Reginald Carl Lindsay

“For these reasons, the plaintiffs motion for de novo review is hereby GRANTED.”

“In summary, Genesis’s motion for summary judgment as to counts I and II of Strange’s complaint is granted. Strange’s motion for summary judgment on count I of his complaint is denied. Genesis’s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim is granted as to count I and denied as to counts II and III. Counts II and III of Genesis’s counterclaim are dismissed without prejudice.”

“Because this court cannot constitutionally exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants, Simeon’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.”

“Therefore, to the extent that Carillo seeks damages against Du-Bois in his official capacity for alleged past violations, the motion to dismiss is ALLOWED.”

“For the reasons stated above, the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED as to all counts in the original complaint.”

“The plaintiffs motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint is DENIED.”

“Accordingly, the orders in Carillo I are vacated insofar as they address the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims. The orders in Carillo I will stand, however, insofar as they granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims for damages. Those orders will also stand to the extent that they deny the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief based upon the plaintiffs constitutional claims.”

“The plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Mandatory or Prohibitive Injunc-tive Relief and Interim Equitable Relief, dated May 2, 2001, is DENIED.”

“The defendants’ Motion to Dismiss count I of the amended complaint, dated May 7, 2001, is treated as one for summary judgment and GRANTED.”

“Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to all counts.”

“For the foregoing reasons, I GRANT the FBI’s motion to dismiss counts 3 and 7 and DENY the USA’s motion to dismiss counts 8 and 9 (except to the extent that count 9 raises a claim based on RICO).”

“Because there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the issue of liability, and because McLain is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, I GRANT summary judgment in his favor on the issue of liability and DENY Somerville’s motion for summary judgment.”

“For these reasons, the defendant’s motion to affirm the appeals officer’s determination is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED.”

“For the reasons stated above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is granted as to all counts of the complaint, except count IV and count X to the extent that they assert respectively claims for intentional interference with advantageous business relations against Whitney (count IV) and libel and slander claims against her (count X). Accordingly, counts I, II, III, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX are dismissed as to both defendants with prejudice. Count X is dismissed with prejudice to the extent that it purports to assert a libel and slander claim against NSTAR.”