Nauman Steele Scott

“For the foregoing reasons, the NLRB’s request for an injunction pursuant to Section 10(j) of the Act is hereby DENIED.”

“motion to set aside the entry of default is hereby GRANTED.”

“Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint, insofar as it asserts a cause of action sounding in tort against the USPS, be and it is hereby dismissed.”

“it is hereby ordered that plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is granted and that this action be and it is hereby remanded to the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, State of Louisiana.”

“Inasmuch as we may not exercise removal jurisdiction, the motions filed by G&H are rendered moot.”

“defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, then, turns on whether Mr. Blake acted willfully in failing to pay over the withholding taxes. We view the disputed facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Blake. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); Mazo v. United States, supra. *225 During certain fiscal quarters prior to the ones at issue, the corporation fell delinquent in its payment of withholding taxes. Mr. Bryant’s predecessor was fired at that time and a payment schedule was arranged with an IRS agent to amicably resolve the matter. It was understood by Blake, Hardin and Silver that they were also responsible for the corporation’s ongoing obligation to collect and pay over the withholding taxes. From that time through the first quarter of 1975 the corporation maintained a nearly insolvent financial status. It thereafter became defunct. During the quarters at issue, Mr. Blake remained aware of the poor corporate financial profile. Various creditors were paid, with the requisite two of the three officers signing each check. Mr. Bryant, asked weekly about the withholding system by all three officers, assured them that these taxes were being paid. There is some issue as to whether the IRS checks, once signed, were mailed. However, none of the officers took the simple steps to personally review the monthly bank statements to ascertain the balance or take stock of the cancelled checks. That job was delegated to Mr. Bryant. During the first quarter of 1975, the tax delinquency was made known to the Board of Directors, including Blake, Hardin and Silver, at a meeting with IRS representatives. Various creditors were paid thereafter, but not the IRS. For all three quarters at issue, employees were paid their net salaries. Thus the tax fund was accumulated, then depleted for the purpose of paying creditors other than the IRS. Willful conduct under § 6672 entails an intentional act, including a reckless disregard of a known or obvious risk that the IRS liability may not be satisfied. See Mazo v. United States, supra, at 1154 and cases cited thereunder. The Mazo court indicated that once actual notice of a prior delinquency is given to a responsible corporate official, mere delegation of authority is no excuse for any subsequent failure to pay withholding taxes. Id. at 1157. In this instance it can be said that the delinquencies combined with the corporation’s continued financial distress would require more active oversight by the officers. These officers’ continued signing of checks to other creditors after they were told of the current tax delinquency points to a willful failure to pay the IRS. Id. at 1156-1157; Teel v. United States, 529 F.2d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 1976). Mr. Blake focuses on Mr. Bryant’s assurances as having misled him. We are not persuaded by this allegation and quote from the Mazo opinion, which dealt with the same situation. ‘In essence the appellants’ primary argument is that an issue was created with respect to willfulness by their contention that Lavoie, the controller, misled them by asserting that he had taken care of the matter or would take care of the matter for them. However, once they were aware of the liability to the government, they were under a duty to ensure that the taxes were paid before any payments were made to other creditors. If, after receiving actual notice, corporate officials could once again delegate their responsibility to subordinates, then repeated escape from liability would be possible and the government would be required to monitor corporate affairs daily. The statutory concept of willfulness conveys no such meaning.’ Mazo v. United States, supra, at 1157. The totality of the circumstances reveals that Henry E. Blake acted willfully, under the meaning and spirit of § 6672 as interpreted by the courts, in failing to ensure the payment of withholding taxes to the IRS. Based upon the foregoing, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed.”

“Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of the plaintiff herein is hereby granted,”

“the Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of the defendant herein is hereby denied.”

“Plaintiff having failed to file a proper administrative claim within the two years provided by law, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss and hereby dismiss plaintiff’s complaint at plaintiff’s cost.”

“For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.”

“the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss indicates that the plaintiff has failed to file any administrative claims with the United States Army Claims Service, the appropriate Federal agency, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Accordingly, we presently have no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED. The defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and it is ORDERED that the action be DISMISSED without prejudice.”

“For these reasons, plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is denied.”

“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”

Scott reaffirmed an earlier indemnity ruling after subsequent authority and held that the contractor owed no defense or indemnity for the indemnitee's own negligence.

Scott calculated maintenance-and-cure offsets after a Jones Act jury trial; the opinion did not decide a party motion.