Sarah A. L. Merriam
How Judge Merriam decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She begins statutory and constitutional interpretation with the enacted text. In Unkechaug she resolved treaty preemption by parsing Article VI clause by clause, including the placement of commas in the Supremacy Clause.
“In interpreting Article VI of the United States Constitution, we begin with the text. ... The placement of the commas around ‘or which shall be made’ makes very clear that the phrase ‘under the Authority of the United States’ modifies ‘all Treaties made.’”
Willing to overrule circuit precedent (en banc) to protect a criminal defendant’s procedural rights -- here the right to be present when supervised-release conditions are imposed.
“[we] overrule Truscello. We VACATE the portion of the defendant’s sentence imposing the thirteen discretionary conditions of supervised release.”
Repeatedly requires sentencing courts to make an individualized, on-the-record assessment before imposing discretionary supervised-release conditions, and to keep the written judgment faithful to what was actually said at sentencing -- a theme that recurs across her en banc Maiorana opinion and two later panel opinions (Guard, McAdam).
“We conclude that the District Court erred by imposing Conditions 14 and 15 without making the required individualized assessment and articulating on the record its reasons for imposing the conditions.”
Procedural preferences
Addresses appellate jurisdiction and sovereign immunity before reaching the merits, and resolves issues on the narrowest dispositive ground.
“Because our conclusion that the Andros Order is not federal law is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address the parties’ remaining arguments.”
Holds appellants to a strict burden of establishing appellate jurisdiction, especially on interlocutory qualified-immunity appeals -- a defendant who continues to dispute the plaintiff's version of the facts, rather than accepting it for purposes of the appeal, cannot obtain immediate review.
“Corrow does not accept, even for the limited purposes of pursuing this appeal, Jok's version of the facts, or any set of stipulated facts.”
Cautions
Deems inadequately-briefed arguments forfeited -- arguments raised only in a footnote, or not pleaded, will not be considered.
“We ordinarily deem an argument to be forfeited where it has not been sufficiently argued in the briefs, such as when it is only addressed in a footnote.”
Will affirm even where a district court's reasoning was flawed (e.g. applying the wrong standard of review) if her own de novo review of the record independently supports the same result -- the error is treated as harmless rather than a basis for reversal.
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo; therefore, the District Judge's failure to conduct the required de novo review of the R&R is harmless.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the District Court appropriately entered summary judgment in defendants' favor, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.”
“We hold that a sentencing court intending to impose non-mandatory conditions of supervised release, including the ‘standard’ conditions described in §5D1.3(c), must notify the defendant during the sentencing proceeding ... [we] overrule Truscello. We VACATE the portion of the defendant’s sentence imposing the thirteen discretionary conditions of supervised release. ... We REMAND this matter to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.”
“For the reasons stated, we VACATE the District Court's judgment of dismissal and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“No such unlawful conduct is required by the contracts NexPoint seeks to rescind, and therefore we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.”
“We therefore VACATE the judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.”
“The judgment of the District Court is therefore AFFIRMED.”
“In light of Slattery, we vacate the dismissal of Plaintiffs' expressive-association claim, the grant of summary-judgment to Plaintiffs as to the Act's Notice Provision, and the permanent injunction. We remand for the District Court to determine whether any Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an expressive-association claim under Slattery. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs' free speech and free exercise claims.”
“Accordingly, we VACATE the District Court's grant of JNOV for Antonik and NYU on Edelman's retaliation claims, and REMAND with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict on these claims. We further VACATE the District Court's decision granting JMOL in favor of Kaplan on the retaliation claim, and remand for a new trial on that claim. We AFFIRM the judgment as to the remaining claims.”
“We conclude that by their actions, including by affirmatively seeking a resolution of their dispute in the District Court, the UBS Defendants waived their right to compel arbitration. We therefore AFFIRM the District Court's denial of the UBS Defendants' motion to compel arbitration on the alternative ground of waiver.”
“Accordingly, we AFFIRM IN PART, and VACATE and REMAND IN PART, with instructions to amend the written judgment to conform with the oral pronouncement of Special Conditions 2, 4, and 7.”
“Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment entered by the District Court.”
Put Judge Merriam's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Merriam actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Merriam's own signed orders and cites them.