Wiley Young Daniel
Judge Daniel no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Daniel decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He allowed equitable tolling where a claimant reasonably relied on inaccurate agency guidance and did not have counsel when the deadline expired.
“An employee should be entitled to rely on seemingly authoritative statements made by the federal agency presumed to have expertise in employment discrimination matters.”
He required fraud allegations to identify the time, place, content, speaker, and consequences of the alleged misrepresentation.
“a complaint must ‘set forth the time, place and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the consequences thereof.’”
At the notice stage of a collective action, he applied the deliberately lenient preliminary certification standard.
“The standard for certification at this stage is a lenient one.”
Procedural preferences
He treated reconsideration as a narrow remedy, not an opportunity to repeat available arguments.
“A motion for reconsideration ‘is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.’”
He treated an express contract as displacing an implied-contract theory covering the same subject matter.
“If an express contract exists, there can be no implied contract covering the same subject matter between the parties because the provisions of the express contract supersede those of the implied contract”
Cautions
He rejected formal accessibility compliance where a design still excluded wheelchair users from equal enjoyment of the branded entrance experience.
“Defendants have unnecessarily created a design for their brand that excludes people using wheelchairs from full enjoyment of the aesthetic for that brand.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) Plaintiffs Second, Third and Fourth Claims for Relief under 47 U.S.C. §§ 276, 201, and 416(c) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Crv. P 12(b)(6) Plaintiffs Second, Third and Fourth Claims for Relief under 47 U.S.C. §§ 276, 201, and 416(c) based on statute of limitations is DENIED AS MOOT, it is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief for Breach of Contract based on statute of limitations is DENIED, it is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) Plaintiffs Fifth Claim for Relief for Unjust Enrichment is DENIED”
“Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Statute of Limitations as to its Second, Third and Fourth Claims for Relief under 47 U.S.C. §§ 276, 201, and 416(e) is DENIED AS MOOT, it is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Statute of Limitations as to its First Claim for Relief for Breach of Contract is DENIED.”
“ORDERED that Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc.’s Renewed Motion To Dismiss is DENIED.”
“Plaintiffs’ first, second, third and fourth claims against Defendant Togo G. West only are DISMISSED with prejudice”
“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss filed October 6, 2000, is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), filed March 30, 2001, is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss filed September 8, 1999 is DENIED.”
“the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Darrell Danyluk and Matthew Reed on March 28, 2005 (docket # 27), is DENIED.”
“the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.”
“defendants’ motion to transfer venue to the Central District of California, Orange County Division (Santa Ana), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), is GRANTED.”
“defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.”
“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, is GRANTED”
“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs State Law Claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is GRANTED”
“Defendant’s Motion to Certify Question to Colorado Supreme Court is DENIED”
“Plaintiffs Motion for Approval of Hoffman-LaRoehe Notice is GRANTED”
“Defendants Roan Cliff Corporation, Cheri J. Witt-Brown, Brian Hurford, Craig Cherry and Craig Gran-lund’s Joinder in Co-Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment based on Statute of Limitations [Docket # 480] is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of Defendants’ Reply, or in the Alternative, for Leave to File Surreply [Docket # 498] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“Defendants Roan Cliff Corporation, Cheri J. WitNBrown, Brian Hurford, Craig Cherry and Craig Granlund’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket # 367] is DENIED.”
“Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Statute of Limitations and Brief in Support Thereof [Docket # 413] is DENIED.”
“ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 6 days (N = 12).
The eight sampled cases covered eight different civil subject areas. This narrow early-tenure slice is not a career-wide caseload profile.
A historical record
Judge Daniel no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.