M. David Weisman
How Judge Weisman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Social Security appeals he enforces the treating-source and articulation rules but is even-handed. An ALJ loses when she mischaracterizes the record, ignores contrary evidence, gives a non-'acceptable medical source' opinion NO weight (rather than just not-controlling weight), or relies on 'meaningless boilerplate' credibility language without explaining what testimony was credited. But he affirms ALJ findings that are adequately supported, declines to 'scour' a long record for an argument the claimant failed to develop, and agrees a claim that one cannot work is reserved to the Commissioner.
“The fact that Ms. Kos is not an acceptable medical source ... means that her opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, not that it should be given no weight at all. ... [the ALJ] recited the 'meaningless boilerplate' that the Seventh Circuit has condemned.”
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion he holds defendants to the correct standard and will not let them import summary-judgment requirements into the pleadings stage: a plaintiff need only plausibly plead the elements (protected class, adverse action, causation), not make out a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. He will, however, dismiss duplicative counts and dismiss a retaliation claim where the plaintiff fails to allege he actually opposed or complained about discrimination.
“the elements CWFR cites are those for making a prima facie case of discrimination to defeat a summary judgment motion, not those required to survive a motion to dismiss. ... plaintiff does not allege that he complained in any way to anyone about discrimination.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces settlements only where there was a genuine meeting of the minds on every material term -- and treats the SCOPE OF THE RELEASE as material, especially amid parallel litigation. Drawn-out redlining, a conditional acceptance (which 'is effectively a counteroffer'), and counsel's own references to a future 'opportunity' or a 'proposed' agreement all signal preliminary negotiations, not a binding contract.
“the parties did not enter into an enforceable oral settlement agreement because they did not reach a meeting of the minds on all material terms. First, the parties had no agreement as to the scope of the release -- a provision that Plaintiff's counsel acknowledges is material.”
Cautions
A motion to reconsider (Rule 54(b)) is not a vehicle for a 'second bite at the apple' or for new arguments/evidence that could have been raised earlier -- it is granted only for a genuine misapprehension, an error of apprehension (not reasoning), or a controlling change in law or facts. He will, however, correct his own legal error on reconsideration when shown one (here, reversing himself on Ledbetter Fair Pay Act timeliness because unpaid suspension days are discrete acts, not ongoing compensation discrimination).
“Motions for reconsideration are not an opportunity for the movant 'to take a second bite at the apple or raise new arguments that it did not make in the first instance.' ... Upon reconsideration, the Court agrees that plaintiff's unpaid suspension days were discrete acts of alleged discrimination.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [17], denies SSA's motion for summary judgment [25], reverses the SSA's decision and remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.”
“the Court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [17], denies SSA's motion for summary judgment [25], reverses the SSA's decision and remands this case.”
“the Court recommends that the SSA's motion for summary judgment [20] be denied and the SSA's decision be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.”
“the Court grants in part and denies in part defendants' motion for reconsideration [110]. The motion is granted with respect to Count II, and the Court enters judgment in defendants' favor on that count. The motion is denied with respect to Count III, which remains pending.”
“the Court grants in part and denies in part defendants' motion to dismiss [17]. The Court: (1) dismisses with prejudice the Title VII claims plaintiff asserts against Kelly and Montalbano in Count I; (2) dismisses without prejudice the Title VII claim plaintiff asserts against CWFR in Count II as duplicative of the claim in Count I; and (3) dismisses without prejudice and with leave to amend the Count III 1981 retaliation claim. The Title VII claim plaintiff asserts against CWFR in Count I stands.”
“the Court recommends that the District Court deny Plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement agreement [184].”
“the Court reverses the Commissioner's decision, grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [20], denies the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [24], and pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this Order.”
“the Court reverses the Commissioner's decision, grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [20], denies the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [24].”
“For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion to compel. Defendant is ordered to produce information and documents in accordance with this order by March 1, 2023.”
“the motion is denied, without prejudice, in part and granted in part. The motion is denied, without prejudice as to the emails. The motion is granted with respect to the internal memo. The CCSAO shall forthwith produce the memorandum it is currently withholding based on its claim of privilege.”
“the Court grants in part defendants' motion to dismiss [79] and dismisses without prejudice the denial-of-medical-care claims he asserts against the County and defendant Doscher. Plaintiff has fourteen days from the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to file an amended complaint that cures the defects identified herein, if he can do so and comply with Rule 11. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint by that date, these claims will be dismissed with prejudice.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants' motion for reconsideration [103].”
“For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies defendants' motion to dismiss [103].”
“the Court grants E&I's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [78]. The complaint against Defendant E&I is dismissed without prejudice.”
Put Judge Weisman's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Weisman actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Weisman's own signed orders and cites them.