Alan Cooke Kay
Judge Kay no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Kay decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At the pleading stage, a feasible professional-services characterization was enough to avoid a statutory contractor bar.
“Because it is feasible that Plaintiffs actions constituted that of a ‘professional engineer acting solely within [its] professional capacity,’ it is not apparent that H.R.S. Section 444 bars Plaintiff from bringing this lawsuit.”
He separated policy exclusions that clearly foreclosed coverage from negligent-infliction claims that still depended on facts.
“The Court DENIES the Motion insofar as it concludes that there are questions of fact as to the possibility of coverage under the Homeowner’s Policy and Umbrella Policy for the underlying claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.”
Procedural preferences
He denied dismissal on the existing record while expressly allowing a renewed motion after targeted discovery.
“However Defendants may bring a successive motion to dismiss if upon additional discovery Defendants can show that Plaintiff has in fact transacted business in Hawaii as defined by the statute.”
He treated admissible evidence, rather than briefing or oral argument, as the basis for resolving factual disputes.
“Legal memoranda and oral argument are not evidence and do not create issues of fact.”
Cautions
A proper remand did not itself establish that removal was improper or justify a fee award.
“Although remand is proper now, the Court finds that removal was proper when Meridian filed the Notice of Removal and therefore no attorney’s fees award is authorized.”
A safety rule did not trigger per se consequences unless it actually imposed a mandatory duty in the circumstances.
“Here, because the Coast Guard Commercial Diving Operations regulations were inapplicable to Plaintiff at the time of his injury, LDI was under no mandatory duty to comply with them.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“ORDER VACATING THIS COURT’S AUGUST 1, 1991 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF”
“For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS the Respondents’ motion to dismiss.”
“For the reasons stated above the Court DENIES Vlacovsky’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and DENIES his requ.est for attorney fees.”
“For these reasons the Court DENIES without prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Stafford’s motion for reconsideration.”
“ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss count four of the counterclaim.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 416.5 days (N = 20).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 91 days (N = 1).
The enumerated assigned-case cohort is a bounded early-senior-era sample and does not represent Kay’s full career caseload.
A historical record
Judge Kay no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.