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Thomas Jennings Bailey

Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (now U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) district Deceased · served 1918–1963 Appointed by Woodrow Wilson (Democratic) 9 signed orders read

Judge Bailey no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Bailey decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He read an insurance exclusion narrowly in light of the basic protective purpose of the policy.

“After all that may be said, the purpose of insurance is to insure.”

He treated the creation of a new group of chemical compounds as potentially inventive even where prior literature predicted that such a group might exist.

“The production of a new group of chemical compounds, even though some one has stated that such a group of compounds may exist, may be an invention within the meaning of the patent laws.”

Cautions

He set aside an administrative order where the agency had not made the jurisdictional findings necessary to connect its action to the governing national policy.

“Inasmuch, then, as we are of the opinion that the Commission had no jurisdiction, unless it be necessary to carry out the national transportation policy, and, as the Commission has made no findings to support that conclusion”

He confined patent disclosure analysis to the application itself rather than extrinsic evidence of what the inventor possessed.

“That question must obviously be determined from the application itself”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Cawood v. Coe
· 1940-06-10
Patent entitlement action (patent applicant) Denied

“The complaint should be dismissed with costs.”

Line Material Co. v. Coe
· 1941-05-06
Patent entitlement action (patent applicants) Granted in part

“Plaintiffs are not entitled to a patent containing claims 10, 11 and 12, as to which claims the complaint should be dismissed. 3. There is no estoppel either by judgment or in pais as to claims 2 to 8, inclusive, of the present application. 4. Plaintiffs are entitled to a patent containing claims 2 to 8, inclusive, of the present application.”

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Coe
· 1941-06-04
Patent entitlement action (patent applicant) Granted

“plaintiff is entitled to the issuance of a patent containing these claims.”

Capital Transit Co. v. United States
· 1944-05-01
Administrative review (transit companies) Granted

“the order of the Commission should be set aside.”

Dubonnet v. Marshall
· 1948-06-11
Declaratory judgment action (plaintiff) Denied

“The complaint will be dismissed.”

Motion for new trial (plaintiff) Denied

“The motion for a new trial will be overruled”

Norden v. Royall
· 1949-03-24
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“The motion of the plaintiff for a summary judgment will be sustained”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“the motion of the defendant for a summary judgment will be overruled.”

Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales S. A. v. McGrath
· 1950-01-10
Discovery motion (plaintiff) Denied

“Ordered that the motion of the plaintiff be and it is hereby denied and that the said questions be answered.”

Guiberson v. Larson
· 1950-10-11
Motion for temporary injunction (plaintiff) Denied

“The application for a temporary injunction will be denied.”

Keane v. American Insurance
· 1955-01-03
Motion for judgment as matter of law (defendant insurer) Denied

“The motion of the defendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is overruled”

Motion for new trial (defendant insurer) Denied

“its motion for a new trial is also overruled.”

Motion for judgment (plaintiff insured) Granted

“The motion of the plaintiff for judgment is sustained in the amount fixed by the compromise settlement”

A historical record

Judge Bailey no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.