Nina Radoff Morrison
How Judge Morrison decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a Fourth Amendment cell-phone border search she requires a warrant and probable cause and will exclude the fruits: a 'routine' suppression argument keyed to her own Sultanov holding, backed by a developed suppression-hearing record, can win even in a child-pornography case. She also scrutinizes good faith hard -- an agent who omits the actual trigger for a search from the warrant affidavit forfeits the good-faith exception.
“the Special Agent who prepared the subsequent warrant application misled the magistrate judge about the actual circumstances that led to the airport search, intentionally omitting the one and only item of specific information known to CPB that led Robinson to be targeted for secondary screening and a device search in the first place.”
Procedural preferences
Where both sides rely on voluminous materials outside the pleadings, she will exercise Rule 12(d) discretion to convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment -- but only after Local Rule 12.1 notice and a real opportunity for the pro se party to submit its evidence. Litigants should expect a Rule 56 record, not just the pleadings, when they flood the docket with exhibits.
“the Court concludes that the procedural prerequisites for an application of 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been met, and it will exercise its discretion to convert Defendant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”
She disposes of repeat and collateral litigation on threshold doctrines and applies them rigorously: res judicata and collateral estoppel to bar a relabeled second suit, Younger abstention to refuse to enjoin an ongoing state prosecution absent a proven bad-faith exception, and Rooker-Feldman plus sovereign and judicial immunity to dismiss suits that are really appeals from state-court judgments. A litigant who cannot distinguish a prior adjudication or fit a recognized exception should not expect the merits to be reached.
“As Plaintiff has failed to assert a valid exception to Younger v. Harris, this Court must abstain from interfering in his pending criminal prosecution.”
Cautions
Construes pro se filings liberally 'to raise the strongest arguments they suggest,' but dismisses where the legal theory is simply unavailable -- no state action against a public defender / Legal Aid Society under Section 1983, and no private right of action under criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. 241/242) or for bribery. Liberal construction does not rescue a non-cognizable claim.
“18 U.S.C. Sections 241 and 242 are 'both criminal statutes' which do not provide a private right of action ... 'no private right of action exists against a defendant for soliciting a bribe' because bribery 'is a criminal offense, not a basis for civil liability.'”
Treats a stay of the whole action as an 'extraordinary remedy' and will not grant an indefinite one on speculative grounds -- and a party cannot move for a stay on behalf of not-yet-appeared co-defendants who may become its adversaries. Move for relief on your own behalf, with a concrete, time-bounded justification.
“The Court has certainly found no case in which a court in a civil action has granted a motion filed by one party on behalf of a second party -- who has not yet appeared and who may end up being the first party's adversary -- for an indefinite stay.”
Leave to amend tracks who is in front of her and whether amendment could help. A counseled plaintiff who never asks for leave can have its federal claims dismissed with prejudice; a pro se plaintiff is ordinarily granted at least one chance to amend out of caution, but that chance is denied where the defects are incurable (judicial/sovereign immunity, no private right of action, Rooker-Feldman). Counsel should request leave to amend in the alternative; pro se litigants should expect a single, defect-targeted opportunity to replead.
“The Court dismisses the federal law claims with prejudice since at no time since the Court was presented with Plaintiff's motion did Negative ask this Court to consider granting it leave to amend to cure any potential pleading defects”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For these reasons, Robinson's motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his iPhone is GRANTED.”
“For the reasons outlined herein, Defendant's motion, construed as a motion for summary judgment, is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amendment, Sections 241 and 242, and bribery claims, and denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claim.”
“Because Plaintiff's arguments raised in her sur-reply do not alter the Court's conclusions, the Court denies Defendants' motion to strike.”
“Williams has not shown any basis for relief under the demanding standards required by 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Accordingly, the petition is denied. Additionally, a certificate of appealability will not issue, because Williams has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
“The Court grants Defendant Legal Aid Society's motion to dismiss.”
“for the reasons outlined above, the fact that Corporation Counsel has not yet determined whether it will represent the individual defendant police officers who may be facing a parallel CCRB investigation simply does not merit the 'extraordinary remedy' of an indefinite stay of Plaintiff's Section 1983 action. ... Defendant City of New York's motion is therefore denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motions to dismiss.”
“McNamara's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Negative's CFAA and DTSA claims are dismissed with prejudice, while its state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.”
“the court grants Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies the Commissioner's cross-motion. The Commissioner's decision is remanded for further consideration consistent with this opinion.”
“the court grants Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies the Commissioner's cross-motion.”
“the Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss with regard to all of Plaintiff's federal claims. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on Plaintiff's state law claims.”
“Accordingly, Plaintiff's April 25, 2024 Motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) is denied.”
“Accordingly, this petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed without prejudice. As Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 285 days (N = 3).
As an active judge who took the bench in 2022, Judge Morrison has a young, fast-growing, and mostly pending docket. The most recent slice (spring 2026) is dominated by a surge of alien-detainee habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2241 (e.g. P.P. v. Mullin, Diallo v. Lyons, Duong v. Maldonado, Cabanas Reyes v. Soto, Kuprashvili v. MDC Brooklyn, Alvarado Rodriguez v. Maldonado), alongside criminal prosecutions (United States v. Gumbs, United States v. Figueroa), FLSA, labor, and FMLA wage matters (Cherubin, Dolores Saravia Fuentes v. ICON), consumer credit-reporting cases (Ortiz v. TransUnion, Khan v. Alcon), Social Security appeals (Lopez), immigration mandamus suits (Qu v. USCIS, Urunov v. Edlow), and assorted contract and foreclosure matters. Case durations are not yet computable: too few cases have terminated, and this sample surfaced only pending recent filings. This is a caseload sketch from case-level records, not a measure of outcomes.
Put Judge Morrison's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Morrison actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Morrison's own signed orders and cites them.