Malcolm Muir
Judge Muir no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Muir decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Muir gave substantial deference to labor arbitration when the award could be traced to the agreement and ordinary contract doctrines such as waiver and estoppel.
“The arbitrator’s application of those principles is not a basis to overturn her award.”
In prolonged immigration detention, he focused on concrete progress toward removal and granted relief when governmental coordination produced no meaningful development.
“We are of the view that the events discussed in the Respondents’ most recent brief establish the lack of meaningful progress towards removing Elashi.”
Procedural preferences
He required the class representative to prove actual typicality rather than relying on a generalized common grievance.
“We may not presume that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been met.”
Cautions
For trust-fund tax liability, he treated payment of other creditors after learning taxes were unpaid as willfulness despite the responsible person's stated intentions.
“Her intentions notwithstanding, Michele S. Tedesco’s actions meet the definition of a willful failure to collect, account for or pay over the withheld taxes.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The United Steelworkers of America’s motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“The motion filed January 27, 1987, requesting ‘... an Order dismissing R. Budd Dwyer’s post-trial motions, vacating the verdict returned against R. Budd Dwyer, and dismissing the indictment filed May 13, 1986, as to R. Budd Dwyer’ is denied.”
“Plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel (Document 2 of the record) is denied as moot.”
“Magistrate Judge. Blewitt’s order authorizing substitution is affirmed.”
“we denied Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order”
“the Environmental Protection Agency’s motion to intervene as a defendant was orally granted.”
“The Environmental Protection Agency’s motion to dismiss (Doc. -.24). is granted.”
“OHM’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 26) is granted.”
“The Unions’ motion for summary judgment (Document 18) is granted.”
“Rutgers’ motion for summary judgment (Document 22) is denied.”
“The summary judgment motion filed on October 1, 1990, by the Defendants is granted.”
“O’Driscoll’s motion entitled ‘Motion to Bifurcate Trial, Summoning and Empaneling a Second Jury Only In the Event of Conviction of First-Degree Murder’ (Doc. 32) is denied.”
“O’Driscoll’s motion entitled ‘Motion, In Light of the Government’s Failure to Comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3432, to Dismiss the Aggravating Factors Set Forth in the Superceding (sic) Indictment and in the Government’s Supplemental Notice of Aggravating Factors’ (Doc. 339) is denied as moot.”
“The motion entitled ‘Motion for Return of Property Pursuant to Fed. R.Crime. 41(e)’ (Doc. 83) filed by Maria Parlavecchio is denied.”
“Gambino’s petition for writ of habe-as corpus (Document 1) is denied.”
“The motion of Merrill Lynch for a preliminary injunction filed on June 5, 2001, is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 50.5 days (N = 10).
The twenty enumerated early-2000 cases included five prisoner civil-rights matters, four habeas petitions, two student-loan recoveries, two contracts, two prison-condition cases, and one each involving wage law, motor-vehicle injury, other personal liability, disability benefits, and employment civil rights. All twenty were terminated. This narrow cohort does not establish Muir's tenure-wide caseload mix.
A historical record
Judge Muir no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.