Franklin Ulyses Valderrama
How Judge Valderrama decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In employment-discrimination cases he applies the post-Ortiz 'evidence as a whole' standard but still requires the plaintiff to put real, admissible evidence on each element; a stray age-related remark not made by the decisionmaker, not close in time to the firing, and not referencing the termination cannot defeat summary judgment.
“the comment was not made by the decisionmaker, was not made around the time of the termination decision, and did not in any way reference Bayer’s termination. ... there is no evidence in the record that Warnecke was aware of the comment or complaint”
On a Heck v. Humphrey defense he 'carves off' only the claims whose success would necessarily invalidate the conviction and lets the rest proceed; force used AFTER a detainee is subdued is litigable without transgressing Heck, and a defendant who moves to dismiss (rather than for summary judgment) cannot win on collateral estoppel without record evidence that the issue was actually litigated.
“Heck . . . do[es] not affect litigation about what happens after the crime is completed. ... the proper response is not to toss the entire complaint. Instead, the judge must carve off any Heck-barred contentions and proceed with what remains.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces Local Rule 56.1 strictly: facts in the movant's statement that the non-movant fails to controvert with specific citations to admissible evidence are deemed admitted, and he will not let a party defeat summary judgment with an affidavit that contradicts the party's own deposition. He applies these rules to pro se litigants too.
“where Blazek did not respond to certain purported facts of ADT’s by offering admissible evidence of his own, the Court accepts as true the facts set forth in ADT’s Local Rule 56.1 statement ... The Court also will not consider Blazek’s denials wherein Blazek seeks to defeat summary judgment by contradicting his own deposition testimony.”
Cautions
He denies leave to amend when the proposed amendment would be futile (e.g., pleads no cognizable legal duty) and, having done so, will not permit further amendment -- terminating the case. Get the operative pleading right early.
“Having already denied the Insight Parties’ motion for leave to amend based on futility, the Court, in its discretion, does not permit further amendment. ... With no remaining claims and further amendment not permitted, this civil case is terminated.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons given above, Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment [61] is denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Insight Parties’ motion for leave to amend [77]. ... Having already denied the Insight Parties’ motion for leave to amend based on futility, the Court, in its discretion, does not permit further amendment. ... With no remaining claims and further amendment not permitted, this civil case is terminated.”
“With Counterclaim Counts I and II withdrawn, the Court strikes the Amicorp Parties’ Motion to Dismiss [55] as moot.”
“For the foregoing reasons, ADT’s motion for summary judgment [51] is granted. The Court enters summary judgment in favor of ADT and against Blazek. Civil case terminated.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [31] is granted. Civil case terminated.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [80] is granted in part and denied in part.”
“Defendants Hain and Kane County's motion to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV [39] is granted.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [30] is denied.”
“Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' class allegations is denied.”
“Jeffreys and Gomez's motion to dismiss [64] is granted with prejudice. The Cook County Defendants' motion to dismiss [66] is granted with respect to Dart with prejudice, and denied as to all remaining Cook County Defendants. The Wexford Defendants' motions to dismiss [93][102] are denied.”
“Experian's motion for summary judgment [103] is granted in part and denied in part. Summary judgment is granted as to count II and statutory damages under U.S.C. 1681n(a) but is denied as to count III.”
“Tudryn's motion for summary judgment [87] is granted and the Advocate Defendants' motion for summary judgment [84] is denied.”
“the Advocate Defendants' motion for summary judgment [84] is denied”
“Northwestern's Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of Jackson's Second Amended Complaint is granted.”
“Northwestern's Motion to Strike certain allegations is granted in part and denied as moot in part.”
“the Court denies ICS' Motion to Compel Arbitration [10].”
“the Court denies in part and grants in part Gilbert's Motion to Strike [17]. The Court strikes the Hansen Declaration but does not strike any other portions of ICS' Reply.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 776 days (N = 12).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 553.0 days (N = 2).
Sampled from his earliest terminated civil dockets (filed 2013-2019, terminated 2020-2021 -- inherited from Castillo). Mix is employment / civil rights (Morrow-Estrada v. Home Depot, Hall v. Collins, Wright v. Cook County), prisoner civil rights (Cates, Lumpkins, McFadden), FMLA (Guttke), FLSA (Lee v. Xilin), product liability (Rinehart v. Synthes), and commercial contract (Jacobson Warehouse, Gravelle, Amicorp).
Put Judge Valderrama's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Valderrama actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Valderrama's own signed orders and cites them.