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James Clinkscales Hill

United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia district Retired 1976 · served 1974–1976 Appointed by Richard Nixon (Republican) 20 signed orders read

Judge Hill no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Hill decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Hill required an evidentiary record capable of defeating every plausible set of supporting facts before accepting a failure-to-state-a-claim defense.

“Nothing appears in the record which supports defendants’ claim that there are no set of facts upon which relief can be granted.”

He treated ownership and a timely demand for return as supporting relief for both original records and copies made after the demand.

“Petitioners have a sufficient property interest in any copies made after demand for return of the originals to the return, also, of these copies.”

Procedural preferences

Hill treated relief from default as a discretionary determination based on the totality of circumstances.

“Earlier this Court noted that a motion to set aside a default is addressed to the Court’s discretion.”

Once later service and relief from default resolved the practical issue, he declined to decide an obsolete service challenge.

“Since the Court has decided that, assuming valid service originally, the default should be set aside and since defendant Strid has now been served at his residence, there is no need to rule on the motion to quash return of the original service.”

Cautions

On summary judgment, Hill required the complaint to be read favorably to the nonmoving plaintiff unless undisputed facts negated every available right of recovery.

“It is necessary, on a motion for summary judgment, to construe the plaintiffs’ complaint most favorably towards the plaintiffs and to deny summary judgment if the undisputed facts do not negate any right of recovery that might be included in the complaint.”

Where administrative findings were incomplete, he viewed remand to the factfinder as the appropriate remedy.

“The Court remands the matter to the fact finder, the agency, for more complete findings of fact.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co.
· 1975-09-25
Bankruptcy appeal (bank) Denied

“the order of the bankruptcy judge is affirmed.”

Mason v. Pulliam
· 1975-10-15
Motion for return of property (petitioners) Granted

“petitioners have a right to immediate possession of all original records and documents voluntarily turned over to Special Agent Pulliam”

Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
· 1975-06-03
Summary judgment (defendant insurer) Granted

“The defendant is granted summary judgment insofar as the case proceeds upon a claim of sex discrimination.”

Doe v. AFL-CIO, Department of Organization, Region 6
· 1975-12-17
Employment discrimination claim (plaintiff) Denied

“judgment is hereby ordered to be entered in this case in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.”

Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v. Pendley
· 1975-12-10
Motion for leave to amend (plaintiff) Denied

“plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is denied”

Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“defendants’ motions to dismiss are hereby granted.”

Trice v. Weinberger
· 1975-03-26
Social security appeal (claimant) Granted

“this action is remanded to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to attempt to reconcile conflicts and deficiencies in the record and for a further development of the facts.”

Hagopian v. Consolidated Equities Corp.
· 1975-04-14
Summary judgment (defendants) Granted

“defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count One is granted.”

First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Rochester v. Fisher
· 1976-04-02
Motions to compel (plaintiff judgment creditor) Granted

“plaintiff’s motion to compel is GRANTED”

Motion for protective order (defendants) Denied

“defendants’ motion for a protective order is DENIED.”

Ingram v. Dunn
· 1974-10-11
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“defendant is entitled to judgment.”

Fears v. United States
· 1975-01-13
Motions to dismiss (United States) Granted

“government’s motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs Asberry L. Fears and Charlie Arline is GRANTED.”

Summary judgment (United States) Granted

“the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as against all plaintiffs (except Asberry L. Fears and Charlie Arline dealt with in Section I herein) is granted.”

Hudnall v. Kelly
· 1975-02-05
Motions to dismiss (defendant Shelby) Denied

“Shelby’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1) is denied.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant Shelby) Granted

“grants its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”

In re Kelley
· 1975-02-07
Bankruptcy appeal (debtor-appellant) Denied

“The Bankruptcy Judge’s order from which this appeal is taken is affirmed.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The district tenure predates representative electronic case-level dockets. The profile therefore makes no claim about complete caseload mix, case duration, administrative dispositions, or motion timing.

A historical record

Judge Hill no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.