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George Clinton Sweeney

United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts district Retired 1966 · served 1935–1966 Appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt (Democratic) 25 signed orders read

Judge Sweeney no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Sweeney decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Sweeney treated the federal courts' interest in protecting the integrity of their own process as sufficient to require a uniform federal rule.

“The federal interest which is, here, involved is the essential concern of the federal courts with the integrity of their process”

Sweeney credited a patent's departure from accepted technical assumptions when the evidence showed that the departure produced a stronger and commercially successful product.

“This was a radical departure from the deeply rooted misconception that a strong glass would not tolerate residual stresses.”

Procedural preferences

Sweeney directed parties to use discovery, rather than a more definite statement, for evidentiary detail when the complaint already gave fair notice.

“The details they seek by this motion are more appropriately obtained by discovery.”

Sweeney enforced agreed arbitration procedures when the asserted labor dispute fell within the contracts' grievance provisions.

“whether or not the alleged strike is a violation of the contracts clearly is an arbitrable issue.”

Cautions

Sweeney held that preliminary corporate negotiations were not necessarily material securities information before a transaction had been completed.

“until a transaction has been completed, there cannot, as a practical matter, be a duty on the participants to divulge either the details or even the fact of the discussions.”

Sweeney would not permit a plaintiff to divide a single accrued claim among separate suits to create jurisdiction.

“This constitutes but one claim and cannot be divided into separate suits for the purpose of evading the jurisdictional requirements of the Tucker Act”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Franchi Construction Co. v. Local No. 560 of the International Hod Carriers
Motion for more definite statement (defendants) Denied

“All defendants except Local 12, Plumbers and Gas Fitters Union (hereinafter Plumbers) have filed motions for a more definite statement. They are denied.”

Motions to dismiss (defendants) Denied

“Plumbers and The FraminghamNewton Building and Construction Trades Council move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. These motions are denied.”

Motions to stay (defendants) Denied

“The motion is denied.”

Ward v. Associated Motorcycles Ltd.
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The motion to dismiss the action is, accordingly, allowed.”

United States v. Goldberg
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted in part

“Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion is allowed as to those counts of the complaint which allege facts previously alleged in the indictment and which, by the defendant’s plea, are admitted; namely, Counts 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19 through 25, 27, 28, and 31 through 36. The motion is denied as to the remaining counts which allege false applications to banks different from those given in the indictment or, in the case of Counts 8 and 10, on dates different from those in the indictment.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.”

Corkin v. United States Life Insurance
Claim after bench trial (plaintiffs) Denied

“Accordingly, judgment may be entered for the defendant.”

Petition to reopen case (plaintiffs) Denied

“The request to reopen is therefore denied.”

Textile Banking Co. v. S. Starensier, Inc.
Motion for leave to amend complaint (plaintiff) Granted

“The motion for leave to add parties defendant and to file a substitute complaint is allowed.”

Nationwide Charters & Conventions, Inc. v. Garber
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“the motion to remand is denied.”

Request for interlocutory certification (plaintiff) Denied

“That request is denied.”

Levin v. United States
Claim after bench trial (plaintiff) Denied

“Judgment may be entered for the defendant.”

Mt. Vernon Cooperative Bank v. Gleason
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“The plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.”

Franchi Construction Co. v. Local No. 560 of the International Hod Carriers
Motion for more definite statement (defendants) Denied

“All defendants have moved under Rule 12(e), F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C., for a more definite statement. These motions are denied.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“The motion to dismiss is, accordingly, denied.”

Motions to stay (defendants) Granted

“The motion to stay is allowed.”

Philips Electronic & Pharmaceutical Industries, Corp. v. Electronic Products, Inc.
Permanent injunction (plaintiff) Granted

“The plaintiff is entitled to a judgment which will include a) a permanent injunction against further infringement of patent 3,035,372 by the defendant and b) damages to be assessed by a master who will be appointed by the court if the parties cannot agree upon a master.”

Damages award (plaintiff) Granted
Treble damages (plaintiff) Denied

“The' plaintiff’s prayer for treble damages is denied as I find that this *709patent was honestly contested on both of the questions of infringement and invalidity.”

Counsel fees (plaintiff) Denied

“The plaintiff’s prayer for counsel fees is denied.”

In re Fred W. Mears Heel Co.
Motion to modify subpoena (subpoenaed party) Granted

“This modification will have the effect of limiting the various papers set forth in the subpoena to those referring to the acquisition of the stock of the Maple Wood Heel Company, and the subpoena is modified to that effect.”

In re United Last Co.
Motion to quash subpoena (movant) Granted

“The motion to quash is granted for the reason that the period sought to be covered by the subpoena is well beyond what might be termed a reasonable and unoppressive period.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

No case-level docket record was returned for Sweeney's 1935-1966 tenure. The profile therefore makes no claim about caseload mix, case duration, administrative dispositions, or motion timing.

A historical record

Judge Sweeney no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.