L & M Lignos Enterprises
Safety-training violation affirmed, penalty reduced to $750
Apply this precedent to your situation
This is citable Commission precedent from 1995, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.
Plain-English summary
L & M Lignos Enterprises was a bridge painting and sandblasting firm working beneath a bridge in Cleveland, Ohio. Employee Emmanuel Kleoudis fell from a suspended scaffold onto a barge and later died from his injuries. Although the company told employees to use safety belts and lifelines above 10 feet, the Commission found that it had not adequately instructed them to recognize the fall hazard or understand the rule, and a coworker believed a belt was unnecessary at the scaffold's height. The Commission affirmed the serious violation of the construction safety-training standard. Because the Secretary withdrew the separate guardrail item on review, the Commission reduced the combined $1,500 penalty to $750.
Decision snapshot
- Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.244(b), 1926.21(b)(2), 1926.59(h), and 1926.451(a)(4).
- Outcome: Modified. The serious training violation was affirmed, the guardrail item was withdrawn, and the penalty was reduced to $750.
- Key point: Giving employees a safety rule is not enough under the training standard when the employer does not teach them to recognize the hazard and understand when the rule applies.
Full text (OSHRC public release)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
One Lafayette Centre
1120 20th Street, N.W. - 9th Floor
Washington, DC 20036-3419
.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, ..
..
Complainant, ..
..
v. .. OSHRC Docket No. 92-1746
..
.
L & M LIGNOS ENTERPRISES, ..
.
..
Respondent.
DECISION
Before: WEISBERG, Chairman; FOULKE and MONTOYA, Commissioners.
BY THE COMMISSION: .
L & M Lignos Enterprises ((‘L&M”), a bridge painting and sandblasting firm, was
hired to remove the paint from the underside of a bridge in downtown Cleveland, Ohio. On
November 22, 1991, while removing paint, L&M employee Emmanuel Kleoudis fell from a
scaffold’ onto a barge floating beneath the bridge and later died from his injuries.
Following an inspection of the worksite by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”), L&M was cited for a violation of 29 C.F.R. 5 1926.21(b)(2) for
failing to instruct employees in the recognition and avoidance of hazardous conditions?
’ The scaffold that the employees stood on was 28 inches wide and 32 feet long, and was
suspended from the bridge by cables. This form of scaffolding is known as a “pit system.”
2 On review, the Secretary withdrew his allegation that Respondent violated 29 C.F.R.
5 1926.451(a)(4) by failing to install guardrails and toeboards on the scaffold.
2
Administrative Law Judge Paul L. Brady affirmed a serious violation of the standard.3 For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the judge’s decision.
The cited standard, section 1926.21(b)(2), re q uires that the employer “instruct each
employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations
applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure
to illness or injury.” It is undisputed that L&M told its employees to wear safety belts and
lifelines when working at heights over 10 feet.4 The compliance officer acknowledged that
the employees “had been told to tie off, had been told to wear belts.” When employees
apply for a job with L&M they are required to sign a form which states that “I have read
and agree to abide by the company safety rules and understand the wearing of personal
protective equipment is a condition of employment.” Employees also are given a memo
which states in part:
Section 360.[Lifelines] and safety belts shall be provided by the employer and
it shall be the responsibility of the employee to wear such equipment . . . by
all workmen exposed to the hazards of falling when the operation being
performed is more [than] 10 feet above solid ground or above permanent
floor or platform.
The management of this Company hereby provides you a safety belt with the
[lifeline] attached. It is the desire and order of the management that you use
3 The hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Edwin G. &dyers, who retired
prior to the issuance of a decision.
4 The Secretary also cited L&M for violating 29 C.F.R. 6 1926.451(a)(4) but withdrew the
citation on review. That standard requires a platform to have guardrails and toeboards if
it is more than 10 feet above the ground or floor. L&M contends that it required its
employees to use tied-off safety belts because it could not place guardrails on the scaffold
due to the configuration of the bridge deck. The Secretary does not dispute this, but instead
focuses on L&M’s alleged inadequate instruction on safety belts and lifelines.
Lignos claims that the evidence does not establish that the scaffold was 10 feet high. As
Judge Brady noted, while there are varied estimates for the distance from the scaffold to the
barge, the compliance officer was the only person to actually attempt to measure the height
based on where the scaffold hung and that, even if weighted with personnel and equipment,
the scaffold would have been at least 10 feet high. L&M does not cite any evidence to
disprove this.
3
a safety belt and [lifeline] for your personal protection at all times. We expect
our employees to comply fully with Section 360 . . . .
These instructions provide an adequate workrule but are not enough alone to meet
the terms of the standard. “An employer complies with section 1926.21(b)(2) when it
instructs employees about the hazards they may encounter on the job and the regulations
applicable to those hazards.” Concrete Constr. Co., 15 BNA OSHC 1614, 1619, 1991-93 CCH
OSHD ll 29,681, p. 40,243 (No. 89-2019, 1992). Nowhere else does the memo explain the
hazards that respondent’s employees may encounter at various worksites that require the use
of lifelines and safety belts when working over 10 feet. L&M’s vice-president Michael
Lignos and its foreman Peter Enzor may have discussed with its employees the wearing of
safety belts and lifelines, but employee Steven Lortos, who was working with Kleoudis on
the scaffold, did not recognize that a hazard existed at that height. He believed that “even
if you jump [from the scaffold], you are not going to [get] hurt.” When questioned when he
“need[s] to put a safety belt on,” Lortos testified “after 25 feet you have to wear it no
matter what, 30 feet” and that “[alctually, on that particular thing, I think it is a little
embarrassing, 15 feet to wear a belt.” L&M complains that the compliance officer limited
his investigation to one employee, Lortos. However, L&M had ample opportunity to present
its own witnesses to rebut Lortos’ testimony. There is no evidence in the record that L&M
offered any instruction whatsoever to its employees about hazards present when working ten
or more feet above the ground.’ For these reasons, we find that the Secretary has proved
that L&M violated 29 C.F.R. 9 1926.21(b)(2). Judge Brady found that the violation was
serious as alleged. L&M does not challenge that characterization on review. We therefore
conclude that the violation was serious.
5 To support his finding of a violation, Judge Brady held that L&M did not enforce the
instruction it gave to employees to wear safety belts and lifelines when working 10 feet above
ground. Under Commission precedent, section 1926.21(b)(2) only requires that the employer
instruct its employees of hazards, and does not require enforcement of those instructions.
Drwo Engrs. & Constructors, 11 BNA OSHC 2010, 1984-85 CCH OSHD Y 26,930 (No. 81.
745, 1984). Chairman Weisberg finds it unnecessary to reach the question of whether
enforcement of the instructions is required under this standard inasmuch as the record
establishes that L&M failed to properly instruct employees within the meaning of the
standard.
4
The Secretary had proposed a combined penalty of $1500 for items l(a) and l(b) of
Serious Citation No. 1. The judge assessed the proposed amount. L&M did not dispute the
appropriateness of the penalty the judge assessed. On review, the Secretary withdrew item
l(b) and argues that a penalty of $750 is appropriate for the remaining item, l(a).
Accordingly, we affirm the serious violation and, based on the statutory criteria in 29 U.S.C.
5 666(j), assess a total penalty of $750.
It is so ordered.
&$hmsii & bh&l&nQ
Stuart E. Weisberg
Chairman
Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.
Commissioner
Velma Montoya
Dated: February 14, 1995 Commissioner
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
One Lafayette Centre
1120 20th Street, N.W. - 9th Floor
Washington, DC 20036-3419
.
.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, ..
..
Complainant, ..
..
.
V. . Docket No. 92-1746
.
L & M LIGNOS ..
ENTERPRISES, ..
.
Respondent.
NOTICE OF COMMISSION DECISION
The attached decision by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission was issued on
Februarv 14.1995. ANY PERSON ADVERSELY AFFECTED OR AGGRIEVED WHO WISHES
TO OBTAIN REVIEVVOF THIS DECISION MUST FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE
APPROPRIATE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN 60 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS
DECISION. See Section 11 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. 8 660.
FOR THE COMMISSION
February 14. 1995
Date
.
Executive Secretary
Docket No. 92-1746
NOTICE IS GIVEN TO THE FOLLOWING:
Daniel J. Mick, Esq.
Counsel for Regional Trial Litigation
Office of the Solicitor, U.S. DOL
Room S4004
200 Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20210
Benjamin T. Chinni, Esq.
Associate Regional Solicitor
Office of the Solicitor, U.S. DOL
Federal Office Building, Room 881
1240 East Ninth Street
Cleveland, OH 44199
Richard Hayes
Hayes Environmental Services, Inc.
5727 Airport Hwy.
Suite A
Toledo, OH 43615
Paul L. Brady
Administrative Law Judge
Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission
Room 240
1365 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-3 119
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
One Lafayette Centre
1120 20th Street, N.W. - 9th Floor
Washington, DC 20036-3419
FAX:
PHONE:
COM (202) 6os5050
COM(202) 6064100 FTS (202) 6o6-5050
f=rs (202) 606-5100
SECRETARY OF LABOR I
Complainant,
v. \ OSHRC DOCKET
NO. 92-1746
L & M LIGNOS ENTERPRISE
Respondent.
NOTICE OF DOCKETING
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION
The Administrative Law Judge’s Report in the above referenced case was
docketed with the Commission on January 3, 1994. The decision of the Judge
will become a final order of the Commission on February 2, 1994 unless a
Commission member directs review of the decision on or before that date. ANY
PARTY DESIRING REVIEW OF THE JUDGE’S DECISION BY THE
COMMISSION MUST FILE A PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW.
Any such etition should be received b the Executive Secretary on or before
January 2B, 1994 in order to ermit suBicient time for its review. See
Comrmssion Rule 91, 29 C.F.e, . 2200.91.
All further pleadings or communications regarding this case shall be
addressed to:
Executive Secretary
Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission
1120 20th St. N.W., Suite 980
* Washington, D.C. 20036-3419
Petitioning parties shall also mail a copy to:
Daniel J. Mick, Esq.
Counsel for Regional Trial Litigation
Office of the Solicitor, U.S. DOL
Room S4004
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20210
If a Direction for Review is issued by the Commission, then the Counsel for
Regional Trial Litigation will represent the Department of Labor. Any party
having questions about review rights may contact the Commission’s Executive
Secretary or call (202) 606-5400.
FOR THE COMMISSION
Date: January 3, 1994
Executive Secr%ary
DOCKET NO. 92-1746
NOTICE IS GIVEN TO THE FOLLOWING:
Daniel J. Mick, Esq.
Counsel for Regional Trial Litigation
Office of the Solicitor, U.S. DOL
Room S4004
200 Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20210
William S. Kloepfer
Assoc. Re ional Solicitor
Office of ta e Solicitor, U.S. DOL
Federal Office Building, Room 881
1240 East Ninth Street
Cleveland, OH 44199
Richard Hayes
Hayes Environmental Services, Inc.
5727 Airport Hwy.
Suite A
Toledo, OH 43615
Edwin G. Salyers
Administrative Law Jud e
Occupational Safety an cf Health
Review Commission
Room 240
1365 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309 3119
00108838202:05
UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
1365 PEACHTREE STREET, N.E., SUITE 240
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30309-3119
PHONE: FAX:
COM (404)3474197 COM (404)347-0113
FTS (404)347-4197 Frs (404)347-m 13
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
Complainant,
V. OSHRC Docket No.: 92-1746
L & M LIGNOS ENTERPRISES,
Respondent.
Appearances:
Kenneth Walton, Esquire Richard Hayes, President
Office of the Solicitor Hayes Environmental Sewices, Inc.
U. S. Department of Labor Toledo, Ohio
Cleveland, Ohio For Respondent
For Complainant
Before: Administrative Law Judge
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 22, 1991, Emmanuel “George” Kleoudis, a sandblaster employed by
L & M Lignos Enterprises (L&M), fell off of a scaffold as he was sandblasting the underside
of a bridge in Cleveland, Ohio. Kleoudis fell onto a barge floating beneath the bridge. He
sustained severe injuries from the fall and died a few weeks later.
As a result of the fatality, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) assigned compliance officer Richard M. Hanula to investigate L&M. Following
Hanula’s inspection, the Secretary issued two citations to L&M alleging violations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act). L&M contested the first citation, which
charged L&M with serious violations of four standards: 5 1926.21(b)(2) for failing to instruct
its employees in the recognition and avoidance of hazardous conditions (Item la); 5
1926.45 l(a)(4) for failure to install guardrails and toeboards on all open sides and ends of
platforms more than 10 feet above the ground or floor (Item lb); 5 1926.59(h) for failure
to provide employees with information and training on hazardous chemicals in their work
area (Item 2); and 5 1910.244(b) for failure to provide a support on which an abrasive blast
cleaning nozzle may be mounted when it is not in use.
Judge Edwin G. Salyers held a hearing in this matter on January 13, 1993, in
Cleveland, Ohio. At the time of the hearing, Steve Lortos, a former employee of L&M’s
who had been working with Kleoudis when Kleoudis fell from the scaffold, could not be
located. Following the hearing, the Secretary was able to find Lortos and on March 28,
1993, moved to reopen the record in this case in order to take Lortos’s deposition. Judge
Salyers granted the Secretary’s motion on July 9, 1993. On August 10, 1993, the parties
deposed Steve Lortos.
Background
L&M specializes in bridge painting and sandblasting. L&M was hired along with
American Bridge Company to sandblast the coating off of the Carter Road Bridge in
downtown Cleveland (Tr. 19). Peter D. Enzor was the foreman for L&M on the project.
He had been with L&M for 10 years (Tr. 108). Michael Lignos, vice-president for L&M,
visited the site every day (Tr. 164-165)) L&M’s work crew on the project consisted of
Kleoudis and Lortos.
Kleoudis and Lortos were working off of a scaffold suspended by two wires from the
bridge. The scaffold, referred to as a “pit,” was an aluminum platform that was 28 feet wide
and 32 inches wide. The platform was inserted into two brackets which were hooked onto
the two wires. The platform was not equipped with guardrails or toeboards (Tr. 7-8,10, 21).
Hanula estimated that the distance from the pit to the rebar on the bridge above it was
5 feet 10 inches to 6 feet (Tr. 25-26). Michael Lignos disagreed with this estimate, but did
.not offer his opinion as to what the distance was (Tr. 190).
The distance from the pit to the barge below was the subject of an array of estimates.
Hanula did not arrive at the bridge site until January 8, 1992, by which time the pit was
down and L&M was no longer working on the bridge (Tr. 18-19). Hanula measured from
the brackets in which the pit was inserted (Tr. 127). With the help of an American Bridge
Co. employee, Hanula measured the distance to be 16% feet (Exh. C-3; Tr. 27). No one
from L&M was present when Hanula took this measurement (Tr. 86). A report filed by an
2
inspector from the Ohio Department of Transportation estimated the pit to be “about 10
to 12 feet” from the barge below (Exh. C-5). Enzor estimated at the hearing that the pit
was “roughly 10 or 11 feet” above the barge (Tr. 126). Enzor stated that it was possible that
with the weight of two men and their equipment on the scaffold, the pit could be lowered
below 10 feet. Enzor acknowledged, however, that he did not measure the distance and that
10 to 11 feet was “just a guess” (Tr. 127). Enzor’s ability to judge distances is indicated in
a statement given by Enzor on November 27, 1991, five days after Kleoudis’s death (Exh.
C-8, p. 14):
,’ Q. About how high up is that scaffold?
A. Twenty-five, thirty, I don’t know.
Q. Is it ten or twelve feet off the ground?
A. That sounds good.
Lignos testified that the pit was 10 to 12 feet high when it was empty, and 9 to 10
feet high when people and equipment were on it (Tr. 177-178). In his August 10, 1993,
deposition, Lortos (for whom English is a second language) expressed his opinion regarding
the pit’s height (Deposition of Steve Lortos, p. 80):
Q. When you were erecting the pit, going back to the erection the day
before the accident, how high was the pit?
A. About 15 feet or 17 feet.
Q. Could it be lower than that?
A. No .
Q. You have testified 12 feet in previous depositions.
A. I didn’t take a ruler to measure it. I figure.
Q. You did not measure it?
A. They don’t be 100 feet or 50 feet or 30 feet. I know 15, 17, 18, 21,
around there I estimate.
The estimates of the height of the pit ranged from 9 to 30 feet. Hanula, however,
was the only witness who actually measured the distance. Even though the actual scaffold
was not there, the brackets that held it were. Hanula measured the brackets at l6*% feet
above the barge. Enzor and Lignos testified that the scaffold was lowered when weighted
down by workers and equipment. Lignos put the scaffold at 12 feet at its highest, and 9 feet
at its lowest, allowing for a 3 foot “give” in the wires. Allowing for 3 feet of “gi,,” applied
to Hanula’s measurement, the scaffold would still be higher than 10 feet, at 13% feet. Based
on the record, it is determined that on the day of Kleoudis’s accident, the scaffold with
Kleoudis and Lortos and their equipment on it, was at least 10 feet high.
The other area of dispute involved Kleoudis’s and Lortos’s use, or nonuse, of safety
belts. Enzor testified that on the day of the accident, he observed Kleoudis and Lmtos
wearing safety belts, but he could not tell whether or not they were tied off once they began
work on the scaffold (Tr. 118, 120, 122). Lortos testified, however, that he and Kleoudis
discussed whether or not they would wear safety belts at the scaffold’s height, and had
decided against it (Tr. 78-79). Kleoudis and Lortos were not wearing safety belts on the day
of the accident, but, Lortos testified, the next day when he returned to the site, someone had
placed a safety belt next to where Kleoudis had fallen and one up on the scaffold where
Lortos had been working (Deposition of Steve Lortos, p.43). Lortos, who was in the best
position to know, stated consistently on several occasions that he and Kleoudis were not
wearing safety belts and were not tied off on the day of the accident (Exhs. C-4, R-3, p. 54;
Deposition of Steve Lortos, p. 43).’ It is determined that Kleoudis and Lortos were not
wearing safety belts and were not tied off on November 22, 1991.
Item la: Alleged violation of 5 1926.21(b)(2)
The Secretary alleges that L&M violated 8 1926.21(b)(2), which provides:
The employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance
of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment
to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury.
L&M had a written safety program which requires its employees to use a safety belt
and life line when “exposed to the hazards of falling when the operation being performed
is more that [sic] 10 feet above solid ground or above permanent floor or platform”
(Exh. R-l). Employees are required to sign a sheet acknowledging the receipt of certain
1 In his original statement, Lortos said that when the paramedics arrived, they took Kleoudis’s belt off,
removed the hose, and disconnected the air compressor (Exh. R-3, p. 41-42). Lortos explained that he was
speaking of the belt on Kleoudis’s helmet that held the air hose, not a safety belt (Deposition of Steve Lortos,
p. 46).
4
safety equipment, including a safety belt and harness (Exh. R-2). Lignos explained L&M’s
safety training for new employees: “I give them all the paperwork, his W-4 form, they sign
all this stuff. We explain through all the requirements on some of these people, their
education is low. A lot of them are broken up English they speak, and I have to explain it
to them in Greek personally” (Tr. 170).
Foreman Enzor also testified as to L&M’s safety training. Each new employee was
told to wear safety belts. L&M. conducted weekly safety meetings, and sometimes more
often than that if problems arose (Tr. 109). Enzor explained L&M’s three-step disciplinary
procedure, in which a safety infraction draws first a verbal warning, then a written warning,
and finally suspension (Tr. 112-l 13).
Enzor’s testimony on L&M’s safety training was undercut, however, by his later
testimony upon cross-examination (Tr. 147-148):
Q. Have you ever been exposed to the OSHA standards, the OSHA safety
standards?
A. I have no idea what you’re talking about.
Q. The standards contained in 29 C.F.R. 8 1926, have you ever - -
A. That don’t mean nothing to me.
Q. So, what exactly is it that you discuss with employees, then if it’s not
safety standards or any standards that might be applicable to the work
environment? What safety things do you talk about?
A. Common sense things when they’re up there to try and save their life.
Furthermore, despite Enzor’s explanation of L&M’s three-step disciplinary process,
and his assertion that he had never seen Kleoudis and Lortos fail to tie off (Tr. 155), Enzor
stated that he did not usually check on the men to see if they were tied off (Tr. 153-154).
. The efficacy of L&M’s safety program was further undermined by Lortos’s testimony.
Lortos explained why he and Kleoudis did not wear safety belts that day (Deposition of
Steve Lortos, pp. 25-26):
We don’t wear it because it was fifteen feet above the ground, and even if you
jump, you are not going to hurt. Each individual makes up his mind. If you
want to wear it, you wear it. If you don’t want to wear it, you don’t wear it.
Nobody going to tell you nothing. It is your choice. If it was strictly
regulations you have to wear it, you are going to have to wear it. After
George fell down, it was strictly law you have to wear it no matter what.
Lortos’s perception of choice regarding the wearing of the safety belt was probed by
the Secretary’s counsel (Deposition of Steve Lortos, pp. 26-27):
Q. On the morning that Mr. Kleoudis fell, did you think that the Lignos’s
[sic] required you to wear a belt?
A. No .
Q. Did you think you would be punished if you didn’t wear a belt that
morning?
A. No .
Q. Where were your belts?
. . .
A. In the trailer.
Lortos was asked during his deposition to read from his signed application for
employment (Deposition of Steve Lortos, pp. 68-69; Deposition Exh. 2):
“I certify that the answers to the above questions are true. I have reaa ana
agreed to abide by the company safety rules and understand the wearing of
personal protective equipment is a condition of employment.” I don’t
understand what that means. “Certify.” What does that mean, “certify”?
What does that mean, that word, “certify”?
Lortos also signed a copy of L&M’s safety program (Deposition Exh. 3). He stated
that no one explained it to him, and that he knew he had to sign it along with all of the
other forms in order to work (Deposition of Steve Lortos, pp. 125426).
When asked how high an employee has to be working before he needs to put on a
belt, Lortos guessed 25 to 30 feet (Deposition of Steve Lortos, p. 109). Lortos believed it
was “a little embarrassing” to wear a belt at 15 feet (Tr. 110). Lortos testified that painters
‘and sandblasters will sometimes not wear a belt because of pride: “They think they are
going to laugh at you, the other painters” (Tr. 111). But, Lortos stressed, if wearing a safety
belt is made a condition of employment, employees will wear it (Deposition of Steve Lortos,
p. 112):
If they give it to you, you have to wear it. If you work for me, and I tell you
you have to wear your belt, and you go up there and you don’t wear your belt,
6
the next news is you are going to go home. If you want to lose your job, you
are going to go home. If you want to keep your job, you put the belt on.
The Secretary has established that L&M failed to instruct its employees in the
recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to their work
environments. Enzor, the foreman, was completely unfamiliar with the OSHA regulations
and did not check on his employees to see if enforcement of L&M’s safety program was
needed. Lortos and Kleoudis felt free to disregard L&M’s written work rule requiring them
to tie off above 10 feet. Any safety training given by L&M was negligible, and enforcement
of its safety program was nonexistent.
The hazard created by L&M’s failure to train its employees in the recognition and
avoidance of the fall hazard was serious, as evidenced by Kleoudis’s death. The Secretary
has proven that L&M committed a serious violation of 5 1926.21(b)(2).
Item lb: Alleged Violation of 5 1926.451(a)(4)
The Secretary alleged that L&M violated 5 1926.451(a)(4), which provides in
pertinent part:
Guardrails and toeboards shall be installed on all open sides and ends of
platforms more than 10 feet above the ground or floor . . .
The parties stipulated that the scaffold platform was not guarded with guardrails or
toeboards (Tr. 8). L&M raises the infeasibility defense with regard to this allegation. L&M
argues that the configuration of the bridge deck prevented the placement of guardrails on
the scaffold because of the beams and steel supports under the bridge deck (Tr. 129).
To prove the affirmative defense of infeasibility, the employer must show that
“( 1) literal compliance with the terms of the cited standard was infeasible under the existing
circumstances and (2) an alternative protective measure was used or there was no feasible
alternative measure.” Mosser Corm. Co., 15 BNA OSHC 1408, 1416, 1992 CCH OSHD
7 29,546, p.39,907 (No. 89-1027, 1991), citing Seibel Modem Mfg.& Welding Cop., 15 BNA
OSHC 1218, 1226, 1228, 1991 CCH OSHD n 29,442, pp. 39,682 & 39,685 (No. 88-821,
1991). Westvaco Copom-ion, No. 90-1341 (1993).
The Secretary does not really dispute L&M’s contention that it could not place
guardrails on the scaffold because of the configuration of the bridge deck. L&M has
established the first element of the infeasibility defense. The second element, however,
requires the employer to use an alternative protective measure or that there was no feasible
alternative measure. L&M asserts that there was a feasible alternative measure and that it
was using it. L&M contends that it required its employees to wear safety belts and tie off
when working on its scaffolds. Hanula testified that, had the evidence shown that the
employees were wearing safety belts and tying off, he would not have cited L&M for a
violation of 5 1926.451(a)(4) (Tr. 96). As noted previously, however, L&M did not enforce
its work rule requiring employees to tie off when working above 10 feet. Kleoudis and
Lortos ignored L&M’s written work rule and worked without fall protection. Lortos testified
that Lignos and his father, L&M owner Louis Lignos, came up to talk with them about 9:00
or 9:30 the morning of the accident. Lortos stated that they saw Kleoudis and himself
working without safety belts, and that they did not say anything about it (Tr. 32-33).
The Secretary has established that L&M failed to guard the scaffold platform on
which Lortos and Kleoudis were working and that it failed to require use of alternative fall
protection. The hazard created by L&M’s failure to comply with 8 1926.451(a)(4) was
serious, exposing the employees to a fall of at least 10 feet. The violation of
5 1926.451(a)(4) is affirmed as serious.
Item 2: Alleged Violation of 5 1926.59(h)
The Secretary alleged a violation of 6 1926.59(h), which provides:
Employers shall provide employees with information and training on
hazardous chemicals in their work area at the time of their initial assignment,
and whenever a new hazard is introduced into their work area.
Lignos testified that he sat down with employees and discussed hazardous substances
on the worksite with them (Tr. 173-174).
. Lortos told Hanula that he had never received any safety training, including hazard
communication training (Tr. 59-60). L&M had diesel fuel, sandblast grit, carboline, and
various paints at the site. Enzor testified that he did not provide any safety training to
employees regarding hazardous substances (Tr. 113). When asked why he did not provide
training on hazardous chemicals, Enzor replied, “I usually take care of it. . . . They aren’t
involved with the chemicals on the diesel as much as I am” (Tr. 138). Enzor stated that he
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was the only one who handled diesel fuel, and that he had gotten it on his clothing while
handling it (Tr. 140).
The employees do not need to handle hazardous chemicals on a daily basis in order
for hazard communication training to be warranted. All that is required is that the hazard
substances be present in the employees’ work area.
The hazard associated with lack of training in hazardous substances is that employees
may not know the proper steps to take in an emergency if they or their co-workers are
exposed to the hazardous materials. L&M was in serious violation of 8 1926.59(h).
Item 3: Alleged Violation of 5 1910.244(b)
The Secretary alleged that L&M violated 8 1910.244(b), which provides in pertinent
part ..
A support shall be provided on which [an abrasive blast cleaning] nozzle may
be mounted when it is not in use.
L&M had no nozzle support on the scaffold, although Lignos testified that when a
painter finishes using a blasting nozzle, he will tie the nozzle to the scaffold with manila rope
(Tr. 63, 198).
Hanula testified that it is not apparent from the standard why a nozzle support is
required. He discussed the standard with other compliance officers, who offered one
possible reason for 9 1910.244(b): “[I]f the hose would not be supported and for some
reason would not shut off, it would be difficult for the employee to handle under those
circumstances without having something to hold it down” (Tr. 63). This is not a convincing
rationale. The standard does not require “something to hold it down”; it requires a
“support,” which implies something to hold it, period. Lortos testified that the blasting
nozzle is under quite a bit of pressure, and if no one holds on to it, “it flaps around
-everywhere it wants to go” (Deposition of Steve Lortos, p. 36). Merely resting the nozzle
in a support will not keep the nozzle in place if it fails to shut off for some reason.
The Secretary’s case is complicated by Hanula’s inability to explain exactly what kind
of support the standard requires. When asked what would constitute a support within the
meaning of the standard, Hanula replied, “Sir, I’m not very familiar with the construction
standards, and I have never actually been involved in this situation prior to this. I’m not
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sure what the design parameters would be for a nozzle support” (Tr. 64). When asked if
all the standard required was “some place to put the nozzle when it’s not in use?,” Hanula
responded, “That’s a way of describing it, I guess. I’m not sure that in this brief period of
time if that’s enough description of what it is, but I guess in general terms, that fits it”
(Tr. 64).
The problem presented by the standard and Hanula’s explication of it is that an
employer is provided with very little guidance as to what is required. From Hanula’s
description, a minimal effort would be required to comply with the standard. The Secretary
gives no reason why tying a nozzle to the scaffold cannot be considered providing a support
for the nozzle. The Secretary has failed to establish that L&M was in violation of
5 1910.244(b).
PENALTY DETERMINATION
The Commission is the final arbiter of penalties in all contested cases. Secretary v.
OSAHRC and Interstate Glass Co., 487 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1973). Under section 17(j) of the
Act, in determining the appropriate penalty the Commission is required to find and give
“due consideration” to (1) the size of the employer’s business, (2) the gravity of the
violation, (3) the good faith of the employer, and (4) the history of previous violations. The
gravity of the violation is the principal factor to be considered.
Upon consideration of the relevant factors, it is determined that an appropriate
penalty for Items la and lb combined is $1,500.00, and that an appropriate penalty for
Item 2 is $600.00.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The foregoing decision constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing decision, it is ORDERED:
1. Items la and lb of the citation alleging violations of 29 C.F.R. 0 1926.21(b)(2)
and 5 1926.451(a)(4) respectively, are affirmed and a total penalty of $1,500.00 is assessed;
2. Item 2 of the citation alleging a violation of 29 C.F.R. 8 1926.59(h) is affirmed
and a penalty of $600.00 is assessed; and
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3. That Item 3 of the citation alleging a violation of 29 C.F.R. 8 1910.244(b) is
vacated.
Judge
Date: December 21, 1993
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