Stephen Henley Locher
How Judge Locher decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On religious-accommodation / religious-discrimination claims, Locher enforces the Eighth Circuit's prima facie framework strictly at the threshold: the plaintiff must identify a bona fide religious belief that actually CONFLICTS with (i.e., requires non-compliance with) an employment requirement AND must have informed the employer of the need for accommodation before violating the policy. A religiously neutral policy applied to religiously motivated misconduct, with no advance accommodation request, defeats the claim as a matter of law before any undue-hardship analysis. Practical lesson: to survive summary judgment before Locher on a religious-discrimination theory, plead and prove a specific religious obligation that required the conduct and concrete advance notice to the employer of the conflict.
“In the absence of a conflict, however, the law does not require the employer to give preferential treatment to an employee who violates a religiously neutral policy even if the violation is motivated by religious beliefs, particularly if the employer has no reason to believe, in advance, that an accommodation is needed... As Snyder has not identified any religious belief or practice that required him to post his message, and as there is no evidence that he placed his employer on notice that he needed an accommodation from company policy prior to violating it, he has failed as a matter of law to establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination.”
Procedural preferences
Locher applies Rule 56(e) precisely on summary judgment: where a party purports to 'deny' an entire statement-of-facts paragraph but supports the denial only as to part of it, he treats the unaddressed portion as undisputed, and he expects the correct 'admitted in part and denied in part' nomenclature. Practical lesson: respond to each factual assertion with paragraph-by-paragraph precision and record support, or risk having facts deemed undisputed against you.
“The Court likewise treats facts as 'undisputed' in other places where one side or the other purported to 'deny' an entire paragraph but only provided support for the denial as to some portion of the paragraph. See id. In these circumstances, the correct nomenclature would have been that the statement is 'admitted in part and denied in part.'”
In First Amendment challenges to content restrictions, Locher works through multiple competing doctrinal frameworks explicitly rather than picking one and ignoring the rest, then explains which framework he thinks best fits the facts before applying it. In the Iowa school book-ban litigation, he set out three plausible standards (a minors'-obscenity standard, a 'substantial and reasonable governmental interest' library-curation standard, and the school-speech Hazelwood test) and explained that the outcome would differ depending on which applied, while making clear which one he found the better fit. Practical lesson: briefing that addresses every plausible governing standard -- not just the one you think wins -- and explains why it should control is more likely to be engaged with on the merits.
“For reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in establishing that the unconstitutional applications of Senate File 496 substantially outweigh the constitutional applications if the governing standard is the Ginsberg standard for obscenity as applied to minors and/or the 'substantial and reasonable governmental interest' standard established in Pico and Pratt. Plaintiffs have not, however, satisfied their burden if the Hazelwood standard applies... Because the Court believes the first two standards are the best fit in the circumstances presented here, it concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden.”
Cautions
A grant of relief from Locher is not the end of the story where the government can show later changed circumstances. After granting a habeas petition and ordering an ICE detainee's release, he denied a subsequent motion to enforce that same order once the government developed a concrete removal plan (a travel document and an accepted third-country destination), holding that this satisfied the 'changed circumstances' standard his own order had set. Practical lesson: a favorable order from Locher may specify the conditions under which the other side can undo it -- read those conditions closely, because he will hold the losing side to them just as strictly as he held the winning side to its burden the first time.
“This argument is not enough to entitle Yugar-Cruz to relief because the Federal Respondents have established that ICE has a travel document to effectuate his removal. ... This satisfies the Court's requirement that there be 'changed circumstances' and a 'significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.'”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The Court therefore DENIES Snyder's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“The Court GRANTS the Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by the Penguin House Plaintiffs and GRANTS IN PART the Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by the GLBT Youth Plaintiffs. All Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or acting in furtherance of the provisions of Senate File 496 that: (i) require the removal of books from school libraries that are not ‘age-appropriate’; and (ii) prohibit any ‘program, curriculum, test, survey, questionnaire, promotion, or instruction relating to gender identity or sexual orientation to students in kindergarten through grade six.’”
“The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Pending further proceedings, Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or acting in furtherance of the provisions of Senate File 496 that require the removal of books from school libraries that are not ‘age-appropriate.’”
“After careful review, the Court GRANTS Yugar-Cruz’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF 1) and orders him RELEASED on reasonable conditions of supervision consistent with 8 CFR § 241.13(h).”
“The Motion to Enforce is DENIED. (ECF 17.)”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 185.5 days (N = 10).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 55 days (N = 1).
The reviewed sample covers about 21 cases from 2020 through 2026. It is weighted toward six related Midwest Energy Emissions Corp. patent suits, most of which were still pending when reviewed, and also includes immigration-detainee and other habeas petitions, employment and civil-rights cases, consumer-credit claims under the FCRA, and personal-injury matters. It is a limited case sample rather than a complete docket census.
Put Judge Locher's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Locher actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Locher's own signed orders and cites them.