Walter Hartman Hodge
Judge Hodge no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Hodge decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He strictly construes federal condemnation authority: 40 U.S.C. 257 confers no general power to condemn, and a general appropriation act does not by necessary implication authorize a particular taking absent specific congressional authorization.
“Sec. 257 is therefore not sufficient authority to sustain this action, in the absence of other specific legislation.”
He reads the Miller Act as a remedial statute entitled to liberal construction to protect suppliers of labor and material on public projects, requiring only a good-faith reasonable belief that materials were intended for the work.
“the Miller Act is remedial in nature and is entitled to a liberal construction in order to effect the legislative intent to protect those whose labor and material go into public projects.”
He applies governmental-function tort immunity to municipal and quasi-municipal bodies such as school districts, and holds that carrying liability insurance neither imposes liability nor waives immunity absent a statute so providing.
“the carrying of liability insurance does not impose any liability or constitute any waiver of immunity in such instance.”
He extends official / quasi-judicial immunity to prosecutors sued for conduct in their official capacity, including under the Civil Rights Act.
“is immune from suit under the Civil Rights Act for conduct in the performance of his official duties.”
Procedural preferences
He will not grant summary judgment where the affidavits leave a genuine issue of material fact, sending disputed factual questions (such as Indian use and occupancy) to trial.
“A motion for summary judgment cannot be granted where there is a genuine issue as to material facts.”
He treats statutory waiting periods as conditions precedent to suit: a Miller Act action filed before the 90-day period is premature and cannot be saved by a relation-back amendment, and must be dismissed.
“the ninety day period provided by the present Section 270b (a) likewise creates a condition precedent to commencing suit.”
On competing claims to a fund he applies first-in-time priority: an attachment lien perfected by serving the writ on a third-party holder is not divested by a receiver appointed afterward in a suit to which the attaching creditor was not a party.
“The mere appointment of the receiver, therefore, did not divest the lien acquired by the attachment.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The venue of the action is therefore properly laid in this district under the Jones Act.”
“Defendants Kelley and United Pacific Insurance Company are entitled to summary judgment against plaintiff that plaintiff take nothing upon the following claims”
“must be granted and the case dismissed against the surety”
“the motion to dismiss the complaint against said defendant is granted”
“The motion to dismiss is therefore granted.”
“The motion to reconsider is granted and the Court has considered the matter anew upon briefs submitted by both parties.”
“The motion of the plaintiff to dismiss the counterclaims must therefore be granted”
“the findings of the Examiner, affirmed by the Appeals Council, are supported by substantial evidence.”
“The petition for reconsideration must be denied.”
“No such order as appears to be prayed for by plaintiff may therefore be issued.”
“a fee of $250 is reasonable to be allowed to the defendants in this action.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
As a Territorial and then U.S. District Judge from 1954 to 1975, and Chief Judge from 1961 to 1966, Hodge carried a general federal civil and criminal docket that included maritime and Jones Act cases, public-works and contract disputes, condemnation and Federal Tort Claims Act litigation, tax and license matters, Social Security cases, Alaska Native issues, and criminal proceedings. The surviving record does not permit quantitative caseload analysis.
A historical record
Judge Hodge no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.