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Rodney W. Sippel

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri Appointed by Bill Clinton (Democratic) 10 signed orders read

How Judge Sippel decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

At the 12(b)(6) stage he reads Rule 8 generously: general allegations that give the defendant fair notice survive, and an entry-level employee need not plead the precise corporate structure to allege a joint-employer relationship.

“Although it would have been preferable for the Plaintiff to plead specific facts regarding each corporate defendant, the allegations made were sufficient to put the Defendants on notice of the claims against them.”

On a Missouri Merchandising Practices Act claim he enforces both the Division-of-Finance licensee exemption and the 'in connection with the sale' limit, so a loan servicer that took assignment years after origination is not liable.

“The loan servicing activity of Nationstar in this case began years after the loan was originated and is not ‘in connection with’ the sale or marketing of the loan.”

Procedural preferences

Title VII claims not raised in the underlying EEOC charge are treated as unexhausted and dismissed; only the discrete act actually charged (here, retaliatory termination) proceeds.

“The only discrete act that Carter raised in his EEOC charge was his allegation that he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his rights under Title VII. That is the only claim for which he received a right to sue from the EEOC. Carter’s EEOC charge does not assert any of the other discrete acts that he alludes to in his complaint.”

A Rule 60(b) motion that attacks the merits of a prior § 2255 denial (rather than a defect in the habeas proceeding itself) is recharacterized as a second-or-successive § 2255 motion and denied unless the Eighth Circuit has authorized it.

“Despite his assertion otherwise, Brown’s Rule 60(b) motion must be treated as a second or successive section 2255 motion. ... Brown has not received authorization from the Eighth Circuit to file these claims. As a result, I will deny his motion.”

Cautions

He warns parties (including pro se litigants) that a failure to timely respond to a summary-judgment motion will be ruled on the existing record without any further notice.

“Plaintiff is specifically warned that if he fails to timely respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, then the Court will proceed to rule the summary judgment motion without any additional notice being given to plaintiff.”

Repeated discovery non-compliance and failure to appear at a court-ordered hearing draw cost-shifting and dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute.

“Smith has repeatedly failed to participate in discovery in this case, despite the Court’s orders to do so. Smith also failed to attend the hearing, despite the Court’s order to appear in person. As a result, Defendants’ motion to compel and for sanctions will be granted in part”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Carter v. Missouri Department of Social Services, Family Support Division
4:09-cv-00624 · 2009-11-12
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant FDS’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Carter’s claims under the ADA, the ADEA, and under TitleVII (with the exception of Carter’s retaliation claim) [#22] is GRANTED.”

Smalley v. Gamache
4:10-cv-00319 · 2012-10-15
Motions to dismiss (plaintiff (pro se, own voluntary dismissal)) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to dismiss [#89] is denied.”

Motion for extension of time (plaintiff (pro se)) Moot / procedural

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time [#96] is denied as moot.”

Brown v. United States
4:13-cv-02204 · 2016-05-20
Motion for relief from judgment (petitioner (criminal defendant)) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Carl Brown’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from Petitioner’s 924(c) Indictment Count [29] is DENIED.”

Wilmering v. Bank of America
4:14-cv-00852 · 2014-08-28
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Nationstar’s motion to dismiss Count II [#16] is GRANTED.”

Pennington-Thurman v. United States
4:17-cv-02536 · 2017-10-25
Motion to proceed ifp (plaintiff (pro se)) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 2) is GRANTED.”

Motion to recharacterize filing (plaintiff (pro se)) Moot / procedural

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to have notice of removal filed as a motion for removal (Docket No. 5) is DENIED as moot.”

Preliminary injunction (plaintiff (pro se)) Moot / procedural

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (Docket No. 6) is DENIED as moot.”

Johnson v. McDonald's Corp.
4:20-cv-01867 · 2021-06-03
Motions to dismiss (defendant (McDonald's Corp.)) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that McDonald’s Corporations Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [21], is DENIED.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant (McDonald's USA, LLC)) Denied

“IT IS FURTEHR ORDERED that McDonald’s USA LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [19], is DENIED.”

Smith v. City of St. Charles, Missouri
4:21-cv-00093 · 2022-10-14
Motion for sanctions (plaintiff) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Jimmy E. Smith, Jr.’s motion for sanctions or alternatively to compel a counteroffer [75] is DENIED.”

Motion for entry of default (plaintiff) Denied

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Jimmy E. Smith, Jr.’s motion for entry of default against Defendant Amanda Watson [77] is DENIED.”

Motion to withdraw as counsel (plaintiff's counsel) Granted

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of Jason R. Craddock, Sr. to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff Jimmy E. Smith, Jr. [78] is GRANTED.”

Motions to compel (defendant) Granted in part

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to compel and for sanctions [82] is GRANTED in part.”

Motion for extension of time (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions in this case [80] and [93] are DENIED as moot.”

Motions to stay (plaintiff) Moot / procedural
Graw v. Eli Lilly and Company
4:25-cv-01033 · 2026-02-23
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Eli Lilly and Company’s motion to dismiss [12] is GRANTED. Plaintiff Patti Jo Graw’s Amended Complaint [6] will be DISMISSED with prejudice.”

Peak v. Wheeler
2:25-cv-00051 · 2026-01-16
Motion to proceed ifp (plaintiff (pro se)) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to commence this action without prepaying fees or costs [ECF No. 2] is GRANTED.”

Preliminary injunction (plaintiff (pro se)) Denied

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief [ECF Nos. 6, 7 and 8] are DENIED.”

Motion to appoint counsel (plaintiff (pro se)) Moot / procedural

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 4] is DENIED AS MOOT.”

Jones v. Cofer
4:26-cv-00780 · 2026-05-27
Motion to proceed ifp (petitioner (pro se)) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] is GRANTED, and the filing fee is waived.”

Habeas petition (petitioner (pro se)) Denied

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1] is DENIED and DISMISSED as second or successive.”

Put Judge Sippel's record to work

Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Sippel actually rules, not a generic AI guess.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Sippel's own signed orders and cites them.