Charles Robert Eskridge III
How Judge Eskridge decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Enforces a contractual choice-of-law (and forum-selection) clause and will not set it aside absent a developed showing; a party resisting it must point to specific authority and record evidence, not bare assertion.
“Generally speaking, ‘Texas law favors the enforcement of contractual choice-of-law provisions.’ ... Morton provides the Court with no authority suggesting that it is a fundamental policy of California to apply its usury law to a commercial loan provided by a Texas bank to a Louisiana corporation and guaranteed by a Louisiana citizen.”
On a Rule 12(b)(2) personal-jurisdiction motion he holds the plaintiff to the theory actually pleaded in the complaint; a defendant can win dismissal by showing the complaint's stated theory does not connect the defendant to the forum.
“A reader of the complaint will nowhere discern this attenuated theory. The complaint doesn't mention either Klonopin specifically or benzodiazepines generally.”
Procedural preferences
Reviews a magistrate judge's M&R de novo on dispositive issues and will reverse it where he disagrees -- in this sample he twice sustained the losing party's objections and rejected the recommendation (granting leave/denying a strike in Group1; admitting experts and denying SJ in Armstrong). An adverse M&R is not the last word before him.
“The objections by Plaintiffs to the Memorandum and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are SUSTAINED.”
Daubert gatekeeping: inconsistencies between an expert's opinion and the record go to credibility/weight for the jury, not admissibility -- exclusion is reserved for fundamentally unsupported opinions. Counsel should brief Daubert as a weight problem, not assume exclusion.
“inconsistencies between the testimony of Poczynok, the evidence, and expert testimony proffered by Wing Enterprises may affect Poczynok's credibility before the jury. But they don't render his testimony inadmissible.”
After a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal he ordinarily allows one chance to replead by a date certain (Rule 15 'bias in favor of granting leave to amend'), but warns that further amendment will not likely be granted absent exceptional circumstances. Plan to cure all identified defects in the first repleading.
“Shenton will thus be permitted to seek leave to amend his complaint. But any such motion for leave must address the deficiencies and concerns identified above and will be subject to the dictates of Rule 11(b).”
Cautions
You cannot amend your complaint through a response brief. A new claim or theory raised only in opposition to a motion -- and not in the pleading -- will be disregarded.
“But only in their response to this motion -- and not in their complaint -- do they attempt to connect that claim to HLR via Klonopin. The request by the Rosens to read this new theory into the complaint isn't well-taken.”
Respond to motions on time. Under S.D. Tex. Local Rule 7.4 he deems an unanswered summary-judgment motion unopposed and will grant it once the movant discharges its initial burden.
“The motion for summary judgment by Defendant Uval Vanunu is deemed to be unopposed for failure by Plaintiff Eric Hunter to timely respond. As such, it is granted.”
He will dismiss on the statute of limitations at the pleading stage when the bar is evident on the face of the complaint and no basis for tolling is pleaded -- raise every tolling theory in the complaint itself.
“Shenton here pleads no facts that would entitle him to equitable tolling apart from the conceded 779 days. It's therefore evident from the face of the complaint that the action is barred.”
Summary-judgment opponents must cite specific record evidence for each argued point; he treats arguments and affirmative defenses unsupported by pinpoint record cites as waived and will not search the record for the nonmovant.
“The Fifth Circuit ‘has regularly reminded litigants that Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court ... a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.’ The Court thus finds Morton to have waived challenge in this regard.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The motion by Plaintiff Group 1 Automotive Inc for leave to amend is GRANTED. Dkt 51.”
“The motion by Defendant Aetna Life Insurance Company to strike or dismiss is DENIED. Dkt 55.”
“The motion by Defendant Wing Enterprises Inc to exclude the testimony of Peter Francis is DENIED. Dkt 97.”
“The motion by Defendant Wing Enterprises Inc to exclude the testimony of Peter Poczynok is DENIED. Dkt 98.”
“The motion by Defendant Wing Enterprises Inc for summary judgment is DENIED. Dkt 96.”
“The motion by Defendant EnSite USA Inc to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is GRANTED. Dkt 16.”
“The motion by Defendant Hoffman-La Roche to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. Dkt 4.”
“The motion by Defendant Evanston Insurance Company for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt 13.”
“The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment brought by Pierce Partners. As such, Morton must pay Pierce Partners: The full amount of the note, one million dollars; Interest calculated at eighteen percent; and Pierce Partners' reasonable attorney fees and costs.”
“The motion to dismiss by Defendants is GRANTED. Dkt 26. Defendant Sabrina Carpenter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant UMG Recordings, Inc, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.”
“The motion for summary judgment by Defendant Uval Vanunu is GRANTED. Dkt 38.”
“The related motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt 31. A final judgment will enter separately dismissing this case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“The Rule 54(b) motion by Plaintiff to vacate is DENIED. Dkt 48.”
“The motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt 5. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“The motion to enjoin all other entities from original state cases is DENIED. Dkt 10.”
“The motion by Defendants US Bank NA and Select Portfolio Servicing Inc for summary judgment on all claims by Plaintiff Carole A. Jones is GRANTED. Dkt 10. The claims brought by Plaintiff Carole A. Jones are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“The motion by the United States of America to intervene and to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt 46. The complaint by Plaintiff Amy C. Walden-Bing is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 347 days (N = 3).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 329 days (N = 7).
Active, high-volume Houston-Division docket. As of June 2026 his newly-assigned cases are dominated by a surge of '463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee' 2241 petitions (e.g. Kham v. Blanche 4:26-cv-04427, Orellana v. Bondi 4:26-cv-04359), all filed May/June 2026 and pending. The merits civil cases sampled span ERISA (Group1/Aetna), insurance (Phan/Evanston), FLSA (Shenton/EnSite), commercial contract/guaranty (Pierce/Morton), products liability (Armstrong/Wing), copyright (Luna-Vides), and civil rights (Hunter). He also presides over In re Anadarko Petroleum Securities Litigation (4:20-cv-00576). The mix above is descriptive; this record does not include a quantitative nature-of-suit breakdown.
Put Judge Eskridge's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Eskridge actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Eskridge's own signed orders and cites them.