)) |
Only by a later marital property agreement, so the replacement must itself satisfy § 766.58's document, signature, and enforceability rules (§ 766.58(4)) |
| Wyoming verified 2026-07-28 | Case-law framework under Laird, Lund, and Jones plus Wyoming's marriage-agreement Statute of Frauds; no comprehensive UPAA (Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-105(a)(iii)) |
Writing subscribed by the party charged; the contemplated marriage supplies consideration and makes the premarital bargain operative (Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-105(a)(iii); Lund) |
No prenup-specific notary, acknowledgment, witness, attestation, or recording requirement; writing and subscription are the statutory form rule (§ 1-23-105(a)) |
Detailed net-worth statements are not always required where the signer knows the other has substantial wealth and there is no concealment or overreaching; no UPAA-style statutory waiver checklist (Laird) |
No fixed counsel mandate or pre-wedding period; meaningful choice, opportunity to negotiate and understand, compulsion, bargaining inequality, education, and concealed terms inform procedural unconscionability (Jones ¶ 31) |
Case law — Laird requires an understanding and free execution without fraud, deceit, or overreaching; Jones balances substantive unfairness and procedural lack of meaningful choice, measured when the contract was made |
May waive support; Seherr-Thoss enforced a prenup expressly waiving spousal support and using a lump-sum divorce settlement. No prenup-specific statutory public-assistance override |
Child support cannot be contracted away, and custody cannot be fixed contrary to the court's authority and the child's best interests (§ 20-2-201(a); Combs) |
May be changed after marriage through a valid postnuptial agreement; existing marriage is not consideration, so other identifiable consideration and applicable contract formalities are required (Lund; Combs; Jones) |
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