Nicholas G. Garaufis
How Judge Garaufis decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In employment-discrimination cases he denies summary judgment where the plaintiff offers direct-evidence remarks tied to the decisionmaker and the adverse action -- such remarks are treated as more than 'stray' and create triable issues even under the ADEA's heightened but-for-causation standard.
“Rodriguez's alleged comment was ‘less a 'stray' remark than an open declaration of bias. It not only reflected a highly discriminatory attitude, but also came at the time of the [adverse employment action] and referred directly to [Plaintiffs] tenure with [Wyckoff] in negative terms.’”
Procedural preferences
He resolves subject-matter jurisdiction before the merits, and applies the FTCA's administrative-exhaustion prerequisite strictly -- requiring actual proof the agency received the notice of claim, not merely proof of mailing, and applying that bar with equal force to pro se litigants.
“The majority view among district courts in this circuit is that to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), actual proof of receipt by a federal agency, not just proof of mailing, is required.”
On a magistrate's R&R to which no party objects, he reviews for clear error and will adopt it -- but he exercises independent judgment on discretionary relief (here, declining to appoint the plaintiff's hand-picked foreclosure referee and demanding additional candidates).
“The court finds no clear error, but declines to appoint Susan E. Rizos, Esq. as referee at this time. Accordingly, the court ADOPTS the R&R as modified, and GRANTS Plaintiffs motion for default judgment.”
Cautions
Retaliation and discrimination claims need a tight causal connection: a long temporal gap between protected activity and the adverse action negates the inference, and a pro se plaintiff must still establish he was 'qualified' for the position to make out a prima facie case.
“A twenty-year span between a protected activity and an alleged adverse employment action is far too removed to constitute the causal connection necessary to state a retaliation claim.”
Reconsideration is hard in his court: the standard is 'strict', and new evidence (even helpful deposition admissions) will not reopen a ruling unless it cures the specific defect the court already identified -- repackaging an issue the court fully considered will fail.
“Courts narrowly construe and strictly apply these principles to avoid ‘repetitive arguments on issues that have already been considered fully by the court.’”
Challenging a superseding indictment as untimely is an uphill fight: charges that narrow or merely add detail relate back to the original indictment, and a venue ruling already made becomes law of the case absent cogent and compelling reasons to revisit it.
“Superseding charges that narrow, rather than broaden, are timely, so the removal of the Exchange investors does not affect the timeliness of the Third Superseding Indictment.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment( Dkts. 82, 91) are DENIED.”
“the court GRANTS Amazon's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Won's cross-motion for partial summary judgment.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”
“the Defendant's motion to dismiss Count One of the Third Superseding Indictment is DENIED.”
“As Plaintiff's amendments would be futile, his motion for reconsideration is therefore DENIED.”
“the court ADOPTS the R&R as modified, and GRANTS Plaintiffs motion for default judgment.”
“Defendants' motion for dismissal of Plaintiff's constitutional tort claims is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's challenges to his deportations from the United States are DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANfED, and Defendants' motion to sever is DENIED as moot.”
“As Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed, Defendants' motion to sever is denied as moot.”
“the Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) ... which has been converted by this court into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 ... is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the moving Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED on all grounds.”
“The court DENIES Defendant Xi Liu's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 128).”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 89 days (N = 15).
Garaufis is a long-tenured Brooklyn judge who took senior status in 2014 but remained actively assigned civil and criminal cases. Recent intake includes securities, False Claims Act, immigration, family-leave, and criminal matters. In the terminated-case sample, serial ADA public-accommodation suits, immigration actions, and miscellaneous matters often close within days or months, usually through settlement or dismissal, while contested civil-rights, insurance, and prisoner cases run for years. His criminal docket has included the NXIVM prosecution and the Manuel Chang fraud trial.
Put Judge Garaufis's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Garaufis actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Garaufis's own signed orders and cites them.