Laurie Smith Camp
Judge Camp no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Camp decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In ADEA cases Smith Camp applies the strict but-for causation rule of Gross v. FBL and the Hazen Paper distinction: a factor that merely correlates with age (here, the employer's health-insurance costs) is analytically distinct from age, so an employer motivated by that factor does not violate the ADEA -- even if its language about 'oldest and sickest employees' was 'crude and perhaps insensitive.' A plaintiff whose own theory attributes the firing to cost-cutting has pleaded herself out of an age claim.
“Although health care costs tend to be positively correlated with age, such costs are analytically distinct from age. ... there can be no discrimination under the ADEA [w]hen the employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age . . . even if the motivating factor is correlated with age, at least when age is analytically distinct from the motivating factor.”
Procedural preferences
She enforces Nebraska's local summary-judgment rule strictly: a non-movant who fails to controvert the movant's numbered statement of facts per NECivR 56.1(b) has those facts deemed admitted. Counsel opposing an MSJ before her must file a paragraph-by-paragraph response to the movant's fact statement, not just 'additional facts.'
“Plaintiff also submitted a numbered statement of 'additional material facts,' but did not respond to the Defendant's statement of facts as required by NECivR 56.1(b). Accordingly, all properly referenced material facts in the Defendant's statement are considered admitted unless controverted in the Plaintiff's response.”
On claims against Nebraska political subdivisions she requires the complaint to plead compliance with statutory claim-presentment prerequisites (the § 23-135 90-day county-claim deadline for contract claims; the PSTCA one-year written-claim requirement for tort claims). A complaint silent on presentment is dismissed as implausible.
“Nothing in the (Amended) Complaint suggests that Merrell submitted his contract claim to the County within 90 days of the time it arose ... Accordingly, Merrell's third claim is not plausible, and it will be dismissed, without prejudice.”
Cautions
She rules on summary judgment claim-by-claim and is willing to deny in part: in Longwell she dismissed the failure-to-hire theory but let the Title VII anti-male-bias theory proceed to trial, expressly framing the precise fact questions left for the jury. A defense MSJ before her is not all-or-nothing.
“Few issues remain for trial. They are: (1) Can Longwell prove, more likely than not, that Bunker had an anti-male bias? (2) If so, can Longwell prove, more likely than not, that such anti-male bias was a motivating factor in OPAS's decision to eliminate Longwell's job?”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The Plaintiff Thomas J. Kawa’s Fourth Amended Complaint (Filing No. 84) is stricken;”
“the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Causes of Action in the Third Amended Complaint, for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted, is denied as moot;”
“The Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal (Filing No. 10) is granted in part, as follows: a. The Plaintiff's third theory of recovery is dismissed, without prejudice; and b. The Plaintiff's fourth theory of recovery is dismissed, without prejudice, as to the Defendant Douglas County, Nebraska; 2. The Motion is otherwise denied;”
“The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 46) is granted; 2. This action is dismissed with prejudice;”
“Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 25) is granted; 2. The Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Filing No. 9) is dismissed, with prejudice;”
“Defendant Omaha Performing Arts Society’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 41) is granted in part, as follows: Plaintiff David Longwell’s failure-to-hire claim is dismissed; and 5. The Motion for Summary Judgment is otherwise denied.”
“Plaintiff David Longwell’s Motion to Strike/Objection to Certain Evidence submitted by Defendant (Filing No. 49) is granted;”
In a post-conviction criminal order, after previously denying the defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion and declining a certificate of appealability, the court construed the pro se Notice of Appeal as a motion to reconsider the certificate denial, denied reconsideration, and denied leave to appeal in forma pauperis under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. This was an appellate-procedure disposition rather than a ruling on the underlying substantive motion. Grounding quote: 'No certificate of appealability will be issued.'
“The Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 16) is granted in all respects; and 2. A judgment shall be separately filed.”
“Defendant HearthStone Homes, Inc.’s Summary Judgment Motion (Filing No. 21) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: HearthStone Homes, Inc.’s motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s claim of Religious Employment Discrimination based on upon the amount of Mr. Ollis’s severance pay; 2.) HearthStone Homes, Inc.’s motion is denied in all other respects.”
“IT IS ORDERED: The Motion for Reconsideration of Judgment on Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 76, filed by Plaintiff Thomas Majda Jr., is denied.”
“The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant W&G, Inc. (Filing No. 36) as to the award of attorney's fees is granted.”
“The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 45, Case No. 4:04cv3194) is granted;”
“Plaintiff John W. DeCamp's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 56, Case No. 4:04cv3194) is denied;”
“The Defendants' Motion to Strike the Brief and Affidavit of John DeCamp (Filing No. 53, Case No. 4:04cv3194) is granted;”
“In light of this, the Motion to Change Venue and for Recusal is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 1185 days (N = 2).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 109 days (N = 3).
The 21 sampled terminated cases are weighted toward employment and civil-rights claims, with additional employee-benefit, labor, contract, personal-injury, trademark, securities, and other statutory disputes. The sample is not a complete account of Smith Camp's 2001–2020 caseload.
A historical record
Judge Camp no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.