John Malach Shaw
Judge Shaw no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Shaw decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Outer Continental Shelf drilling-contract disputes he draws a sharp line between maritime and platform law for indemnity claims: admiralty law governs only where the injured party was himself employed to provide the maritime service the contract contemplated, not merely because maritime operations caused the injury.
“platform law governs the indemnity claim where, as here, the platform worker is injured by (rather than in) the performance of a maritime obligation under the drilling contract.”
He reads the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act narrowly -- it voids an oilfield indemnity agreement only to the extent it shifts the indemnitee's own negligence, leaving the balance of the indemnity obligation enforceable.
“section 2780 nullifies an oilfield indemnity agreement only to the extent that the agreement purports to defend and indemnify a party against the consequences of its own negligence. Application of section 2780 leaves the indemnity agreement valid and enforceable in all other respects.”
In Jones Act cases he will resolve seaman status on summary judgment where the record permits only one conclusion -- denying status to a worker with no vessel assignment, but granting it (via the fleet doctrine) to a diver more or less permanently tied to an identifiable group of vessels.
“The Court finds that the plaintiff was more or less permanently assigned to an identifiable fleet of vessels and did a substantial part of his work on the vessel or vessels during the critical period of employment.”
He enforces the Federal Tort Claims Act's discretionary-function exception to bar suits over government policy judgments, even assuming an abuse of discretion.
“the decisions exercised by government employees concerning this jeep fall within the purview of a discretionary function or duty, and whether or not they abused their discretion, the plaintiffs’ claims herein are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).”
Procedural preferences
He requires a genuine nexus between a nonresident defendant's Louisiana business and the plaintiff's claim before the state long-arm statute -- and thus personal jurisdiction -- will reach it; general in-state sales are not enough.
“Since the Court finds that there is no nexus between plaintiff’s cause of action and defendant’s business as required by Louisiana courts, the Louisiana Long-Arm Statute is not applicable.”
On Louisiana prescription he holds that relation-back under Rule 15(c) cannot revive a claim once prescription has already accrued against a would-be solidary obligor.
“this court finds that Richard’s amended complaint naming Reed-Joseph Company as an additional defendant did not interrupt prescription with respect to Bluff-ton.”
He resists deferring a Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 'new drug' seizure to the agency: in a Government enforcement action the district court, not the FDA, decides whether the product is generally recognized as safe and effective.
“deference would be inappropriate here, where it is the agency that is asking the district court to determine ‘new drug’ status in an enforcement action commenced by the Government.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The Court will GRANT the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to the reasons stated above.”
“Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
“the defendants’ motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Jones Act and general maritime law claims is GRANTED, and further because the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction the entire matter is DISMISSED.”
“the motion by the defendant, C.S.E. Automation Engineering and Services, Inc., d/b/a Automation USA and Automation International, Inc. to transfer this action to the Eastern District of Louisiana, is GRANTED.”
“the motion of Noble Drilling Company for summary judgment in its favor on its cross-claim for contractual indemnity from Anadarko Production Company is GRANTED.”
“Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration by Anadarko Production Company is DENIED.”
“the motion for partial summary judgment brought by Garber Brothers, Inc. is GRANTED, but only to the extent that Forest Oil Corporation cannot recover defense and indemnity if it or its independent contractors who are directly responsible to Forest Oil Corporation were negligent or otherwise at fault.”
“the motion for summary judgment brought by CRC Mallard, Inc. is GRANTED to the extent that (a) Garber Brothers, Inc. will be entitled to contribution from CRC Mallard, Inc. on Forest Oil Corporation’s defense and indemnity claim only if Forest Oil Corporation and its independent contractors who are directly responsible to Forest Oil Company are not negligent or otherwise at fault and (b) Garber Brothers, Inc. is not entitled to tort indemnity or tort contribution from CRC Mallard, Inc. In all other respects, the motions are DENIED.”
“the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims but concludes that the defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law on all but one of the plaintiff’s claims.”
“concludes that the defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law on all but one of the plaintiff’s claims.”
“the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law.”
“the summary judgment motion filed by all defendants is hereby GRANTED; therefore, the remaining summary judgment motions are moot.”
“the Court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss based upon its finding that all of the actions of government employees which the plaintiffs claim contributed to causing the vehicular accident in which they were injured on December 26, 1981, are actions which Congress intended to shield from tort liability pursuant to the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680.”
“For the following reasons this Court has determined that the motion to dismiss should be granted.”
“Accordingly, defendant Garrett’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
As a district judge and then senior judge in the Lafayette/Opelousas Division (1979-1999), Shaw carried a general civil and criminal docket dominated by the maritime, oilfield-service, and offshore-energy litigation of south Louisiana. The retained enumeration is a slice of 18 terminated civil cases filed 1997-1999 -- almost all Jones Act / general-maritime personal-injury suits against drilling and marine-service companies (e.g. Cagle v. Ensco Offshore, Carpenter v. Kerr McGee, Fontenot v. Cliffs Drilling, Stelly v. T. L. James) -- consistent with the admiralty and oilfield subject matter of his published opinions.
A historical record
Judge Shaw no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.