Rachel E. Schwartz
How Judge Schwartz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Schwartz does not look at cash on hand alone — she compares the movant's monthly income to monthly expenses, and if the surplus exceeds the filing fee she will recommend denial even when the movant currently has little or no cash, typically pairing the denial with a 30-day window to pay. To win IFP before her, a pro se plaintiff should show that required, recurring expenses leave no realistic surplus over the $405 fee.
“Judges in this district have denied IFP motions when monthly income exceeds monthly expenses by an amount that would enable the movant to pay the filing fee, even when the movant does not currently have enough cash on hand to pay the filing fee.”
On 1915(e) screening of a pro se complaint, Schwartz applies the Rule 12(b)(6) / Iqbal-Twombly plausibility standard strictly: the complaint must say what each defendant did, when, how it harmed the plaintiff, and which specific legal right was violated. Vague invocations of 'civil rights' and constitutional amendments without supporting facts will not survive, and she will not construct a legal theory or supply facts for the litigant.
“mere 'labels and conclusions,' and 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' will not suffice; a plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.”
For a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim she requires a plausible allegation that each named defendant acted under color of state law; naming a person only by title or as a private party, without facts tying them to state authority or to joint action with a state actor, is fatal. When all federal claims fail on screening she declines supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses state-law claims without prejudice.
“There are no allegations that Defendant Wright acted under color of law or abused any power that they possess by virtue of state law. This alone warrants dismissal of any § 1983 claim Plaintiff may be raising against Defendant Wright.”
Procedural preferences
Before recommending dismissal of a pro se complaint on screening, Schwartz first puts the plaintiff on written notice of the specific Rule 8 / pleading deficiencies and gives an opportunity to amend; only after the plaintiff declines or fails to amend does she recommend dismissal, reasoning that further amendment would be futile. Her R&Rs carry the standard 14-day written-objection admonition (28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), D. Kan. Rule 72.1.4(b)).
“It would be futile to give Plaintiff another opportunity to amend because the Court already gave Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint to address the concerns the Court detailed in writing to Plaintiff, but she declined. The Court therefore recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.”
On a motion for leave to amend a pleading filed after the scheduling-order deadline, Schwartz applies Rule 16(b)(4)'s good-cause standard before reaching Rule 15(a): a party who sits on new information for weeks before moving, or who moves only shortly before a final pretrial conference, will not show diligence even if the underlying information truly was learned late. By contrast, a motion filed by the court's own (even extended) deadline, with discovery time still remaining, is timely and will be granted absent a specific showing of prejudice or futility -- lateness or a lack of specificity in the opposing brief is not enough on its own.
“Even assuming that Plaintiff both diligently sought this information and, despite this diligence, could not have learned this information before January 28, 2025, Plaintiff failed to diligently pursue an amendment based on this information.”
On discovery disputes and deposition conduct, Schwartz expects the parties to raise problems with her chambers immediately -- during or right after the event -- rather than litigate them later in a motion; a party who waits weeks to complain, or who never requested a discovery conference as the local rules require, undercuts its own request for relief even if the other side's conduct was genuinely improper. She also weighs both sides' conduct: finding opposing counsel's questioning improper does not by itself win a sanctions motion if the movant was also uncivil or dilatory.
“Had Plaintiff sought a discovery conference during the deposition, the Court doubts that the present motion would be necessary. This is the purpose of D. Kan. Rule 37.1(a).”
On motions to compel discovery, Schwartz enforces D. Kan. Rule 37.1 timeliness strictly: a party that lets a discovery default sit for weeks or months before raising it with the court -- rather than promptly requesting a discovery conference -- risks denial as untimely regardless of the merits, even where the opposing side was independently at fault (e.g. a wholesale non-response). Where she does reach the merits, she tends toward calibrated relief -- granting in part and narrowing a request's temporal or custodial scope -- rather than an all-or-nothing ruling.
“Finding the present Motion timely would thwart the very purpose of the Rule—to quickly address discovery disputes well in advance of the discovery deadline.”
On a motion to strike a plaintiff expert's rebuttal report, Schwartz parses it paragraph by paragraph rather than ruling on the report as a whole: testimony that specifically contradicts a defense expert's conclusion is proper rebuttal, but testimony that merely bolsters the plaintiff's own case-in-chief theory -- even using the same underlying facts -- is struck as improper, especially when raised only shortly before the discovery deadline.
“In situations like this, the appropriate course is to limit the proposed rebuttal expert's testimony rather than striking it altogether.”
Cautions
On motions to reopen a detention hearing or reconsider a pretrial-release revocation, Schwartz holds firmly to prior findings absent genuinely new, credible information; a defendant's belated offer to enter treatment, or a claim that jail conditions are difficult, will not move her if it does not address the specific reasons -- risk of flight or danger, or an inability to comply with conditions -- that led to the original detention or revocation decision.
“Defendant's lack of candor with her evaluator gives the Court serious concerns about the sincerity of Defendant's desire to participate in inpatient treatment at this time.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because Plaintiff appears to have a more than $1,100 in excess monthly income—far exceeding the $405 filing fee—Plaintiff has not established that his access to the Court would be seriously hampered by requiring him to pay the filing fee, and he has not established an inability to pay the filing fee. For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge deny the Application and direct Plaintiff to pay the filing fee within thirty days of an order on this Report and Recommendation.”
Schwartz's signed 18-page R&R recommended sua sponte dismissal of a pro se in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim and declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. Her detailed Section 1983 analysis found that the plaintiff named defendants only by label, alleged no facts showing what each defendant did or that they acted under color of state law, and cited constitutional provisions such as the Eleventh Amendment that created no private right of action. The court had already given her a chance to amend, which she did not take, so further amendment would be futile. The district judge adopted the recommendation.
District Judge Daniel D. Crabtree's Memorandum & Order (read in full) ACCEPTING, ADOPTING, and AFFIRMING Schwartz's 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) screening R&R (her Doc. 15, 2024-10-15) dismissing plaintiff's federal claims for failure to state a claim and declining supplemental jurisdiction; the same order also AFFIRMED Schwartz's Order (Doc. 20) denying plaintiff's motion to recuse (the recusal motion itself is captured with dates in the broader docket record). A screening dismissal on no party motion. This document was signed by Judge Crabtree, so it is recorded as Schwartz's recommendation adopted.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 6) issued by United States Magistrate Judge Rachel E. Schwartz on August 30, 2024, is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED, and AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Doc. 3) is DENIED.”
District Judge John W. Broomes's Memorandum & Order (read in full) ADOPTING Schwartz's R&R (her Doc. 12, 2022-06-21) recommending dismissal of a pro se complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: no complete diversity between the parties and no federal question. A sua sponte jurisdictional dismissal on no party motion. The order was signed by Judge Broomes; it is recorded as Schwartz's recommendation adopted.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 146, is DENIED.”
District Judge Julie A. Robinson's Order (read in full) ACCEPTING and ADOPTING Schwartz's R&R (her Doc. 11, 2025-09-09) recommending dismissal without prejudice of Defendant Sylvan Learning Center under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), after plaintiff did not respond to Schwartz's own show-cause order about the unserved defendant. A sua sponte Rule 4(m) dismissal on no party motion. This document was signed by Judge Robinson; it is recorded as Schwartz's recommendation adopted.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees, ECF No. 3, is DENIED without prejudice to refiling on or before January 16, 2026.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend, ECF No. 83, is GRANTED. Defendant must file its Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses, ECF No. 83-1, within two business days from the date of this order.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Donna L. Huffman's Motion for Findings of Deposition Misconduct and Sanctions, ECF No. 122, is DENIED.”
Schwartz's signed 35-page Memorandum and Order in a referral case assigned to District Judge Julie A. Robinson resolved the court's own show-cause order over the defendants' violation of the operative protective order through disclosure of attorneys'-eyes-only expert reports. She publicly admonished defense counsel as the sanction, rejected the plaintiff's request for a $96,967.33 fee award, and denied expedited third-party discovery into the scope of the violation as disproportionate. The disposition arose from the court's show-cause order rather than a discrete party motion.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel Production of Documents (ECF No. 108) is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 94 days (N = 1).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 5 days (N = 5).
The sampled matters consist mainly of short criminal-magistrate proceedings, such as initial appearances and complaints, together with civil referrals from district judges. The Hubbard matter analyzed below is a pro se civil-rights complaint referred to Schwartz.
Put Judge Schwartz's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Schwartz actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Schwartz's own signed orders and cites them.