Jeffrey Stuart Sutton
How Judge Sutton decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Textualist statutory interpretation anchored in the precise words Congress chose: in the PLRA the strike provision counts 'action[s] or appeal[s],' not claims, so a partial or jurisdictional dismissal is not a strike. Parse the operative noun/verb, not the statute's general purpose.
“The Act, notably, refers to ‘action[s] or appeal[s],’ not claims, when it mentions what counts as a strike. ... This language suggests that all claims in a complaint, not just some of them, must be dismissed on grounds listed in the Act for the dismissal to count as a strike.”
Reads a statute's mens-rea adverb strictly and applies it identically in civil and criminal settings: under the CFAA/SCA 'intentionally' modifies 'exceeds,' so a computer insider must KNOW his access is forbidden -- an improper motive (per Van Buren) does not make authorized access a violation.
“An insider does not intentionally do more than is justified if he has no reason to know that his conduct is off-limits.”
Procedural preferences
On constitutional challenges he defaults to rational-basis review absent a basis for heightened scrutiny and defers to legislative line-drawing -- a State's policy choice that survives rational basis will be upheld even on contested social questions.
“In the absence of any explanation for heightened review of Tennessee's birth-certificate amendment policy, we must uphold the policy if a rational basis supports it.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Tennessee chose to record births based solely on biological sex. That choice of government policy, indeed that choice of government speech, ... does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”
“Because the Conlan company failed to show that Massey acted without authorization or intentionally exceeded his authorization, it cannot recover under either Act. We affirm.”
“We vacate the district court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.”
“We thus affirm the district court’s decision to deny the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.”
“Because the definition of ‘coal or other mine’ refers to locations, equipment and other things in, above, beneath, or appurtenant to active mines, the Maxxim facility is not a mine subject to the Administration’s jurisdiction. We reverse.”
“Because the administrative law judge was an inferior officer of the United States, and because she was not appointed by the President, a court of law, or the head of a department, as the Constitution demands, we vacate the Commission’s decision and remand for fresh proceedings.”
“The district court rejected the claims as a matter of law. We affirm.”
“Because Huff has not shown that the incomplete report injured him in any way, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his case for lack of standing.”
“No part of that decision goes awry legally, and no part of his habitual-residence finding sinks to clear error. We affirm.”
Put Judge Sutton's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Sutton actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Sutton's own signed orders and cites them.