🧪 TEST MODE ACTIVE Use test card: 4242 4242 4242 4242

William James Jameson

United States District Court for the District of Montana district Retired 1990 · served 1957–1990 Appointed by Dwight D. Eisenhower (Republican) 21 signed orders read

Judge Jameson no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Jameson decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On summary judgment, Jameson refused to weigh competing testimony and resolved doubts for the nonmoving parties.

“In considering motions for summary judgment the court may not weigh testimony and must resolve any doubts against the moving party.”

Material discrepancies between a witness's statement and later deposition supplied good cause for production of the earlier statement.

“in view of the admitted discrepancies between the statement and deposition, production should now be ordered.”

A possible state-law claim against a resident defendant defeated a fraudulent-joinder theory and required remand.

“if there is a possibility that plaintiff has a cause of action under the applicable state law, the joinder is not fraudulent and the case should be remanded.”

Procedural preferences

Jameson deferred federal intervention in an ongoing state prosecution until state procedures had run their course.

“In view of my conclusion that any intervention by this court at the present time is unwarranted, I do not presume to pass upon the merits of plaintiff’s claim that her constitutional rights may be violated.”

In administrative review, he treated supported agency findings as binding rather than reweighing the record.

“the court may not weigh evidence adduced in an administrative proceeding, and if, upon review of the entire record, there is found substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s decision, it must be affirmed.”

Jameson treated venue transfer as preferable to dismissal when dismissal would extinguish a timely federal claim.

“If this action were dismissed, a new action would be barred by the statute of limitations. It is clear accordingly that dismissal would be improper.”

Cautions

A third-party claim could not obtain indemnity merely by alleging that another motorist was more culpable.

“It is my conclusion that this is not a case where the principles of indemnity are applicable.”

A single out-of-state sale did not create personal jurisdiction merely because the buyer later drove the product through Montana.

“The sale by Cooley to plaintiff, even if Cooley had known plaintiff would drive through Montana, would not evidence any intention to do business in this state.”

An association indictment survived when the charging allegations, read as a whole, adequately stated the antitrust offense.

“Viewing the indictment as a whole, it is my conclusion that it is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Tassie v. Continental Oil Co.
· 1964-05-01
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“1. That plaintiff’s motion to remand be, and the same hereby is, denied.”

Motions to transfer (plaintiff) Granted

“2. That plaintiff’s motion to transfer this cause to the Butte Division of this court be, and the same hereby is, granted.”

United States ex rel. Angell Bros. v. Cave Construction, Inc.
· 1966-03-09
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Denied

“1. The defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.”

United States v. Williams
· 1966-05-27
Motion for judgment of acquittal (defendant) Denied

“The motion for a judgment of acquittal is denied.”

Haydu v. City of Billings
· 1966-09-27
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“On the basis of the evidence and statements of counsel at the preliminary hearing, the court finds that the issues presented by the complaint are res judicata, and the motion to dismiss is granted.”

Meyer v. Noble Drilling, Inc.
· 1966-10-06
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“The motion for summary judgment is granted.”

Fifield v. American Automobile Association
· 1967-01-16
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“It is ordered that the motion to dismiss is denied, and the defendant is granted 30 days to answer.”

Continental Oil Co. v. Atwood & Morrill Co.
· 1967-02-27
Motion to quash or dismiss or transfer (defendant) Denied

“Accordingly, it is ordered that the defendant’s motion is denied, and the defendant is granted 30 days to plead further.”

Hamman v. United States
· 1967-03-14
Motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (United States) Denied

“For the reasons herein set forth, it is ordered that the motion of the defendant United States of America to dismiss or for summary judgment is denied in each of the above entitled actions.”

Thomas v. District Court of Thirteenth Judicial District
· 1967-07-06
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“The motion to dismiss is granted, and the clerk shall enter judgment of dismissal.”

United States v. Montana State Food Distributors Ass'n
· 1967-07-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant association) Denied

“The motion accordingly is denied.”

Henault Mining Co. v. Tysk
· 1967-07-24
Summary judgment (defendants) Denied

“The motion of the defendants for summary judgment is denied.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“The motion of plaintiff is granted, except as to the proposed findings.”

Boit v. Emmco Insurance
· 1967-08-24
Motion to dismiss or quash service (Associates Investment Company) Denied

“It is ordered that the motion is denied and the defendant Associates Investment Company is granted 20 days to plead further.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The 22 reviewed decisions cover a broad litigation sample, but they do not establish the distribution of Jameson's full caseload.

A historical record

Judge Jameson no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.