Inge Prytz Johnson
Judge Johnson no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Johnson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She rejected an administrative law judge’s unsupported speculation about a treating physician’s motives and relied on the developed medical record.
“The court finds this is at best, rank speculation and at worst, libelous.”
She preserved most expert testimony when the challenges went to weight and cross-examination rather than admissibility.
“The remainder of said motion is DENIED.”
She required record evidence, rather than argument alone, to create a genuine dispute at summary judgment.
“T.P. Productions has produced no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”
Procedural preferences
She addressed multi-motion post-trial requests separately, applying the governing standard to judgment as a matter of law, remittitur, and a new trial.
“The motion for judgment as a matter of law (doc. 79) is therefore DENIED.”
On remand, she confined the renewed copyright analysis to the issue identified by the appellate court.
“the court provided the parties an opportunity to brief solely the issue of implied license”
Cautions
She distinguished factual evidence from assertions in a party’s brief when reviewing summary judgment.
“the plaintiff’s evidence does not support the factual representations in his arguments”
She limited experts from offering opinions about a corporate defendant’s subjective knowledge or intent.
“Said motion is GRANTED to the extent that none of plaintiffs’ experts may testify as to what defendant ‘knew.’”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The motion for judgment as a matter of law (doc. 79) is therefore DENIED.”
“the defendant’s motion for remittitur and constitutional reduction of punitive damages award (doc. 80) is DENIED.”
“the defendant’s motion for a new trial (doc. 81) is DENIED.”
“It is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Agency to calculate the plaintiffs monetary benefits.”
“It is therefore ORDERED by the court that the defendants’ motions to dismiss *1256 (does. 4, 7 and 44) be and hereby are DENIED.”
“it is ORDERED that the claimants’ motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED.”
“it is ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“the government’s Motion for Reconsideration (doc. 64) is found MOOT”
“ORDERED that the claimants are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in the amount of $363,259.92 plus interest as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 from the government.”
“It is therefore ORDERED by the court that said motion be and hereby is GRANTED. The claims against these defendants are DISMISSED.”
“The alternative motion to amend is therefore DENIED.”
“the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 127) on the plaintiffs bad faith claim is GRANTED”
“the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on its bad faith claim (doc. 125) is DENIED.”
“It is therefore ORDERED by the court that said motion (doc. 215) be and hereby is DENIED.”
“Intervenor QBE is entitled to judgment in its favor and against the defendants as a matter of law on QBE’s claim against defendants.”
“Plaintiff Lancer is entitled to judgment in its favor and against the defendants as a matter of law on Lancer’s claim against defendants.”
“the court shall grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 590) to this extent.”
“the court finds defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all counts of the plaintiffs complaint is due to be GRANTED”
“the court shall DENY the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 40) as to plaintiffs claim under Title VII and § 1983 against defendant Willis in his individual capacity only. The court shall GRANT the defendants’ motion for the reasons set forth above as to plaintiffs Equal Protection claim, Retaliation claim, and for prospective relief pursuant to § 1983.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 362 days (N = 20).
The 20 located assigned cases were all later terminated and included employment, Social Security, civil-rights, contract, personal-injury, trademark, and statutory matters. This narrow archival slice does not establish the distribution of Judge Johnson’s full caseload.
A historical record
Judge Johnson no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.