Roanne L. Mann
Judge Mann no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Mann decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Deference to arbitration; high bar to disturb an award. In Moosazadeh she enforced the parties' NAM arbitration award and rejected a vacatur challenge, stressing that 'errors of law or fact are insufficient' and that a disappointed party's bare assertion of bias 'begs the question of partiality.' A litigant who agreed to binding arbitration before her should expect the award confirmed absent a genuine CPLR 7511 ground.
“The mere suggestion of partiality is not sufficient to warrant interference with the arbitrator’s award, and adequacy of an award is not reviewable.”
Procedural preferences
Consent (636(c)) cases are where Mann decides, not just recommends. Unusually for a magistrate, much of her substantive output is FINAL: parties routinely consented to her jurisdiction for all purposes under 28 U.S.C. 636(c) (Amin Realty, Greco, Moosazadeh, Supervalu), so she entered dispositive summary judgments, confirmed/vacated arbitration awards, and ruled on Rule 60(b) motions as the decision-maker. For a lawyer before her on a consent docket, her order IS the ruling -- no district-judge adoption step.
“After the parties completed discovery and consented to have the case handled for all purposes by a magistrate judge, Travelers moved for summary judgment”
Jurisdictional rigor on settlement enforcement (Kokkonen). In Supervalu she refused to reopen a dismissed case to enforce a settlement where the stipulation did not reserve jurisdiction, applying Kokkonen strictly and directing the movant to a separate breach action. Practice tip: if you want her to retain enforcement jurisdiction over a settlement, the dismissal order must say so expressly.
“a federal court lacks jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement in a closed case in the absence of an independent basis for jurisdiction or a dismissal order specifically reserving such authority.”
Cautions
Her R&Rs are reviewed, not rubber-stamped. Two referral cases here show both ends: in Szewczyk, Judge Brodie adopted her summary-judgment R&R in full on de novo review over the plaintiff's objection; but in Copper/Borrelli, Judge Block sustained the objection and DECLINED to adopt her recommendation to deny a default judgment, distinguishing her FLSA-indemnity authorities. On a contested legal question, her recommendation is influential but not automatic.
“the Court sustains Borelli’s objection and, so, declines to adopt the R&R’s recommendation that its third-party complaint be dismissed.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“defendant’s motion for an order granting it summary judgment on all claims is granted in its entirety, plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied, and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is requested to enter judgment accordingly.”
“the Court denies plaintiff’s motion to vacate the Arbitration Award and grants defendants’ cross-motion to confirm the Award.”
“defendant has failed to make the requisite showing of extraordinary circumstances and extreme hardship to warrant reopening the case under Rule 60(b)(6). Defendant’s motion is therefore denied.”
“this court adopts Magistrate Judge Mann’s R&R in its entirety ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is granted.”
“the Court adopts Judge Mann’s R&R in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismisses the Amended Complaint in its entirety.”
This is an R&R that the district judge did not adopt, kept here as a window on her reasoning. In this FLSA wage-and-hour case, third-party plaintiff Borrelli & Associates (assignee of defendant Cavalry's contractual-indemnity/breach claim against asset-buyer Fleet) moved for a default judgment after Fleet defaulted. By R&R dated 2020-08-11, Magistrate Judge Mann recommended DENYING the default-judgment motion and dismissing the third-party complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), reasoning that the claim was 'an unenforceable contractual indemnification claim in a wage-and-hour case' (extending Herman v. RSR Security and Gustafson). Borrelli objected, triggering de novo review. On 2021-03-16, Senior District Judge Block SUSTAINED the objection, distinguished Gustafson (the Cavalry-Fleet agreement was a pre-existing split of a known liability that benefited the plaintiffs, not an attempt to contract away FLSA obligations), DECLINED to adopt the R&R, and recommitted the matter to Mann. No binding outcome is attributable to Mann here. It demonstrates that her recommendations are reviewed, not rubber-stamped.
“For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied in large part.”
“defendants’ motion to compel (DE #45) is granted and plaintiffs’ cross-motion to compel (DE #46) is granted in part and denied in part without prejudice.”
“Judge Mann recommended granting default judgment in this foreclosure action upon a finding of Defendants’ liability pursuant to well-settled law, (R&R 8–9), and the Court, having received no objections to the R&R, adopted it in its entirety on August 15, 2018.”
“The Court has reviewed the unopposed R&R and, finding no clear error, adopts the R&R in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment in substantial part”
“the Court hereby adopts the Report and Recommendation as the opinion of this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is hereby granted, in part, and denied, in part.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
An Eastern District of New York magistrate in Brooklyn. A sample of her last-assigned dockets (2022, her final active year, plus older miscellaneous matters) shows the magistrate diet: criminal and surveillance-support work (pen-register and trap-and-trace applications, stored-communications orders, cell-phone search-warrant applications, and criminal initial-appearance complaints) alongside FLSA consent cases that resolve quickly by settlement or dismissal and occasional enforcement matters. Consistent with her published orders, her substantive civil work is heavily consent-jurisdiction and referral-recommendation based.
A historical record
Judge Mann no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.