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J. Owen Forrester

United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia district Retired 2014 · served 1981–2014 Appointed by Ronald Reagan (Republican) 25 signed orders read

Judge Forrester no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Forrester decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Forrester enforced prompt insurance notice when the insured offered no justification for a nine-month delay.

“The court finds that nine months is not ‘as soon as practicable.’”

He treated fabricated evidence as a direct injury to both the opposing party and the integrity of adjudication.

“The use of a forged document in defense of a lawsuit prejudices both the opposing party and the judicial system itself.”

Procedural preferences

Forrester required dispositive arguments to be presented early enough for the opposing party to answer them, rather than first appearing in a reply brief.

“because Defendant did not separate its arguments regarding the different claims of race discrimination and articulate grounds justifying summary judgment as to each claim until its reply brief, the court finds it would be unfair to address any such claims at this time.”

He required special-master findings to connect governing law to specific facts so meaningful review could occur.

“a lack of application of specific parts of the record to the law on point on which this conclusion is based makes review, needless to say, more difficult.”

Cautions

Forrester imposed exclusion after repeated discovery failures, describing a progression from delay to disregard of the court’s order.

“the failures of the government in this case to comply with its Rule 16 obligations were begun in lethargy and a lackadaisical acknowledgment of the mandates of Rule 16 and ended with inattention to the order of the court, a stubborn refusal to understand the requirements of Rule 16, and a somnolent review of the materials being produced.”

He refused punitive-damages financial discovery where the pleading alleged only negligence against the targeted defendant.

“The allegations of the complaint are, therefore, insufficient to support an award of punitive damages against defendant Aerostar Transport Corporation.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Hiwassee College, Inc. v. Southern Ass'n of Colleges & Schools, Inc.
· 2007-06-08
Emergency motion to stay (plaintiff) Granted

“Therefore, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs emergency motion to stay [148-1].”

Marshall v. City of Atlanta
· 1996-03-29
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Judge Brizendine’s Report and Recommendation [2-1] is ADOPTED. Defendant Wilboum is DISMISSED from the action.”

Motion to withdraw bankruptcy reference (defendant) Denied

“Defendant Wilbourn’s motion to withdraw the reference [1-1] is DENIED.”

Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring A/S v. Reid Rowell, Inc.
· 1994-03-31
Motions to compel (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendant Solvay’s motion to compel [108-1], therefore, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”

Thomas v. Harvard
· 1999-03-17
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“Defendants’ motion to do so is GRANTED.”

Judgment on the pleadings (defendants) Moot / procedural

“Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings [4-1] and motion to stay discovery [12-1] are DENIED as moot.”

Motion to stay discovery (defendants) Moot / procedural
Maxwell v. United States
· 2000-08-03
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“In accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment [17-1] is DENIED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [15-1] is GRANTED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted
Peters v. Board of Regents
· 1994-03-10
Objections to special master report (plaintiff) Granted

“This court, therefore, must reject the Special Master’s Report as currently prepared. The Special Master’s Report is to be resubmitted to the Magistrate Judge for further consideration in light of this order [42-1],”

Miller v. Bank South Corp.
· 1997-03-31
Objections to special master report (plaintiff) Denied

“These objections, however, are OVER*546RULED for the reasons discussed above [48-1],”

Vax v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service
· 1994-03-10
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“In sum, Defendant’s motions to dismiss are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART [4-1, 8-1]. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to DISMISS this action without prejudice.”

Palmquist v. Piper Aircraft Corp.
· 1991-02-08
Motions to compel (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion to compel is DENIED.”

Foote v. Folks, Inc.
· 1994-09-16
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED [3-1].”

Motion for leave to supplement complaint (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a supplemented complaint [8-1] and motion for leave to file a supplemental brief to objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [9-1] are GRANTED and were considered in preparing this order.”

Motion for leave to file supplemental brief (plaintiff) Granted
United States v. Robinson
· 1997-12-24
Motion for reconsideration (government) Denied

“Accordingly, the government’s motion to reconsider is DENIED and the defendant’s second motion to exclude the testimony of the fingerprint expert is GRANTED.”

Motion to exclude expert (defendant) Granted
S.J. Groves, & Sons Co. v. Fulton County
· 1996-02-22

Forrester defined the scope of an earlier judicial-estoppel ruling in a long-running public-contract dispute.

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The sampled historical cases included habeas, bankruptcy appeals, patent, consumer-credit, employment, contract, and products-liability matters. Most retained timelines were empty shells.

A historical record

Judge Forrester no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.