Mary Lou Robinson
Judge Robinson no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Robinson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She began contract analysis with the enacted text and declined to replace the parties' written terms with unstated intentions.
“the parties’ intent is governed by what they said, not by what they intended to say but did not.”
On disability-accommodation claims, concrete evidence of known limitations and unmet needs could create a trial issue even without an express request for a particular accommodation.
“O’Neil has submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether TTHSC failed to accommodate Peterson’s disability under the ADA and the RA.”
She treated an established collective-bargaining custom as dispositive when the Fair Labor Standards Act expressly authorized that exclusion.
“Any claim for personal showering is foreclosed by 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).”
Procedural preferences
She enforced the limits of federal jurisdiction and would not allow an anticipated federal defense to support removal.
“A defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction.”
In employment cases involving related companies, she focused on who actually controlled the challenged personnel decision.
“The Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact about the critical question of ‘[w]hat entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters related to the person claiming discrimination?’”
Cautions
Unsupported tax-protester theories did not create a genuine issue against parties that complied with a federal levy.
“Plaintiff has not come forth with any evidence to support his allegation that his claims against the Defendants do not arise from Chevron Phillips’ garnishment of his wages pursuant to an IRS levy.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Before the Court is Plaintiff Colony National Insurance Company’s (‘Colony’) Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on April 8, 2009. This motion is GRANTED.”
“For all of the above reasons, each of the Defendants have shown their entitlement to summary judgment upon all of Plaintiff Rodger Don Hughes’ claims and causes of action.”
“Summary judgment is hereby GRANTED as to Defendant Patel. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Defendants Heuerman, TDCJ, and TTHSC.”
“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED.”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted in part. The $50,000 cap as set forth in § 21.2585(d)(1) applies in this case. All relief not herein granted is denied.”
“This action is hereby REMANDED to the 90th District Court of Young County, Texas.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 423 days (N = 3).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 5 days (N = 12).
The three sampled closed civil cases include an employment-discrimination action, a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action, and a transferred prison disability and medical-care case. Their duration figures describe this bounded sample rather than Robinson's full career docket.
A historical record
Judge Robinson no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.