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Clarence H. Mullins

United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama district Retired 1957 · served 1943–1957 Appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt (Democratic) 22 signed orders read

Judge Mullins no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Mullins decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Mullins applied protective statutes according to their plain language and construed exemptions liberally for the class the legislature intended to protect.

“The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and the policy in question falls within the very letter of the statute.”

He treated the substance of an asserted business arrangement as more important than formal documents when the economic relationships had not actually changed.

“the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that the family group arrangement was not entered into with the bona fide intent of the parties to form a partnership for the purpose of conducting the business of the Grayson Lumber Company.”

He required equal seniority treatment when a bargaining structure gave white employees job rights that it denied to Black employees.

“So long as white firemen, by contract or practice existing between the railroad and the Brotherhood, exercise seniority based on continuous service, these •colored firemen must exercise that right.”

Procedural preferences

Mullins favored remand when federal jurisdiction was substantially doubtful, especially where taking jurisdiction would require resolving an unsettled question of state procedure.

“the weight of authority that holds that a case should be so remanded where there is substantial doubt as to the jurisdiction of the federal court.”

He declined declaratory jurisdiction that would fragment a dispute already capable of complete resolution in pending state litigation.

“It is not within the sphere of a declaratory judgment proceeding to deal with litigation by piecemeal.”

He measured the timeliness of intervention by prejudice to the existing parties rather than elapsed time alone when intervention was a matter of right.

“the timeliness of the application must be determined not merely by a desire to reduce the number of litigants or by the mere lapse of time, but by the test of prejudice or unfairness to the interests of the opposing party”

Cautions

Mullins strictly enforced the conditions Congress placed on suits against the United States and would not allow a late amendment to create jurisdiction after the limitations period expired.

“Statutes waiving sovereign immunity from suit are strictly construed.”

He followed controlling constitutional decisions even when local ordinances asserted police-power justifications for race-based property restrictions.

“Under the decisions it becomes my duty to declare each of the three ordinances here involved unconstitutional”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

In Re Beckman
· 1943-05-26
Petition to review referee order (policy beneficiaries) Granted

“The order of the referee directing the beneficiaries to deliver said policy to the trustee and ordering the insurance company to pay the cash surrender value is reversed and vacated, and the referee is instructed to dismiss the petition of the trustee.”

Brown v. Standard Oil Co.
· 1943-10-11
Request for injunction (plaintiff) Denied

“the court finds that the plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, temporary or permanent, as prayed for in the complaint”

Request for injunction (plaintiff) Denied
In re Redwine
· 1944-01-10
Petition to review referee order (judgment creditor) Granted

“The decree of the Referee is set aside and vacated. Proper decree with instructions will be entered in accordance with the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law.”

National Surety Corp. v. Cherokee County Bank
· 1944-09-18
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Proper decree will be entered granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.”

Sumter Farm & Stock Co. v. United States
· 1944-10-02
Tax refund claim (taxpayer) Denied

“The United States is entitled to judgment, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, and to its allowable costs.”

West Point Mfg. Co. v. Davis
· 1944-10-17
Tax refund claim (taxpayer) Granted

“That the plaintiff have and recover of the defendant the sum of $13,107.35”

First Nat. Bank v. United States
· 1944-11-10
Tax refund claim (taxpayer) Granted

“Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant the amount of taxes and interest paid as recited in the fifth finding of fact ($3930.35), with interest as proviued by law.”

Woodward Iron Co. v. United States
· 1945-02-06
Tax refund claim (taxpayer) Granted

“Cause No. 5370 in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for $98.48 plus interest from December 14, 1937.”

Tax refund claim (taxpayer) Granted

“Cause No. 5371 in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for $727.72 plus interest from July 31, 1940.”

Tax refund claim (taxpayer) Denied

“Cause No. 5372 in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.”

Ensley Bank & Trust Co. v. United States
· 1945-04-17
Tax refund claim (taxpayer) Granted

“It is, therefore, ordered and decreed that plaintiff, Ensley Bank & Trust Company, a dissolved corporation, do have and recover from the defendant, United States of America, the sum of $1,760.15”

Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. Thornton
· 1945-06-22
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that this action be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice”

McMichael v. United States
· 1945-11-15
Motions to dismiss (Tennessee Valley Authority) Granted

“On April 18, 1945, the motion of the Tennessee Valley Authority to dismiss for failure to state a claim was granted and the action was dismissed as to said defendant”

Motions to dismiss (United States) Granted

“An order will be entered granting the motion of the United States to dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction.”

Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. v. Muscoda Local 123
· 1946-03-28
Motion to reconsider (prospective intervenors) Granted

“the order of September 11, 1944, will be set aside”

Petition to intervene (petitioners pending on September 11, 1944) Granted

“petitions for intervention pending as of that date will be allowed”

Petition to intervene (petitioners filing on or after March 28, 1945) Denied

“further order will be entered denying or disallowing the several petitions for intervention filed on or after March 28, 1945.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The located opinions span bankruptcy, taxation, labor, civil rights, insurance, copyright, and federal jurisdiction. They do not establish the distribution of Mullins's full caseload.

A historical record

Judge Mullins no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.