Valdemar Aguirre Cordova
Judge Cordova no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Cordova decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Cordova granted habeas relief when a guilty plea omitted a mandatory parole consequence and the unrebutted record showed the defendant would not have pleaded guilty with full knowledge.
“The Court will grant the petition on the conditions stated in this Opinion and Order.”
He recognized enforceable employment expectations created by authorized institutional promises and required public officials to provide the protections normally accompanying tenure.
“plaintiff may not be terminated, by the impetus of university officials, without notice and a hearing at which he would be entitled to the same substantive standards and procedural protections afforded a regularly tenured professor.”
Procedural preferences
He favored comprehensive state resolution of interlocking water-rights disputes and used remand or dismissal without prejudice to avoid fragmented federal adjudication.
“In light of considerations of federal judicial restraint in State matters and judicial administration, further giving regard to the conservation of judicial resources and the comprehensive disposition of litigation, this Court finds that those actions originally brought- in the State Land Department of the State of Arizona and then removed to this Court from the State courts be remanded to the State courts for further proceedings.”
On appeal he would not review an evidence-sufficiency challenge when the appellant omitted the relevant transcript from the record.
“Appellant Thomas has not complied with Rule 10(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and noncompliance therewith is not excusable on the grounds asserted by her. The appeal is dismissed.”
Cautions
He treated tribal courts as separate sovereign institutions rather than inferior federal tribunals when evaluating extraordinary writ relief.
“There is no basis for this Court to depart from these traditional principles or to conclude that the Navajo Tribal Court is inferior to, rather than separate from this Court.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS ORDERED vacating the decision of this Court heretofore issued, 546 F.Supp. 1185, and also now dissolving injunction.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for attorney’s fees is granted in the amount of $2925.00.”
“Following oral argument on April 21, 1981 the Court denied the motion to dismiss.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Respondents are hereby ordered to release the petitioner from custody unless the State institutes appropriate proceedings for the trial of petitioner within 60 days, or unless respondents file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of this Opinion and Order.”
“The plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as prayed for.”
“The court agrees with defendant that injunctive relief is not necessary.”
“THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED granting defendant’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, directing his release on these charges, and that retrial of the defendant be and hereby is barred by law.”
“The plaintiff, Nathalie Norris, on behalf of herself and for the class, is entitled to a summary judgment permanently enjoining the defendants from carrying out their obligations under A.R.S. § 38-871”
“Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association v. White Mountain Apache Tribe (CIV 79-182); Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association v. Gila River Indian Community (CIV 79-183); Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association v. Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Community (CIV 79-184) are hereby remanded to the State courts for all further proceedings.”
“Salt River Pima-Maricopa’ Indian Community v. The State of Arizona (CIV 79-185); San Carlos Apache Tribe of Indians v. State of Arizona (CIV 79-186); and Payson Community of Yavapai-Apache Indians v. The State of Arizona (CIV 79-187) are hereby dismissed without prejudice.”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted to the extent of the declaratory judgment of non-liability and the bill of peace; in all other respects the motion will be denied.”
“Accordingly, this Court concludes that a preliminary injunction should issue to enjoin the defendants and the class they represent from instituting or further pursuing claims against UNC in the Navajo Tribal Court arising out of the spill in question.”
“IT IS ORDERED dismissing Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Tribal defendants Robert Walters, the Navajo Tribal Courts, by and through its Chief Judge, Nelson McCabe, and the Navajo Indian Tribe, through its Chairman, Peter McDonald.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the motion to dismiss filed by the individual defendants Mary John, a widow, Katie Mae John, a single person, Katie Mae John, as next friend of Rodney John and Phillip Jerome John, minors, Mary Lou Goldtooth, individually and Mary Lou Goldtooth as next friend of Randi Lou Goldtooth and Raini Lou Goldtooth, minors.”
“As to the individual defendants, the Court will grant plaintiffs’ application for preliminary injunction.”
“THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED vacating the temporary restraining order of June 10, 1981 and now granting the petition to the following extent:”
“THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Respondents are ordered to release petitioner from custody unless the State institutes appropriate proceedings for the retrial of petitioner within sixty (60) days, or unless respondents file a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Opinion and Order.”
“THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED vacating the minute entry of June 11, 1981 and the temporary restraining order filed June 15, 1981.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing the complaint against the defendant Arizona Board of Regents.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting the preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants Mulhollan, Weigend and Fisher from engaging in any action to remove plaintiff from his position as Professor of English, unless plaintiff is afforded those substantive and procedural protections normally afforded tenured professors in the A.S.U. Department of English.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
No electronic case-level dockets assigned to Cordova were located for his historical tenure, so no caseload mix or duration claim is made.
A historical record
Judge Cordova no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.