Raymond Eugene Plummer
Judge Plummer no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Plummer decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He extends judicial and official immunity broadly and holds the Civil Rights Act creates no exception to it, and that the federal anti-injunction statute bars a district court from enjoining state-court proceedings absent an express statutory exception.
“The Civil Rights Act creates no exception to this immunity.”
He construes ambiguities and drafting omissions in a government lease against the United States as the drafter, applying ordinary contract rules of construction to the government's rights and obligations as lessor of public lands.
“must be charged to the party who drew the lease.”
He guards sovereign immunity strictly: a State (or the United States) that sues does not thereby consent to an affirmative money judgment on a counterclaim, which may be used only defensively as setoff or recoupment.
“no affirmative relief may be given against the sovereign in the absence of consent.”
In an early NEPA-review decision he applied deferential arbitrary-and-capricious review to an agency's environmental-impact statement, upholding the AEC's compliance rather than second-guessing the substance of its judgment.
“its final decision is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
Where Congress has not supplied a federal rule for a federal agency's ordinary commercial lending, he adopts local (state) law as the federal rule of decision, following the approach Congress took in the Federal Tax Lien Act, rather than a blanket 'first in time, first in right' priority for the government.
“the Court adopts as the applicable federal rule in this case that which Congress declared controlling in the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 as amended, namely, local law.”
Procedural preferences
He treats summary judgment as appropriate where the material facts are undisputed and the case turns on a question of law or contract construction, deciding the legal issue on the existing record.
“There is no disputed issue of fact, and inasmuch as the decision of the Secretary turned on construction of the lease contract, the case is appropriate for summary judgment.”
On a claim of pre-indictment or pre-trial delay he requires the defendant both to have asserted the right and to make a plausible, non-speculative showing of actual prejudice; a bare assertion that memories have faded is not enough.
“A mere assertion of the dimming of memory is not sufficient to establish a showing of prejudice.”
He denies a Rule 56(f) continuance for further discovery where the additional evidence sought is irrelevant to the dispositive issue or where that issue is a question of law decidable on the current record.
“It does not appear that further discovery would be useful in the disposition of this matter.”
He determines removability as a matter of federal law by his own independent analysis of the state procedure, rather than deferring to the state's characterization of the proceeding.
“An independent analysis of Rule 89(f), Rules of Civil Procedure, State of Alaska, leads me to the conclusion that the garnishment proceedings established thereby is an independent”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed on the merits with prejudice.”
“this Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Counsel for defendants shall within ten days prepare, serve and submit an appropriate order dismissing the action with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff as a matter of law is entitled to a summary judgment decreeing his claim of lien in the amount of $920-00 to be prior to all other liens or claims.”
“The motion for summary judgment by the United States is denied.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for order limiting recovery is granted.”
“the Chief Adjudicator acted arbitrarily and plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgment declaring that the correct rental for the lands in question is 50 cents per acre as provided for nonparticipating lands in the lease agreement.”
“similar authority for segregations of the type which the Government here wishes the court to uphold is totally lacking in the lease provisions.”
“The motion for summary judgment is accordingly denied.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment is denied.”
“The complaint does not allege substantial grounds for attacking the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 603 and 607 (1969) and should be dismissed without convening a three-judge court.”
“The motion for continuance is accordingly denied.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for relief from this court’s order of March 26, 1971, is granted.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
As a United States District Judge and Chief Judge from 1966 to 1973, Plummer carried a general federal civil and criminal docket that included Federal Tort Claims Act cases, maritime and fisheries disputes, airline and common-carrier regulation, labor matters, oil-and-gas and public-lands litigation, insurance and contract claims, lien-priority disputes, and Alaska Native and environmental cases. The surviving record does not permit a quantitative caseload breakdown.
A historical record
Judge Plummer no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.