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Charles Robert Richey

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia district Deceased · served 1971–1997 Appointed by Richard Nixon (Republican) 15 signed orders read

Judge Richey no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Richey decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He enforced FOIA’s statutory fee-payment requirement despite the filing of litigation.

“payment of fees is a statutory requirement under the FOIA and filing of a FOIA suit does not relieve the requester of the obligation to pay”

He accepted some sacrifice to adversarial presentation where national-security classification made public explanation impossible.

“some sacrifice to the pure adversary process”

Cautions

He denied reconsideration where a party reargued facts and raised a theory omitted from summary-judgment briefing.

“She has merely attempted to reargue facts upon which the Court has already ruled, and has brought forth a new legal theory which she failed to present in opposition to the defendant’s summary judgment motion.”

He required evidentiary support rather than allegations alone at summary judgment.

“Such allegations, without evidentiary support, are insufficient to survive the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Floyd-Mayers v. American Cab Co.
· 1990-04-02
Motions to compel (plaintiffs) Granted

“ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel American to answer deposition questions about its financial resources shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED and that American’s Motion for Protective Order shall be, and hereby is, DENIED; and it is further”

Motion for protective order (American Cab) Denied
Assassination Archives & Research Center v. U.S. Department of Justice
· 1993-08-10
Motion for reconsideration (plaintiff) Denied

“ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration shall be, and hereby is, DENIED.”

Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President
· 1993-07-19
Motion for partial summary judgment (defendants) Denied

“FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs’ Freedom of Information Act claims concerning paper materials shall be and hereby is DENIED without prejudice; and it is”

Motion for extension of time (plaintiffs) Moot / procedural

“FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to the Defendants’ motion for Partial Summary Judgment shall be, and hereby is DENIED as moot.”

QueTel Corp. v. Columbia Communications International, Inc.
· 1991-12-17
Motions to dismiss (Cohen Todd defendants) Denied

“ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Cohen, Todd defendants shall be, and hereby is, DENIED; and it is”

Johns v. Rozet
· 1993-07-23
Summary judgment (plaintiffs) Granted

“ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment against Garnishee Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED; and it is”

Motion for stay (defendants) Denied

“FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for a Stay shall be, and hereby is, DENIED, and it is;”

Other pending motions (parties) Moot / procedural

“any and all other pending motions in the above-captioned case shall be, and hereby are, declared moot.”

Harvey v. District of Columbia
· 1996-12-19
Motion for reconsideration (plaintiff) Denied

“ORDERED that the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Order of December 2, 1996 shall be and hereby is DENIED.”

Modderno v. King
· 1994-12-19
Motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (defendant) Moot / procedural

“ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment [19-1], dated October 12, 1994, shall be, and hereby is, declared MOOT; and it is”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [23-1], dated November 4, 1994, shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED.”

Meyer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
· 1996-05-24
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted in part

“ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims shall be GRANTED, IN PART, consistent with the Memorandum Opinion of even date herewith; and it is”

Motions to transfer (defendants) Granted

“FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to transfer the above-captioned case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri shall be GRANTED; and it is”

Anderson v. Local 201 Reinforcing Rodmen
· 1995-05-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“the Court will enter an Order of even date herewith consistent with the foregoing Memorandum Opinion GRANTING the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.”

Sterling v. United States
· 1993-07-30
Summary judgment (defendants) Granted

“ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED; and that Judgment in the above-captioned case shall be, and hereby is, entered for the DEFENDANTS; and it is”

Trueblood v. US DEPT. OF TREASURY, IRS
· 1996-10-30
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“the Court shall grant the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and shall deny the plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment and requests for attorneys' fees and costs.”

Summary judgment (plaintiffs) Denied
Motion for attorney fees and costs (plaintiffs) Denied
Memorial Hospital v. Sullivan
· 1991-12-09
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Count III of the Complaint shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED; and the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Count III of the Complaint shall be, and hereby is, DENIED; and it is”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied
Motion to amend judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“The Court denies this Motion outright.”

A historical record

Judge Richey no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.