Susan Beth Richard Nelson
How Judge Nelson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Nelson will not infer a private civil remedy from a criminal statute: she holds that a criminal prohibition (here Minnesota's commercial-bribery statute, Minn. Stat. 609.86) creates no civil cause of action unless the statute expressly or by clear implication so provides. A plaintiff dressing a criminal act up as a civil claim should expect 12(b)(6) dismissal.
“The law in Minnesota is clear that commercial bribery exists only as a criminal act—not a civil cause of action. ... '[A] criminal statute does not automatically give rise to a civil cause of action unless the statute expressly or by clear implication so provides.'”
Nelson enforces the specific-objection requirement for magistrate R&Rs strictly: general or conclusory objections, untimely objections, and brand-new arguments raised for the first time in objections do not trigger de novo review and will not be considered. A party who loses before the magistrate must object with particularity and on time, or the R&R stands.
“the burden is on the objecting party to note—with specificity—the basis upon which he objects to each recommendation. ... General or conclusory objections are insufficient to trigger de novo review ... 'New claims or arguments, presented for the first time in the objections to an R&R, will not be reviewed.'”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiff Brock Fredin's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 80] is GRANTED;”
“Plaintiff Brock Fredin's letter request for leave to file a third amended complaint [Doc. No. 89] is DENIED;”
“Defendant Referee Elizabeth Clysdale's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 38], as applied to the now operative Second Amended Complaint, is GRANTED, and all claims against Referee Clysdale are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;”
“Defendants Grace Elizabeth Miller, Catherine Marie Schaefer, and Lindsey Middlecamp's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 44], as applied to the now operative Second Amended Complaint, is GRANTED, and all claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;”
“Defendant Sergeant David E. McCabe's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 49], as applied to the now operative Second Amended Complaint, is GRANTED ... Summary judgment is awarded on the search warrant-based retaliation claim in Count 1 ... and on the Franks-based Fourth Amendment claim in Count 2 ... All remaining claims against Sergeant McCabe are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Defendant John H. Pribyl's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 283] is GRANTED, and all claims against Defendant John H. Pribyl are DISMISSED with prejudice;”
“Defendant Michael Fuhrman's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 296] is GRANTED, and all claims against Defendant Michael Fuhrman are DISMISSED with prejudice;”
“Defendant Janey Nelson's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 344] is GRANTED, and all claims against Defendant Janey Nelson are DISMISSED with prejudice;”
“Defendant Sonia Mosch's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 357] is GRANTED, and all claims against Defendant Sonia Mosch are DISMISSED with prejudice;”
“Plaintiff Harley Dean Meyer's Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Motion to Defendant Mosch's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 376] is GRANTED;”
“Plaintiff Harley Dean Meyer's Motion for Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 367] is DENIED;”
“Hrebal's Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 77] is GRANTED. The Court accordingly enters partial summary judgment in Hrebal's favor, in the manner explained herein.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 9] is DENIED”
“Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 11] is GRANTED.”
“PRMI's motion for a jury trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b). For the following reasons, the Court denies the motion.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 21] is DENIED”
“Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 23] is GRANTED; and ... This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS.”
“Defendant's motion for relief under Rule 60(b) [Doc. No. 207] is GRANTED IN PART (insofar as it requests that the Band be relieved of any further compliance with its obligations under the 1994 Agreements) and DENIED IN PART (insofar as it requests retroactive relief, including relief from payments due the City for the years 2009-2011 ...)”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 47] is GRANTED, consistent with this Order.”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 87] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as detailed herein.”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 152] is DENIED;”
“Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony [Doc. No. 158] is DENIED; and”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability [Doc. No. 165] is DENIED.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 16] is DENIED;”
“Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 20] is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 364 days (N = 1).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 260 days (N = 3).
The sampled dockets all involve the same pro se filer and illustrate a serial-filer component of Nelson's caseload rather than her overall mix: Fredin v. Clysdale, Fredin v. Miller, Fredin v. Street, a second Fredin v. Miller matter, and Fredin v. Kreil. Her broader docket includes complex product-liability and mass-tort matters. This sample is not representative of her full assigned caseload or of counseled, contested cases.
Put Judge Nelson's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Nelson actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Nelson's own signed orders and cites them.