Sheila M. Finnegan
Judge Finnegan no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Finnegan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On consent Social Security review she both remands and affirms on the merits as final judgments (here 1 remand, 2 affirmances). A remand turns on a concrete analytical gap — e.g. an unresolved conflict between the vocational expert's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles — so a claimant should pin the substantial-evidence/'logical bridge' challenge to a specific, identifiable error rather than a general disagreement.
“the ALJ's decision is reversed, and this case is remanded”
Procedural preferences
On referred civil discovery she actively polices the adequacy and transparency of a producing party's search: where responsive documents were missed and the search process could not be clearly explained, she granted relief, while denying the over-reaching parts (e.g. a demand for a second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition). Come to her with a concrete, well-documented showing of a search deficiency and a narrowly-scoped request, not a blunderbuss demand.
“The motion is denied at this time in all other respects.”
She grants compel motions for either side when relevance and proportionality are shown and the opponent has not carried the undue-burden showing — including ordering production of documents used to refresh a witness's recollection under Fed. R. Evid. 612 and allowing more than ten depositions where proportional. Frame discovery disputes around proportionality and a specific evidentiary hook.
“Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel [76] is granted.”
Cautions
She does not award discovery sanctions reflexively: a non-party's Rule 45(d)(1) sanctions motion was denied where the subpoenaing party had not acted sanctionably, the burden was limited, and the fees claimed were not actually incurred by the movant. A sanctions request must be backed by sanctionable conduct and the movant's own real, incurred costs.
“For the reasons set forth above, Non-Party Andrew McLeod's Motion for Sanctions [13] is denied.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Trost Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 16] is granted with prejudice.”
“the Brown and Draus Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 17] is also granted, and the dismissal as to the malicious prosecution claims is with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Expert Opinion Basis Materials (Doc. 107) is granted in part and denied in part.”
“The motion is denied at this time in all other respects.”
“Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel [76] is granted.”
“both motions are granted.”
“For the reasons set forth above, Non-Party Andrew McLeod's Motion for Sanctions [13] is denied.”
“the ALJ's decision is reversed, and this case is remanded”
“Plaintiff's request to reverse or remand the ALJ's decision is denied, and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [19] is granted.”
“the Court grants judgment in favor of the Commissioner.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Judge Finnegan's reviewed docket had two principal components: duty-magistrate matters involving warrants, package seizures, and cell-site applications, and a substantial civil consent docket. Her consent work under 28 U.S.C. 636(c) was led by Social Security disability appeals in which she entered final judgment. She also handled referred civil discovery, including motions to compel, sanctions requests, and deposition-limit disputes.
A historical record
Judge Finnegan no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.