Rossie David Alston, Jr.
How Judge Alston decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Sitting by designation on the Fourth Circuit, he reviews class-settlement and discovery rulings for abuse of discretion and declines to announce broader standards than the appeal requires -- a narrow, record-bound appellate posture.
“Today, we do not decide whether a more stringent standard must be applied to settlement-related discovery motions. We only decide whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the discovery motion at issue.”
Procedural preferences
Enforces the E.D. Va. summary-judgment local rule strictly: where the party opposing summary judgment fails to identify the specific facts in dispute and the record evidence supporting the dispute, he deems the movant's statement of undisputed facts admitted -- even for a pro se litigant. Counsel (and pro se parties) must answer the movant's numbered facts with specific record citations.
“Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Local Rules because he failed to identify the specific facts he was disputing and the record evidence upon which he relied to support his dispute. JDS Uniphase Corp. v. Jennings, 473 F. Supp. 2d 705, 707 (E.D. Va. 2007) (deeming movant’s statement of undisputed facts admitted ...) (citing E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 56(B)).”
Decides fully-briefed dispositive motions on the papers without oral argument when argument would not aid the decision, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 7(J). Do not assume a hearing on an APA/record-review summary-judgment motion.
“The Court has dispensed with oral argument as it would not aid in the decisional process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Civil Rule 7(J).”
On pro se prisoner complaints he generally dismisses without prejudice with leave to amend on the court's standardized Section 1983 form, rather than dismissing with prejudice -- giving the litigant a defined window and a template to cure pleading defects.
“ORDERED that the complaint be and is HEREBY DISMISSED without prejudice, to allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint in compliance with the requirements of this order; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff particularize and amend his Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order using the enclosed standardized §1983 complaint form.”
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss he takes the well-pleaded allegations as true and tests plausibility -- a plausibly-pleaded Title IX peer-harassment 'deliberate indifference' theory survives in part against a school board and most individual defendants (granted-in-part), and is not dismissed wholesale; once an amended complaint is operative, motions aimed at the original complaint are denied as moot.
“For purposes of considering the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court assumes all facts in the Amended Complaint to be true.”
Will permit a sensitive plaintiff (here a minor Title IX sexual-harassment victim) to proceed under a pseudonym IN PART, directing the clerk to substitute initials for party names rather than denying anonymity outright.
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Pseudonym Motion (Dkt. 38) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
In immigration-detention habeas cases involving people who entered the United States years earlier, he treats § 1226(a) as the governing discretionary-detention provision, orders prompt bond hearings, and rejects mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).
“Since Petitioner entered the country in or about 2014, he falls into the category of ‘aliens already in the country’ subject to the discretionary detention provisions in § 1226(a).”
Cautions
The written-order sample is small and uneven. Public entry coverage varies sharply by case, and the recoverable rulings overrepresent matters with uploaded opinions, including defense summary-judgment wins, pro se procedural rulings, and a recent group of similar immigration-detention cases. Treat the counts as examples of reasoning, not as a grant rate.
“While the courts liberally construe pro se pleadings as a matter of course, judges are not also required to construct a party’s legal arguments for him or ‘divine’ what the plaintiff is trying to achieve or say.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant F.C.S.B.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (Dkt. 53) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Individual School Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (Dkt. 56) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant J.O.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (Dkt. 66) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant C.K.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (Dkt. 59) is DENIED;”
“it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant F.C.S.B.'s Motion to Strike (Dkt. 42) is DENIED;”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Pseudonym Motion (Dkt. 38) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED”
“ORDERED that ‘Ex Parte For Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction’ and motion to seal [Dkt. No. 2] is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Rossie D. Alston, Jr on 6/13/2022.”
Alston dismissed a pro se prisoner Section 1983 action without prejudice sua sponte after screening and denied the in forma pauperis and ancillary motions as moot. The disposition is grounded in the verbatim docket-entry order text.
“ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion [Dkt. No. 27] is DENIED; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk treat the Motion, Dkt. No. 27, as a timely filed NOTICE OF APPEAL. Signed by District Judge Rossie D. Alston, Jr on 2/8/2023.”
“Defendant Dr. Esochaghi (‘Defendant’) was served, filed an answer, and filed a motion for summary judgment on December 1, 2023. ... For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.”
Alston dismissed a pro se prisoner's Section 1983 complaint without prejudice on sua sponte screening, with leave to amend on a standardized Section 1983 form within 30 days. The order illustrates his practice of allowing amendment on the court form rather than dismissing with prejudice and is grounded in the verbatim docket-entry text.
In a pro se prisoner civil-rights action, Alston denied the plaintiff's premature summary-judgment motion and dismissed the action without prejudice on screening. The denial was procedural because the complaint never cleared Section 1915 review, not a merits summary-judgment ruling. The disposition is grounded in the verbatim docket-entry order text.
“it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and it is further ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED for the reasons that follow.”
“For all of the reasons above, the Petition (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED, and it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner be provided with a bond hearing by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days of this order;”
“For all of the reasons above, the Petition (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED, and it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner be provided with a bond hearing by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days of this order;”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 126 days (N = 18).
Because cases can be reassigned, the signer is confirmed on each order rather than assumed from the currently-assigned judge -- e.g. Jenkins v. NVR (1:21-cv-01381) shows an Opinion and Order granting transfer signed by Judge Robert G. Doumar before the case reached Alston.
Put Judge Alston's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Alston actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Alston's own signed orders and cites them.