Lyle Elmer Strom
Judge Strom no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Strom decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On the contested question of individual liability under the FDCPA, Strom sided with the view that owners, officers, and signing attorneys can be personally liable without piercing the corporate veil if they meet the statutory 'debt collector' definition, relying on the Eighth Circuit's Powers dicta, an in-district decision by Judge Bataillon, and the plain statutory text.
“Based on: (1) the Eighth Circuit's language in Powers; (2) Judge Bataillon's holding in Henggeler; and (3) the Court's reading of Congress's statutory language, the Court finds that individuals can be held personally liable under the FDCPA without piercing the corporate veil if they fit within the statute's definition of 'debt collector.'”
Procedural preferences
On a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for personal jurisdiction or venue decided on affidavits, he requires only a prima facie showing from the plaintiff and resolves all factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor -- including a dispute over whether a guaranty containing the forum-selection clause was even signed.
“If the district court does not hold a hearing and instead relies on pleadings and affidavits, then the Court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of that party.”
On class certification he conducts the Eighth Circuit's 'rigorous analysis' and will deny a Rule 23(b)(3) class where liability turns on individualized facts: here, head-of-family status, which CMS attorney signed each affidavit, and what process each followed would require 'many distinct factual inquiries,' defeating predominance.
“plaintiff's proposed class would require many distinct factual inquiries. ... enough for the Court to determine that Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement has not been sufficiently established by the plaintiff.”
Cautions
A defense summary-judgment motion can succeed before him on a pro se constitutional claim where the undisputed record shows process was provided: in Andrews he granted the officers' MSJ because the plaintiff received notice and a Ban-and-Bar Review Board appeal, so even assuming a protected interest there was no deprivation 'without due process of law.'
“even if plaintiff suffered a deprivation of a recognized constitutional right, and that deprivation was suffered at the hands of the officers, the deprivation did not occur without due process of law.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied in its entirety as to both CMS and each of the individually named defendants.”
“the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact do in fact exist prohibiting summary judgment. ... the Court finds that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be denied.”
“Because the Court denies class certification under both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) the Court will deny plaintiff's hybrid class for the reasons already stated herein.”
“IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss (Filing No. 13) is denied.”
“Findings and recommendation that motion to dismiss superseding indictment (Filing No. 71) is approved and adopted... Motion to dismiss superseding indictment (Filing No. 69) is denied.”
“The report and recommendation of the magistrate judge is approved and adopted. Defendant's motion to suppress is denied.”
“The findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge are approved and adopted. Defendant's motion to suppress is denied.”
“The report and recommendation of the magistrate judge is approved and adopted; defendant's motion to suppress is denied.”
“In light of this, the motion for summary judgment will be granted and the petition will be dismissed in its entirety.”
“Thus, the State of Nebraska, agencies and instrumentalities of the state, and officers and employees of the state in their official capacity cannot be made to answer to the plaintiff in this Court for financial compensatory relief... the plaintiff's claim against him in his individual capacity must be dismissed.”
“Mr. Sennett's motion to dismiss (Filing No. 19) will be granted because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against him on which relief may be granted under the federal civil rights laws.”
“Thus, even if all of the allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, plaintiff has not alleged a violation of a constitutional right and defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.”
“IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity (Filing No. 58) is denied.”
“For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds Clayborne has not stated claims upon which relief may be granted against any of the defendants named in the complaint... Clayborne will be given 30 days in which to file an amended complaint that states a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 598 days (N = 5).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 160 days (N = 3).
The sampled dockets show Judge Strom carrying a broad general civil and criminal caseload over his tenure: contract disputes, product- and property-liability claims, trademark and patent cases, employment and civil-rights claims, FELA railroad-injury suits, habeas petitions, Social Security disability appeals (which he decided directly rather than referring to a magistrate), consumer/FDCPA class litigation, and federal criminal prosecutions including suppression motions. This is a sample, not a complete enumeration of his full docket.
A historical record
Judge Strom no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.