Ronald Earl Longstaff
How Judge Longstaff decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Longstaff treats the Daubert gatekeeping inquiry as potentially case-dispositive in technical products-liability cases. In Cummings v. Deere he excluded the plaintiff's causation expert as unreliable -- weighting heavily that the opinion was developed for litigation, was not peer-reviewed or tested against the ignition energy actually required, and that the expert's 'rebuttal' supplied calculations he had earlier admitted he never performed -- and because Iowa law then requires expert testimony for a complex product defect, the exclusion led directly to summary judgment. Practical lesson for counsel: in a technical product case before this judge, the admissibility fight over the causation expert may decide the whole case, so the expert disclosure must be complete and method-driven from the outset, not patched in rebuttal.
“Performing calculations and belatedly considering variables which an opposing expert correctly points out you did not do or know, and which you admitted you did not do or know, is not rebuttal -- it is clearly the interjection of new opinion evidence... such tactics weigh heavily in favor of finding that Dr. Roberts' opinions are not reliable, and are, in fact, a results-driven product of litigation.”
Cautions
In Heyne, Longstaff read the ADA's 'substantial limitation' and 'disability' requirements strictly, holding that being able to stand only two hours at a time -- while continuing strenuous carpentry work and where the plaintiff's own physician did not consider him disabled -- is not a substantial limitation on a major life activity, so the ADA claim failed at the threshold. He also held that being placed on forced/involuntary FMLA leave is not by itself an actionable FMLA retaliation injury. Counsel bringing ADA/FMLA claims before him should build a record that squarely satisfies the disability threshold rather than relying on the existence of an impairment or an adverse-feeling employment action.
“This Court agrees with the logic of these cases and holds that the ability to stand in place for only two hours is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of standing under the ADA.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, Deere's motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Charles Roberts, and motion for summary judgment are GRANTED. Deere's motion to strike portions of the testimony of Dr. Charles Roberts is denied as moot. IT IS ORDERED.”
“Given the Court's earlier decision to exclude the testimony of Dr. Roberts, Cummings has failed to present sufficient evidence -- i.e. expert testimony as to the defective nature of Deere's product -- to submit this case to a jury. Cummings' claim of product defect fails as a matter of law... Deere's motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“Deere's motion to strike portions of the testimony of Dr. Charles Roberts is denied as moot. IT IS ORDERED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, HGI's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED on all counts.”
“Because there is no federal question presented and this case does not fall within the scope of the CAFA, the motion to remand to state court will be GRANTED.”
“Microsoft’s motion to stay proceedings pending transfer to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation will be DENIED because having determined that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case, it would be inappropriate for this Court to stay the proceedings any longer.”
“Microsoft’s motion for an extension of time is DISMISSED AS MOOT.”
“The state defendants’ and the City’s motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint, filed March 6, and April 10, 2002, are granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs.”
“GDT’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”
“Its alternative Motion to Transfer to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Phyllis Honor’s motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety. ... Count I is dismissed as an action for damages may not be maintained where a duly authorized administrative body has already addressed the matter. ... The motion to dismiss Count II is denied ... Count III is dismissed as brought against both the FCIC and the RMA as the subject matter of this claimed constitutional takings violation is identical to plaintiffs breach of contract claim.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be denied.”
“Defendant’s motion with respect to government’s exhibit 1 will be denied.”
“Thus, defendant’s motion to continue the trial is denied.”
“For the aforementioned reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“For the reasons outlined above, PFS’ February 7, 2005 motion to dismiss Raduechel’s counterclaim is granted.”
“Raduechel’s May 6, 2005 motion for sanctions is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 295 days (N = 6).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 1 days (N = 3).
The roughly 21 reviewed cases from 1993-2016 are mostly civil matters with several prisoner petitions. Cases that named Longstaff as a defendant and ended administratively within days are excluded from the civil-duration figures. The resulting mix is illustrative rather than a complete caseload census.
Put Judge Longstaff's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Longstaff actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Longstaff's own signed orders and cites them.