Can a lawyer charge a contingent fee to fight an administrative driver's-license suspension in a DUI case?

Plain-English summary

A lawyer asked whether a contingent fee could be charged for representing clients accused of driving under the influence in a civil administrative driver's-license suspension or revocation proceeding. The inquiry drew a distinction between that civil administrative proceeding on one hand, and a criminal DUI proceeding or a license suspension or revocation that results from a criminal conviction on the other.

The committee said that under RPC 1.5(d)(2) and RPC 1.8(j)(2) a lawyer may charge a reasonable contingent fee for representing clients in such administrative proceedings, because they are not criminal proceedings. The committee added that it was not expressing an opinion on the reasonableness of a fee arrangement in the situation where the same lawyer handles both the administrative and the criminal proceeding arising from the same incident.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2003, before the Washington State Bar Association's adoption of the 2006 revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct. The rules were renumbered and revised in 2006; the prohibition on contingent fees in criminal matters carried forward into the current RPC 1.5(d). Subsequent rule amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule mentioned here.

In practice

Under the Washington rules as they stood at the time of the opinion, the committee made the contingent-fee question turn on whether the proceeding is criminal. It concluded that a civil administrative driver's-license suspension or revocation is not a criminal proceeding, so a reasonable contingent fee is permitted for that representation. The committee expressly left open the reasonableness of the fee where a single lawyer handles both the administrative matter and the related criminal case from the same incident; it declined to opine on that combined scenario.

Common questions

Q: Is a contingent fee allowed in an administrative license-suspension case?

A: The committee said yes for a civil administrative driver's-license suspension or revocation, because it is not a criminal proceeding, citing RPC 1.5(d)(2) and RPC 1.8(j)(2).

Q: Why does it matter that the proceeding is civil rather than criminal?

A: The contingent-fee prohibition the committee identified applies to criminal proceedings. Because the administrative license proceeding is not criminal, the committee said the prohibition does not reach it.

Q: What about a lawyer handling both the administrative case and the criminal DUI?

A: The committee declined to opine on the reasonableness of a fee arrangement where one lawyer handles both the administrative and the criminal proceeding arising from the same incident.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets RPC 1.5 (Model Rule 1.5, fees), and relies specifically on the Washington provisions the committee cited, RPC 1.5(d)(2) and RPC 1.8(j)(2), to identify the contingent-fee restriction for criminal matters. The committee's analysis turns on the civil-versus-criminal character of the administrative license proceeding rather than on the amount or structure of the fee.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• Model Rule 1.5 / Washington RPC 1.5(d)(2) (contingent fees; restriction in criminal matters)
• Washington RPC 1.8(j)(2) (cited by the committee alongside RPC 1.5(d)(2))

See also

• WA Ethics Op. 1025: Contingent Fee, Forfeiture
• WA Ethics Op. 1024: Contingent Fee for Collections
• WSBA Ethics Op. 1074: Contingent Fee, Domestic Split

Source

• Landing page: https://ao.wsba.org/print.aspx?ID=1290

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

Advisory Opinion: 2032
Year Issued: 2003
RPC(s): RPC 1.5(d)(2), RPC 1.8(j)(2)
Subject: Contingent fees related to administrative license suspensions

The inquiring attorney asks the Committee whether a contingent fee may be charged for representing clients accused of driving under the influence of alcohol in a civil administrative driver’s license suspension or revocation proceeding (as opposed to a criminal DUI proceeding or a license suspension/revocation resulting from a criminal conviction). Under RPC 1.5(d)(2) and RPC 1.8(j)(2), a lawyer may charge a reasonable contingent fee for representing clients in such administrative proceedings because they are not criminal proceedings.

The committee is not expressing an opinion on the reasonableness of a fee arrangement in the situation where the lawyer is handling both the administrative and criminal proceedings arising from the same incident.