Toby Jon Crouse
How Judge Crouse decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
A statute-of-repose or statute-of-limitations affirmative defense can be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion ONLY when the dates on the face of the complaint make clear the right is extinguished. Crouse will not consider a defendant's extraneous manufacturing/service/warranty records attached to a Rule 12 motion, and will not convert the motion to summary judgment to do so. If the complaint omits the triggering dates, the repose defense must wait for summary judgment.
“Without the extraneous evidence, Honeywell has not established that either statute of repose precludes the claims. ... it would be error to dismiss a claim based on them at this stage of the proceedings.”
On a post-verdict Rule 50(b) JMOL, arguing the plaintiff 'failed to show pretext' misapprehends the posture. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework dissolves once a plaintiff survives summary judgment; at trial the sole question is whether the employer intentionally discriminated. Crouse will not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the jury where sufficient admissible evidence supports the verdict. Frame post-trial motions around the trial standard, not the summary-judgment framework.
“That argument misapprehends the procedural posture of the case. ... ‘the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—disappear[s]’ after a plaintiff survives summary judgment by offering sufficient evidence of pretext.”
On a preliminary-injunction motion where a government defendant restricted a plaintiff's speech and defends by calling it an unprotected 'true threat,' Crouse puts the burden of proving the threat on the defendant, not the plaintiff. If the evidence on that defense is merely in equipoise, the defendant loses; describing a risk or a hypothetical bad actor is not the same as personally expressing a serious intent to commit violence, and how the audience actually reacted at the time (calm vs. alarmed) is strong evidence either way.
“Even viewed in the light most favorable to the Board, the evidence is in equipoise. ... This state of affairs leads to the conclusion that the Board has failed to establish that Mr. Wagner made the statement the Board now contends was a true threat.”
Procedural preferences
Title VII front pay and back pay are EQUITABLE remedies decided by the court; a jury verdict on them is only advisory and the court makes its own findings. In a failure-to-promote case with more prevailing plaintiffs than open positions, only the plaintiff who would have been promoted but for the discrimination recovers equitable relief — awarding every plaintiff full relief is an impermissible windfall/double recovery. Crouse decides which plaintiff would have gotten the job (interview scores, decisionmaker testimony, later promotion history) and limits the award accordingly.
“But for the City’s unlawful discrimination, only one Plaintiff would have been promoted to Major in 2021. ... Awarding front pay and back pay to each Plaintiff as if she had a 100% chance of promotion would make the City liable for more than what its unlawful discrimination caused, which would result in a ‘windfall’ to Plaintiffs.”
A renewed Rule 50(b) JMOL may only reassert the same grounds raised in the pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion (limited exception: new sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds the opponent does not object to). Preserve every JMOL ground in your Rule 50(a) motion before the case goes to the jury, or lose it.
“In moving for renewed judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), a party ‘can only reassert the same grounds for judgment as a matter of law that [it] first asserted in [its] pre-deliberation Rule 50(a) motion.’”
Cautions
Object contemporaneously and specifically at trial or the evidentiary challenge is waived for a new-trial motion. Crouse repeatedly rejected the City's new-trial complaints about 'me too' and other-employee testimony because the City either did not object when the evidence came in or objected only on a narrow ground; testimony admitted without objection cannot later support a new trial. (Note also: anecdotal 'me too' evidence of other employees' discrimination IS admissible when tied to the same decisionmaker and timeframe.)
“the City cannot complain about the evidence to which it did not object nor complain about the testimony that was introduced based on its few objections.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Honeywell’s Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 21, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“the City’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and its Motion for New Trial are DENIED.”
“the City’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial is denied, but its motion regarding front pay and back pay awards is granted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Wellsky's Partial Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 4, is GRANTED.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Doc. 14, is GRANTED.”
“As a result, the motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution, Doc. 19, is denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 19, is GRANTED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Flender's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Doc. 7, is DENIED.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the City's motion for summary judgment, Doc. 100, is GRANTED, and Mar's motion to supplement, Doc. 143, is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Western World's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 146, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“LDG's Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony, Docs. 137, 139, and 144, are DENIED, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and DENIED as moot, respectively.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Jones's Motion to Suppress Evidence, Doc. 21, is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Report and Recommendation, Doc. 7, is adopted in full. The case is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“For the reasons set forth above, Miller's motion to exclude the testimony of CNH's expert, Kirk Ney, Doc. 124, is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Walmart's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 95, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. 92, and Walmart's Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony, Doc. 93, are DENIED.”
“the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. 92, and Walmart's Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony, Doc. 93, are DENIED.”
Put Judge Crouse's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Crouse actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Crouse's own signed orders and cites them.