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Jane Branstetter Stranch

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit circuit Senior status Appointed by Barack Obama (Democratic) 26 signed orders read

How Judge Stranch decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On qualified immunity at summary judgment she looks past the chaotic scene to the specific instrumentality and its design use -- a munition built for long-range crowd dispersal, fired at point-blank range, can be excessive even where the surrounding officers' conduct is protected. She draws inferences in the non-movant's favor and lets a jury decide the close case.

“a reasonable jury could find that [Officer Reinink] used excessive force when he fired Spede-Heat at Hart at point-blank range.”

Vindicates ERISA's substantive participant protections: a pension plan's use of outdated mortality assumptions that reduce married retirees' benefits can violate the actuarial-equivalence requirement, and a complaint so alleging survives a motion to dismiss. (Reflects her decades representing pension participants before the bench.)

“alleged that their plans used outdated mortality data to calculate their benefits, which improperly decreased those benefits in violation of ERISA's actuarial equivalence requirement.”

Skeptical of automatic deference to ESOP/plan fiduciaries at the pleading stage: the circuit's presumption of reasonableness for holding employer stock is a fact question for summary judgment, not a heightened pleading bar, so a plausible allegation that a prudent fiduciary would have acted differently is enough to survive a motion to dismiss. (Dudenhoefer was later reviewed by the Supreme Court as Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoefer.)

“the Kuper presumption of reasonableness ... does not apply at the motion to dismiss stage.”

Procedural preferences

Demands a reasoned record from district courts: a box-checked summary denial of a supervised-release early-termination motion is reversible because nothing shows the court weighed the Sec 3553(a) factors. Explain your reasoning or expect a vacatur.

“we hold that the record must demonstrate that the district court considered the relevant Sec 3553(a) factors before denying an early termination motion.”

Judicial restraint / minimalism: she resists reaching out to decide a major legal question that the parties did not brief, preferring to wait for a case in which the issue is squarely litigated, and is wary of using Loper Bright to redefine settled statutory standards from scratch.

“Loper Bright does not give this court the power or the responsibility to define ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ from new cloth -- it instead teaches that reinterpreting a statute should be undertaken only with great caution.”

Reads AEDPA's habeas tolling provision generously toward petitioners: a state post-conviction motion stays 'pending' -- and the federal one-year clock stays paused -- for the entire window a prisoner could have sought further state review, whether or not he actually files that further appeal.

“AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations was tolled during the period in which he could have, but did not, appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals' denial of his motion for post-conviction relief.”

Textualist about contract structure: a caption or heading on a collective bargaining agreement cannot narrow an otherwise-unambiguous substantive clause; headings can only resolve an ambiguity that already exists in the operative text, never create or shrink coverage on their own.

“titles and headings 'cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.'”

Cautions

Will not let a district court resolve a credibility-dependent factual dispute -- like whether a new eyewitness affidavit is genuine and how it interacts with a since-recanted trial witness -- on the papers alone; she requires an evidentiary hearing before habeas relief can rest on such untested evidence, even where the State's opposition has been thin.

“Nor can it be confidently declared that a hearing 'would only confirm' Jackson's version of events.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Sean Hart v. City of Grand Rapids, Mich.
23-1382 · 2025-05-15
Appeal (appellant) Granted in part

“we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Officer Johnson and Sergeant Bush and AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, but we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Officer Reinink, and REMAND for further proceedings on that claim.”

Thomas Reichert v. Kellogg Co. (consolidated with Watt v. FedEx Corp.)
24-1442/24-5945 · 2026-03-16
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.”

United States v. Edwin Tavarez
23-3666 · 2025-06-23
Appeal (appellant) Granted in part

“we VACATE the district court's Summary Order, AFFIRM the district court's Documents Access Order, and REMAND for further proceedings.”

Moms For Liberty - Wilson County, Tenn. v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
24-5056 · 2025-09-09
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Miguel Moctezuma-Reyes v. Merrick B. Garland
23-3561 · 2024-12-23
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Because Moctezuma-Reyes has not shown that he meets the criteria for cancellation of removal under the old test, and because no party has challenged the BIA's authority to interpret Sec 1229b(b)(1)(D), I would affirm the BIA's judgment and expressly reserve ruling on the current test.”

United States v. Scott Sulik
18-5978 · 2019-07-03
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We find no clear error. We therefore AFFIRM the decision of the district court.”

United States v. Frank Susany, Jr.
17-4093 · 2018-06-22
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Although the district court erred when it refused to reduce Susany's offense level pursuant USSG 2X1.1(b), the error was harmless. We therefore AFFIRM Susany's sentence.”

United States v. Timothy Carpenter
14-1572 · 2019-06-11
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The Government's acquisition of Carpenter's CSLI violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court nevertheless properly denied suppression because the FBI agents relied in good faith on the SCA when they obtained the data. We therefore AFFIRM.”

State of Tennessee v. Michael Corrin (In re Bratt)
16-5717/5719 · 2017-02-23
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We affirm the judgment of the bankruptcy court that approved a Chapter 13 plan using a 12% interest rate for overdue property taxes.”

United States v. Francisco Javier Araiza
· 2016-03-08
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's application of the enhancements found at Guidelines Sec 2D1.1(b)(1) and Sec 3B1.1(c).”

Robert Hayes v. Commissioner of Social Security
17-6142 · 2018-07-12
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Because we find Cybriwsky's motion for attorney's fees to be untimely and the doctrine of equitable tolling inapplicable on this record, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court denying Cybriwsky's motion for attorney's fees.”

Samantha Milby v. MCMC LLC
16-5483 · 2016-12-22
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The district court's judgment is therefore affirmed.”

Put Judge Stranch's record to work

Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Stranch actually rules, not a generic AI guess.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Stranch's own signed orders and cites them.