Caterpillar Tractor Co.

Plain-English summary

OSHA cited Caterpillar under several provisions of the occupational lead standard at a gray-iron foundry. Caterpillar challenged the standard's promulgation, while the Secretary argued that Caterpillar was bound by an earlier court decision involving a trade association of which it was a member. The Commission found the record insufficient to decide whether the association was authorized to represent Caterpillar and adequately represented the company's distinct interests. It remanded for evidence on collateral estoppel and retained jurisdiction. The parties later reached a settlement, which the Commission approved. The official release does not state the settlement's citation or penalty terms and does not include the original judge's decision.

Decision snapshot

• Cited standard(s): Multiple provisions of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025, not individually identified in the official release.
• Outcome: Settlement agreement approved; substantive terms not stated in the official release.
• Key point: Before settlement, the Commission required a factual record on whether a trade association's earlier litigation could bind one of its members.

Full text (OSHRC public release)

Docket No. 80-4061

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v.

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO.,

Respondent.

OSHRC Docket No. 80-4061

ORDER

The Secretary of Labor, Caterpillar Tractor Company,
and the International Union, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW, and its Local 974--the parties in this case--have entered into a
settlement agreement disposing of the litigation before us.  The settlement agreement
is hereby approved.  SO ORDERED.

RAY H. DARLING, JR.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DATED:  December 2, 1986

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v.

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR COMPANY,

Respondent.

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED

AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS

OF AMERICA, UAW, and its

LOCAL 974,

Authorized Employee

Representative.

OSHRC Docket No. 80-4061

DECISION

Before:  BUCKLEY, Chairman; RADER and WALL,
Commissioners.

BY THE COMMISSION:

This case is before the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission under 29 U.S.C. � 661(i), section 12(j) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. �� 651-678 ("the Act).  The
Commission is an adjudicatory agency, independent of the Department of Labor and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  It was established to resolve
disputes arising out of enforcement actions brought by the Secretary of Labor under the
Act and has no regulatory functions.  See section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
� 659(c).

The Secretary of Labor alleges that Caterpillar
Tractor Company violated several provisions of 29 C.F.R. � 1910.1025, a standard
regulating occupational exposure to lead.  Caterpillar argues that the standard was
invalidly promulgated and that the citations issued under it must therefore be vacated.
  Many of the arguments advanced by Caterpillar here have already been considered and
rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v . Marshall , 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied , 453 U.S. 913 (1981) (" Steelworkers ").  
In the Steelworkers case numerous parties challenged various aspects of the lead
standard.  One of those parties was the Cast Metals Federation, a trade association
of which Caterpillar is a member.  The Secretary argues that the principle of
collateral estoppel precludes Caterpillar from relitigating issues that were decided by
the D.C. Circuit in Steelworkers .  We conclude that the record in this case
does not adequately illuminate Caterpillar's relationship with the Cast Metals Federation
to enable us to resolve this argument.  We therefore remand this case for the limited
purpose of receiving further evidence and argument on the collateral estoppel issue.

Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a judgment
on the merits in a prior suit "precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated
and determined in the prior suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause of
action as the second suit."  Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp .,
349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).  Put another way, "once an issue is actually and
necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is
conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to
the prior litigation."  Montana v. United States , 440 U.S. 147, 153
(1979).

The purpose of collateral estoppel and the related doctrine of res judicata were described
by the Supreme Court as follows:

Application of both doctrines is central to the
purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of
disputes within their jurisdictions. . . . To preclude parties from contesting matters
that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from
the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions.

Id .  (citations omitted).

A determination by a court in a prior action binds
not only parties to that action but also persons in "privity" to those
parties.  Id . at 154-55.  This rule is intended to preclude subsequent
litigation by a person "so identified in interest with a party to former litigation
that he represents precisely the same right in respect to the subject matter
involved."  Jefferson School of Social Science v . Subversive
Activities Control Board , 331 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1963).  Before a non-party
can be precluded from litigating an issue decided in an earlier proceeding, privity "
'must be determined as a matter of substance and not of mere form,' based in part on an
identification of the interests advanced in the first proceeding."  Crane v.
Commissioner of Department of Agriculture , Food and Rural Resources , 602
F. Supp. 280, 285 (D.Me. 1985), citing Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Schendel , 270 U.S. 611, 620 (1926).

In some cases, collateral estoppel has been held to
preclude a member of a trade association from litigating issues that were decided in an
earlier case to which the trade association was a party.  E.g ., Expert
Electric, Inc. v. Levine , 554 F.2d 1227, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied , 434 U.S.
903 (1977); Crane v. Commissioner , 602 F. Supp. at 286.  However, collateral
estoppel does not automatically bar a trade association member from litigating issues that
the association previously litigated.  Some members of a trade association may have
interests different from others with respect to the issues in a particular lawsuit, so the
association's participation in a case does not guarantee that the interests of all of its
members were represented or protected.  See Springs Mills , Inc. v.
Consumer Product Safety Commission , 434 F.Supp. 416, 434 (D.S.C. 1977).

Several factors are examined by the courts in
determining whether collateral estoppel bars litigation by a trade association member in a
particular case.  Among these are the purposes and past practices of the association,
and whether the association was vested with the authority to represent the member.  
Contribution of funds toward the litigation by the member is an indication that the
association was authorized to represent the member.  General Foods Corp. v.
Massachusetts Department of Public Health , 648 F.2d at 788; Crane v. Commissioner ,
602 F. Supp. at 286.  The extent of the member's participation in or control over the
litigation is also important.  18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure � 4446.

Another important factor is whether the member's
interests were adequately represented.  General Foods Corp. v. Massachusetts Department
of Public Health , 648 F.2d 784, 787-88 (1st Cir. 1981); Expert Electric v. Levine ,
554 F.2d at 1233; Crane v. Commissioner , 602 F. Supp. 285-86; Grossman v.
Axelrod , 466 F. Supp. 770, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd , 646 F.2d 768 (2d Cir.
1981).  Critical to the adequacy of representation of the member's interests is
whether the association had the member's interests foremost in mind in litigating the
earlier action or, stated another way, whether the member's interests fell squarely within
the general ambit of interests represented in the prior action.  Expert Electric
v. Levine , 554 F.2d at 1233; Grossman v. Axelrod , 466 F. Supp. at 776.

It is uncertain whether the Cast Metals Federation
was authorized to represent Caterpillar, or whether Caterpillar's interests were
adequately represented in Steelworkers by the Cast Metals Federation.  
Although it was a party to the litigation, the Cast Metals Federation is not among the
parties listed as having filed a brief.  647 F.2d at 1203 n.5.  Moreover, the
workplace involved in this case is a gray iron foundry.  Unlike many of the
industries involved in Steelworkers , the gray iron foundry industry does not
produce lead or lead products, nor does it use lead as a raw material; lead is present in
gray iron castings only as an undesirable impurity.  Thus, the gray iron foundry
industry received relatively little attention both in the rulemaking record and in the Steelworkers
decision.  See 43 Fed. Reg. 54491 (discussion of gray iron foundry industry in
preamble to standard); Steelworkers , 647 F.2d at 1302.  These circumstances do
not permit us to infer that the gray iron foundry industry in general, and Caterpillar in
particular, were adequately represented in the Steelworkers litigation.

Normally, where the record in a case lacks sufficient
evidence on a disputed issue, we would resolve that issue against the party having the
burden of proof.  We believe, however, it would be inequitable to apply that general
principle in this case.  The issue of whether collateral estoppel precludes a trade
association member from relitigating an issue previously litigated by the association is
one of first impression for the Commission, [[1]] and it is not clear that the parties
knew their respective burdens of proof.  Under the circumstances, we believe the
preferable course is to permit further development of the record on the collateral
estoppel issue.

Accordingly, the case is remanded to the Chief Judge
for assignment to an administrative law judge.[[2]]  The judge shall afford the
parties the opportunity to present further evidence and argument on the collateral
estoppel question and shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue.
  The Commission shall retain jurisdiction of the case pending receipt of these
additions to the record.

FOR THE COMMISSION

Ray H. Darling, Jr.

Executive Secretary

DATED:  April 16, 1986

The Administrative Law Judge decision in this matter
is unavailable in this format.  To obtain a copy of this document, please request one
from our Public Information Office by e-mail ( [email protected]
), telephone (202-606-5398), fax (202-606-5050), or TTY (202-606-5386).

FOOTNOTES:

[[1]] The courts have not developed a well-defined
body of law on the subject either.  "The status and legal incidents of [trade]
associations remain in often spectacular uncertainty.  The preclusion results that
flow from litigation involving association matters are correspondingly
confused."  18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
� 4456, p. 486 (1981).  Given the uncertain state of the law when this case was
tried, it is understandable that the evidence presented by the parties is not sufficient
to enable us to resolve the issue in an informed manner.

[[2]] Administrative Law Judge Paul E. Dixon, who
originally decided this case, is no longer with the Commission.