Ana C. Reyes
How Judge Reyes decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In employment-discrimination cases she applies the no-pretext rule rigorously at summary judgment: a plaintiff who is qualified but cannot rebut the employer's nondiscriminatory reasons with evidence of pretext loses, because courts do not sit as a super-personnel department second-guessing promotion choices.
“courts cannot second-guess employment decisions, ‘absent evidence of pretext or a discriminatory or retaliatory motive.’ ... Because a reasonable factfinder could not conclude these reasons are pretextual, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”
On executive and military-deference arguments, she defers but does not abdicate: she scrutinizes whether a national-security or readiness rationale is genuine and reasoned rather than a pretext for targeting a disfavored group. In Talbott v. Trump, she applied that approach when enjoining the transgender military-service ban.
“The Court must ignore them and instead ‘defer to the military’s judgment.’ ... Yes, the Court must defer. But not blindly.”
Procedural preferences
In APA review she applies ordinary tools of statutory construction to uphold an agency rule that reflects the best reading of the statute and is reasoned, and treats a genuinely interpretive rule as exempt from notice-and-comment -- declining to disturb agency action that fills a statutory gap Congress left (the Medicaid 'new formulation' line-extension rule).
“Because (1) the Final Rule reflects the best reading of the statute and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor constitutionally infirm, and (2) the subsequent interpretive rule is exempt from notice-and-comment procedures, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment ... and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.”
She dismisses jurisdictionally and without prejudice where a theory is legally insubstantial, separating sympathetic policy questions (here, D.C.'s lack of congressional representation) from what a court has power to decide.
“Plaintiff’s plea for representation raises weighty questions of fairness and democratic legitimacy. But those policy questions are beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. And, given Plaintiff’s wholly insubstantial legal arguments, so too is this case, which the Court dismisses without prejudice.”
Cautions
Read outcomes by POSTURE and area of law, not as a single merits tendency. Her routine merits work skews DEFENDANT/AGENCY-FAVORABLE -- summary judgments for employers/agencies (no pretext; no genuine dispute; need-to-know) in employment-discrimination, Privacy Act, and APA cases, plus a jurisdictional pro se dismissal. But the record also captures her highest-profile PLAINTIFF-FAVORABLE rulings against the second Trump administration: Talbott v. Trump (she enjoined the transgender-military-ban, EO 14183 + the Hegseth Policy, on Fifth Amendment grounds) and Lesly Miot v. Trump (she stayed DHS's termination of Haiti's TPS under 5 U.S.C. § 705). She also ruled FOR the District (against building-industry plaintiffs) on EPCA preemption in NAHB, and for 412 terrorism victims in the Swinney FSIA default judgment.
“First minorities, then women in combat, then gays filled in that blank. Today, however, our military is stronger and our Nation is safer for the millions of such blanks (and all other persons) who serve.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt. 23, and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 1, without prejudice.”
“The Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s motions to file first and second amended complaints, Dkts. 25 & 26;”
“the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 22, and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 24.”
“Because a reasonable factfinder could not conclude these reasons are pretextual, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“After the hearing, the Court GRANTED the Bellwether Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment, Dkt. 40, and announced that an opinion would follow.”
“The Court agrees with Defendant and GRANTS its Motion for Summary Judgment. Dr. Mathur had unwanted physical contact with Plaintiff, yes. But no reasonable juror could conclude that his contact was so egregious as to create a hostile work environment.”
“those policy questions are beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. And, given Plaintiff’s wholly insubstantial legal arguments, so too is this case, which the Court dismisses without prejudice.”
“The Court has no trouble agreeing that the Air Force did not violate the Privacy Act. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 89, and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 106.”
“The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 89, and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 106.”
“Considering the full Record and for the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Renewed Application for Preliminary Injunction.”
“By accompanying Order, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for a Stay Under 5 U.S.C. § 705.”
“The District has the better interpretation. The Court therefore GRANTS the District’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 30, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaratory Relief, and Permanent Injunction, Dkt. 26.”
“The Court therefore GRANTS the District’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 30, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaratory Relief, and Permanent Injunction, Dkt. 26.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
From the published-order sample plus public profiles (NOT a counted distribution): her docket includes employment discrimination (Butler v. Garland; Gaither v. Haaland; McCain v. Bazron), Privacy Act (Murphy v. Air Force), APA/agency review (Chiesi v. Becerra -- Medicaid; National Association of Home Builders v. D.C. -- energy-conservation preemption), FSIA state-sponsor-of-terrorism damages (Swinney v. Iran; Peters v. Qadhafi), pro se constitutional/voting matters (Page v. Raimondo), and high-profile challenges to the current administration -- most prominently Talbott v. Trump (the transgender-military-ban preliminary injunction) and Lesly Miot v. Trump. Her pre-bench specialty was international litigation and arbitration (Williams & Connolly).
Put Judge Reyes's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Reyes actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Reyes's own signed orders and cites them.