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OSHRC Commission decision Docket 78-1539 Decided December 28, 1984 Mixed result

New England Container Company, Inc.

Valve item affirmed, noise items vacated

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The OSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Decision of the Commission
This is a decision of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the highest level of agency review, citable as Commission precedent. It may have been appealed to a U.S. Court of Appeals after issuance; check subsequent history before relying on it. The full text below is from the official OSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official OSHRC release. The full text is the Commission's own document.
Read the official release (oshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

New England reconditioned used 55-gallon drums and operated a noisy blasting machine. The judge affirmed an other-than-serious, no-penalty violation because drums of flammable liquid lacked self-closing valves after installed valves broke and replacements were ordered. Chairman Buckley agreed that the recurrence was not repeated misconduct, while Commissioner Cleary would have called it repeated under the same-standard test but also assessed no penalty. The judge vacated separate items alleging inadequate hearing protection and failure to install feasible noise controls despite a measured exposure of 138 percent of the permissible dose. The members divided over whether the company should have known a temporary operator lacked earplugs and whether a low-cost muffler’s benefit was adequately proven. They left the judge’s mixed decision in place without precedential value on the disputed issues.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. § 1910.106(e)(2)(iv)(d); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(1)
  • Outcome: Self-closing-valve item affirmed as other than serious without penalty; hearing-protection and engineering-control items vacated.
  • Key point: The equal division left unresolved both the repeated classification for temporarily failed valves and the adequacy of proof for noise-control feasibility and enforcement.

Full text (OSHRC public release)

Docket No. 78-1539

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v.

NEW ENGLAND CONTAINER COMPANY, INC.,

Respondent.

OSHRC Docket No. 78-1539

DECISION

Before:  BUCKLEY, Chairman; and CLEARY, Commissioner.

BY THE COMMISSION:

This case is before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
under 29 U.S.C. � 661(i), section 12(j) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 29 U.S.C. �� 651-678 ("the Act").  The Commission is an
adjudicatory agency, independent of the Department of Labor and the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration.  It was established to resolve disputes arising out of
enforcement actions brought by the Secretary of Labor under the Act and has no regulatory
functions.  See section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. � 659(c).

At issue in this case is whether Administrative Law Judge Ben D. Worcester
erred in finding that New England Container Company had not "repeatedly"
violated 29 C.F.R. � 1910.106(e)(2)(iv)( d ),[[1]] and in vacating citation items
alleging that New England violated 29 C.F.R. �� 1910.95(a) and (b)(1).[[2]] 
Chairman Buckley and Commissioner Cleary disagree as to the disposition of the items on
review.

Item 2:  Self-closing valves

Item 2 alleges that New England failed to equip 55-gallon drums of flammable liquid with
self-closing valves, contrary to section 1910.106(e)(2)(iv)( d ).  The Secretary
characterized the violation as repeated because a 1976 citation involving a violation of
the same standard at the same location had become a final order of the Commission before
the alleged violation occurred in 1978.  He did not propose that a penalty be
assessed, however.  During the 1978 inspection, the drums were not equipped with
self-closing valves.  The drums had been so equipped but the valves broke two weeks
before the inspection and new valves were on order.  The judge found New England in
violation, but found the violation "at most . . . other than serious, one in which no
penalty should be assessed."

Chairman Buckley would affirm the judge's decision.  He finds that New England did
not "repeatedly" violate section 1910.106(e)(2)(iv)( d ) within the meaning
of section 17(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. � 666(a).[[3]]  Under the Commission's
decision in Potlatch Corp ., 79 OSAHRC 6/A2, 7 BNA OSHC 1061, 1979 CCH OSHD �
23,294 (No. 16183, 1979), an employer has repeatedly violated a standard under section
17(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. � 666(a), if, at the time of the alleged violation, there was
a Commission final order against the same employer for a "substantially similar"
violation.[[4]]  In determining whether two violations are so "substantially
similar" as to warrant a finding that an employer "repeatedly" violated the
Act, the purpose underlying the test must be borne in mind.  Potlatch
attempted to give concrete effect to the congressional intent underlying the flexible
penalty scheme in the Act--i.e., to authorize or require progressively higher penalties
for progressively greater misconduct.[[5]]  Congress thus coupled violations
willfully committed with those repeatedly committed and authorized for both a ten-fold
increase in the potential penalty.  By specifying this hierarchical system of
penalties, Congress evidently intended that misconduct engaged in repeatedly was either
circumstantial evidence of willfulness, or of itself was of a higher order requiring a
greater deterrent penalty.  See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC ,
540 F.2d 157, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1975).  When such a pattern of misconduct occurs, the
employer may require the greater incentive of an increased penalty to comply with
standards.

Chairman Buckley finds no such pattern of misconduct here.  The
self-closing valves were in place but had worn out shortly before the inspection, and New
England was awaiting the delivery of replacements.  Certainly it cannot be said that
New England's failure to have replacements on hand when the valves unexpectedly failed is
representative of a pattern of misconduct, nor does it demonstrate conduct substantially
similar to the previous violation when New England did not have or use self-closing
valves. Indeed, the violation in this instance is an example of the "purely
inadvertent recurrence" that the court in George Hyman Construction Co. v.
OSHRC , 582 F.2d 834, 841 (4th Cir. 1978), cautioned should not be the basis for a
repeat violation citation.  It is also apparent that New England does not require any
greater incentive to comply with the standard.  It had been in compliance before the
inspection and would have been in compliance on the day of the inspection but for the
failure of the valves and its shortage of replacements.  Indeed, the Secretary
acknowledged that New England needed no additional incentive to comply with section
1910.106(e)(2)(iv)( d ), for he did not even propose that a penalty be assessed.
 Chairman Buckley would therefore affirm the judge's characterization of the
violation of section 1920.106(e)(2)(iv)( d ) as other than serious and would assess
no penalty.

Commissioner Cleary would find the violation to be repeated.  New
England violated section 1910.106(e)(2)(iv)( d ) by failing to equip drums containing
flammable materials with self-closing valves.  The citation it received in 1976 for
violating the same standard has become a final order of the Commission.

In Potlatch , the Commission held that:

A violation is repeated under section 17(a) of the Act if, at the time of the
alleged repeated violation, there was a Commission final order against the same employer
for a substantially similar violation.

7 BNA OSHC at 1063, 1979 CCH OSHD at pp. 28,172-3.  If the antecedent
and current violations concern the same standard, a prima facie case of substantial
similarity has been made out.  Id .  The employer may rebut this prima
facie case by showing that the antecedent and current violations concerned disparate
hazards and conditions.  Id .  Under Potlatch , the employer's
attitude toward compliance with the Act is not relevant to the substantial similarity
question. [[7]]  BNA OSHC at 1064, 1979 CCH OSHD at p. 28,173.  The Potlatch
test has clearly been met here.  The antecedent and current violations concern the
same standard, the same hazard and even the same equipment.  Commissioner Cleary
would therefore conclude that the violation was repeated.

Commissioner Cleary observes that this conclusion is compelled by Commission
precedent.  The clear and easily applied Potlatch test was announced after the
Commission had experienced great difficulties created by the lack of a consistent and
authoritative interpretation of "repeated" by both the Commission and the
courts.  The issue was thoroughly re-examined and a consensus was reached paring down
the significant elements to two--whether a prior violation had become a final order and
whether the present violation was substantially similar to it.[[6]]  The Commission
characterized a number of factors as relevant only to penalty assessment that previously
had been thought relevant to the repeated issue, such as an employer's attitude toward
compliance (including "aggravated conduct," and "disregard" and
"flouting" of the Act), commonality of supervision, and geographical proximity
of violations.  Potlatch does not hold or imply that a pattern of misconduct
must be shown to have existed or that the employer's need for greater incentives to comply
must be considered when determining whether a violation is repeated.

This is not to say that Commissioner Cleary would not consider the events
preceding the violation and the employer's good faith in having ordered replacement valves
in assessing a penalty.  See Potlatch Corp. , 7 BNA OSHC at 1064, 1979
CCH OSHD at pp. 28,172-3.  In this case he agrees with the Chairman that no penalty
should be assessed.

Items 1(a) and (b):  Personal Protective Equipment and Engineering
Controls

New England also was cited for repeated violations of sections 1910.95(a) and
1910.95(b)(1).  Item 1(a) alleged that an employee in the blasting machine area was
not wearing hearing protection when exposed to excessive sound levels, contrary to section
1910.95(a).  Item 1(b) alleged that the company had not implemented feasible
engineering controls to reduce employee exposure in the blasting machine area within
permissible limits, contrary to section 1910.95(b)(1).

In its plant, New England reconditions used 55-gallon drums.  After the
tops of the used drums are removed, any material remaining is poured out and the residue
is burned in an incinerator.  A conveyor belt then takes the drums to the blasting
machine area.  When a drum arrives at the blasting area, an employee positions it in
a device variously called a pneumatic lifter, a barrel loader or a promoter, which lifts
the drum and positions it at the blasting machine.  The blasting machine then shoots
metal pellets into the drum to blast off scale and residue.  The noise in the
blasting machine area stems from three sources:  the banging and scraping of the
metal drums against the metal surface of the conveyor belt; the air exhaust of the
pneumatic lifter; and the metal pellets being blasted against the inside walls of the
metal drums.

The compliance officer testified that, for six hours, he measured the noise
exposure of the operator of the blaster, who was not, wearing personal hearing protection,
using an audiometric dosimeter.  The dosimeter showed that the operator had received
138% of the noise dose permissible under the standard.[[7]]  The compliance officer
also measured the sound levels at the blaster operator's work station with a sound level
meter.  He testified that the sound levels went from a high of 112 dBA to a low of 87
dBA (permissible for any period of time under Table G-16 of the standard).  He stated
that the noise from the drums scraping against the conveyor surface was present for about
70% of the time, and was 92 dBA (permissible under the table for 6 hours), with peaks of
unspecified duration up to 97 dBA (permissible under the table for 3 hours).  He also
stated that the noise levels "at" the pneumatic lifter ranged "anywhere
from 97 to 112 [dBA], depending upon the portion of the cycle" of operations being
measured. The compliance officer took two sets of sound level readings--one within two
feet of the air exhaust of the pneumatic lifter and one near the employee's ear--but he
did not state from which set these sound level readings came.  He did not testify
what noise level was produced when the drums were blasted with metal pellets.
 Although he testified that the work of the blaster operator consumed 4 3/4 hours out
of 6 hours on the day of the inspection, he did not state how long any of these levels
continued, what portion of the operating cycle they covered or how long each operating
cycle was.  He did note that the blasting operation was usually shut down for an hour
each day.

The compliance officer recommended the installation of a muffler, which he
said would cost between $10 and $50, on the air exhaust of the pneumatic lifter.[[8]]
  Though he conceded that this would not reduce the noise from air exhaust on the
pneumatic lifter to below 90 dBA, the permissible level for an 8-hour work day, he stated
without elaboration that it would reduce the blaster operator's noise exposure to 70% of
the permissible dose for 6 hours.  This muffler would affect only the noise from an
exhaust on the pneumatic lifter.  It would do nothing to counteract the noise
emanating from the conveyor belt or the pellets striking the barrel.

In an effort to, among other things, reduce sound levels after a 1976
inspection of the blasting machine area, New England installed mufflers, redesigned the
cylinder on the pneumatic lifter, and installed rubber lining to reduce the noise of the
drum as it goes through the blaster.  It also modified that part of the blaster where
the drum is uprighted.  New England's vice president testified, based on his
extensive experience in the drum reconditioning industry, that the operation cited is
inherently noisy and that noise had been reduced "as much as the state of the art
allows."  He testified that the air exhaust was neither the sole nor the major
source of the noise in the blaster room.

The judge vacated both items, finding that the Secretary had not proved
"that the employer, although put on notice that a hazard existed, had failed to
correct it."  The judge noted that there was credible testimony that New England
had modified its equipment for the purpose of reducing noise in the interval between the
1976 and 1978 inspections, including the installation of a larger piston in the blaster,
the installation of mufflers, and the coating with rubber of areas where metal struck
against metal.  The judge also found that New England provided and enforced the use
of ear plugs.  The judge found that the Secretary failed to prove that New England
knew or should have known that the operator was not using hearing protection.

In Chairman Buckley's view, the record does not support the allegation that
New England failed to install feasible engineering controls and he would affirm the
judge's decision vacating the citation.  Though the Secretary now claims in his brief
that sufficient evidence exists to support a finding that one proposed engineering
control, a muffler, was feasible, the record does not establish what benefits, if any,
will be achieved by use of the muffler.  See Sherwin-Williams Co ., 84
OSAHRC , 11 BNA OSHC 2105, 2110, 1984 CCH OSHD � 26,986, p. 34,702 (No. 14131, 1984).
 The compliance officer's conclusory and unsupported opinion that a muffler could
reduce the exposure to the employee to 70% of that permitted by the standard lacks
sufficient foundation to justify making such a finding.

Chairman Buckley notes that the noise standard does not regulate the sound level at a
noise source but the dose of noise that an employee receives.  To determine the
benefit from a proposed engineering control therefore requires a determination of the
reduction in noise dose effected by the control.  If an employee is exposed to noise
from several sources, it is not ordinarily possible to tell what the dose reduction would
be without knowing what sound level was generated at the employee's hearing zone by the
noise source to be controlled, the length of exposure to that sound level, and the sound
level reduction expected from the control.  If the sound level generated by a source
at the employee's hearing zone is not known, it is nevertheless possible to calculate a
dose reduction if the sound level generated at the source, the distance of the employee
from the source, the amount of time that the source generates noise, and the expected
sound level reduction are known.  This record, however, supplies little or no
evidence on these factors.

Although the compliance officer testified that the proposed muffler would
reduce the blaster operator's exposure to 70% of the permissible dosage, he conceded that
he had based this conclusion on "a cursory engineering study."  There is no
evidence that the compliance officer considered all of the above-mentioned factors in
making his estimate, nor is there evidence of the factors he did consider.  He did
not testify to the amount of time that the air exhaust from the pneumatic lifter generated
any particular noise level. It is not clear whether the sound levels or 97-112 dBA
emanating from that source were measured in the employee's hearing zone or at the exhaust,
where they would be higher.  The compliance officer's statement that the air exhaust
was the primary noise source in the area was not only contradicted by New England's vice
president, but is unsupported by any testimony regarding the noise levels created during
blasting or the amount of time that the air exhaust generated noise, both of which are
needed to determine the relative contributions of various sources to the blaster
operator's noise dose.  The compliance officer also did not testify to the reduction
in decibels a muffler could be expected achieve.  The compliance officer's bare
conclusion is insufficient to support a finding that the muffler would have any particular
effect on the employee's noise dose.  See General Motors Corp ., 81
OSAHRC 30/E13, 9 BNA OSHC 1575, 1577, 1981 CCH OSHD � 25,280, p. 31,239 (No. 78-2894,
1981); Hurlock Roofing Co ., 79 OSAHRC 7/A2, 7 BNA OSHC 1108, 1979 CCH OSHD �
23,358, p. 28,267 (No. 76-357, 1979).

Nothing in the Act or the standard requires New England to make yet another
piecemeal change in its equipment when it has not been shown that the change would benefit
employees.[[9]]  Because the Secretary failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the control he advocated would achieve some benefits, Chairman Buckley
cannot find that the benefits of the control are justified by its cost.  Chairman
Buckley would therefore conclude that the Secretary has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that engineering controls are feasible and would affirm the
judge's disposition of item 1(b).

With respect to item 1(a), Chairman Buckley also would affirm the judge's
finding that the Secretary failed to show that New England knew or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence could have known of the blaster operator's failure to wear personal
hearing protection.  See , e.g ., Scheel Construction, Inc ., 76
OSAHRC 38/B6, 4 BNA OSHC 1824, 1826, 1976-77 CCH OSHD � 21,263, p. 25,560 (No. 8687,
1976)(in all cases the Secretary must prove by a preponderance actual or constructive
knowledge on the part of the employer).  It is clear that New England did not have
actual knowledge that the temporary operator was not wearing earplugs.  There is no
evidence to show that either New England's vice-president or its plant manager knew that
the operator was not wearing hearing protection.  Nor does the evidence show that
with reasonable diligence New England could have known that the operator was not wearing
hearing protection.  New England's vice-president testified that earplugs were
available and that the regular blaster operator used them consistently and regularly.
 The plant manager testified that employees were told that they could be suspended if
they did not use hearing protection.  The burden was on the Secretary to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that New England did not exercise reasonable diligence.
 Although the compliance officer testified that the operator told him he did not
usually wear earplugs, the record indicates that this employee was only temporarily
substituting for the regular operator.  There is no evidence that the operator's
regular duties required him to wear earplugs or that Costa could reasonably have known
that the replacement operator was not wearing earplugs.  The evidence is insufficient
to establish that New England should have known of the operator's failure to wear the
plugs.

Commissioner Cleary would find that the evidence demonstrates that New
England failed to implement engineering controls to reduce sound levels below Table G-16
levels and that such controls were feasible.  He would therefore find a violation of
section 1910.95(b)(1) and affirm item 1(b).  In his view, engineering controls are
economically feasible if they do not threaten an employer's long-term profitability and
competitiveness or, in the event of economic threat, do so because the employer has lagged
behind its industry in providing noise protection for employees.  Sherwin-Williams
Co ., 11 BNA at 2112, 1984 CCH OSHD at p. 34,704 (dissenting opinion).  It is not
disputed that New England's employee was exposed to 138% of his permissible noise
exposure.  The judge found that "[t]here is credible and reliable evidence,
based upon the very thorough testing performed by the Secretary's inspector, Mitchell,
that [the] temporary employee, Miller was exposed to excess noise at the time of the March
1978 inspection and that he was not wearing ear floss or other hearing protection."

The uncontradicted testimony of the compliance officer was clearly sufficient
to demonstrate that the installation of a muffler costing $10-50 on the pneumatic lifter
would reduce the operator's exposure to 70% of the permissible dose.[[10]]  To
determine what engineering controls would be feasible, the compliance officer measured
sound levels at various sources with a precision sound level meter.  He
"determined what the sound level was during different parts of the cycle, and from
that how much time in total . . . that sound level was present during the . . . day."
  Having determined the portion of the blaster operator's total noise dose
contributed by the exhaust from the pneumatic lifter, it would have been a simple matter
for the compliance officer to compute the noise reduction a muffler would accomplish and
determine that it would reduce the blaster operator's noise dose to 70% of that permitted
by the standard.  Thus, although he did not outline every step in his calculations,
the compliance officer undoubtedly calculated the dose reduction by taking into account
the sound level generated at the employee's hearing zone by the exhaust from the pneumatic
lifter, the amount of time it generated that sound level, and the sound level reduction
expected from the control.  Had the parties focussed more directly on the effects of
the engineering controls suggested by the Secretary, the compliance officer might have
been called on to go over these computations in painstaking detail.  See Quick
v. Martin , 397 F.2d 644, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1968).  However, standing alone, the
compliance officer's testimony is certainly sufficient to establish that the benefit of
the installation of a muffler costing only $10-50 would be to reduce the blaster
operator's noise dose to 70% of that permitted by the standard.  Commissioner Cleary
would therefore conclude that the controls are economically feasible.

Commissioner Cleary also would find that the controls are feasible under
current Commission precedent.  Under the lead opinion in Sherwin-Williams ,
engineering controls are economically feasible if the benefit that will be achieved by the
controls justify the cost of implementing them.  11 BNA at 2110, 1984 CCH OSHD at p.
34,702.  It is apparent that the expenditure of a mere $10-50 is justified to reduce
an employee's daily exposure far below Table G-16 levels.

Commissioner Cleary would find a violation of section 1910.95(a) and affirm
item 1(a).  He finds that the judge erred in finding that the employer is not
responsible for the operator's failure to wear earplugs.  When an employer relies on
a workrule to achieve compliance with the standard, he must take steps to discover
violations and effectively enforce the rule when infractions are discovered.  See
R. Zoppo Co ., 81 OSAHRC 18/A2, 9 BNA OSHC 1392, 1395, 1981 CCH OSHD � 25,230, p.
31,183 (No. 14884, 1981).  There is no indication that New England attempted to
enforce the rule requiring the wearing of hearing protection. Biano, the company
vice-president, testified that not all employees wore earplugs.  He stated that
employees neglected to wear the plugs even after he "[t]old them to get them."
  Biano couldn't "think of a procedure we have for disciplining people for not
wearing them."  For these reasons, Commissioner Cleary concludes that New
England failed to adequately implement its safety rule and thus could, with the exercise
of reasonable diligence, have known of the violation.  See Marson Corp .,
82 OSAHRC 29/C4, 10 BNA OSHC 1660, 1663, 1982 CCH OSHD � 26,075, p. 32,804 (No. 78-3491,
1982).

Commissioner Cleary would also characterize New England's violations of
sections 1910.95(a) and (b)(1) as repeated because the Potlatch test was met.
  There was a 1976 Commission final order involving the same standards and excessive
noise from the same machine.

Under section 12(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. � 661(e), official action can be
taken by the Commission with the affirmative vote of at least two members.  To
resolve their impasse and permit a resolution of this long-pending case, Chairman Buckley
and Commissioner Cleary have agreed to affirm the judge's decision but accord it the
precedential value of an unreviewed judge's decision.[[11]]  See Life
Science Products Co. , 77 OSAHRC 200/A2, 6 BNA OSHC 1053, 1977-78 CCH OSHD � 22,313
(No. 14910, 1977), aff'd sub nom. Moore v. OSHRC , 591 F.2d 991 (4th Cir. 1979).

Accordingly, the judge's decision is affirmed.

FOR THE COMMISSION

Ray H. Darling, Jr.

Executive Secretary

DATED:  DEC 28 1984

The Administrative Law Judge decision in this matter is unavailable in this
format.  To obtain a copy of this document, please request one from our Public
Information Office by e-mail ( [email protected]
), telephone (202-606-5398), fax (202-606-5050), or TTY (202-606-5386).

FOOTNOTES:

[[1]] This standard provides:

� 1910.106 Flammable and combustible liquids .


(e) Industrial Plants --


(2) Incidental storage or use of flammable and combustible liquids --


(iv) Handling liquids at point of final use .

( d ) Flammable or combustible liquids shall be drawn from or
transferred into vessels, containers, or portable tanks within a building only through a
closed piping system, from safety cans, by means of a device drawing through the top, or
from a container or portable tanks by gravity through an approved self-closing valve.
  Transferring by means of air pressure on the container or portable tanks shall be
prohibited.

[[2]] These standards provide in part :

� 1910.95 Occupational Noise Exposure .

(a) Protection against the effects of noise exposure shall be provided when the sound
levels exceed those shown in Table G-16 when measured on the A scale of a standard sound
level meter at slow response.


(b)(1) When employees are subjected to sound exceeding those listed in Table G-16,
feasible administrative or engineering controls shall be utilized.  If such controls
fail to reduce sound levels within the levels of Table G-16, personal protective equipment
shall be provided and used to reduce sound levels within the levels of the table.


TABLE G-16--PERMISSIBLE NOISE EXPOSURES[[1]]

Duration per day, hours
Sound

level dBA

slow

response

8..............................................................

90

6..............................................................
92

4..............................................................

95

3..............................................................

97

2............................................................

100

1 1/2
......................................................
102

1.............................................................

105

1/2..........................................................

110

1/4 or
less................................................
115

[[1]] When the daily noise exposure is composed of two or more periods of noise exposure
of different levels, their combined effect should be considered, rather than the
individual effect of each.  If the sum of the following fractions:  
C1/T1+C2/T2[+...+]Cn/Tn exceeds unity, then, the mixed exposure should be considered to
exceed the limit value.  Cn indicates the total time of exposure at a specified noise
level, and Tn indicates the total time of exposure permitted at that level.

Exposure to impulsive or impact noise should not exceed 140 dB peak sound
pressure level.

[[3]] Section 17(a) of the Act provides:

Any employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the requirements of section
5 of this Act, any standard, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to section 6 of this Act,
or regulations prescribed pursuant to this Act, may be assessed a civil penalty of not
more than $10,000 for each violation.

[[4]] Chairman Buckley finds it unnecessary here to decide whether the test
enunciated in Potlatch is correct, particularly with respect to whether a single
prior Commission final order is a sufficient basis for characterizing a violation as one
"repeatedly" done regardless of when or where the prior violation occurred.

[[5]] Under the scheme of the Act, no penalty is assessed for de minimis
violation.  A penalty of up to $1,000 may be assessed for a non-serious violation.
  A penalty of up to $1,000 must be assessed for a serious violation.  A
penalty of up to $10,000 may be assessed for a willful violation or against one who
violates a standard repeatedly.  A penalty of up to $1,000 per day may be assessed
for failing to correct a violation.  Sections 9(a) and 17(a) - (d), 29 U.S.C. ��
658(a) and 666(a)-(d).

[[6]] Potlatch has been followed in every circuit where the
"repeated" issue has been examined in its light. See J.L. Foti Constr.
Co . v. OSHRC , 687 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1982); Dun-Par Engineered Form Co. v.
Marshall , 676 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1982); Willamette Iron & Steel Co. v.
Secretary of Labor , 10 BNA OSHC 1477 (9th Cir. 1982)(unpublished); Communications,
Inc. v. Marshall , 672 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  In Bunge Corp. v. Secretary
of Labor , 638 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit noted its general agreement
with Potlatch , but disagreed only as to the allocation of the burden of proof,
holding that the Secretary must show that conditions were substantially similar.

[[7]] A dosimeter displays the percentage of the permissible dose of noise
that an employee received during the time he wore the dosimeter.  Thus, a 200%
reading on a dosimeter indicates that the employee had been exposed to twice the dose
permitted by the noise standard; an employee exposed to 100 dBA for 1 hour would be shown
to have received 50% of the permissible dose.  The circuitry of a dosimeter is so
designed that it in effect registers the duration of each sound level over 89 dBA and
determines the ratio of that duration to the permissible duration for that sound level,
which is given in Table G-16 of the standard.  It then, in effect, adds that ratio to
all other such ratios, cumulating exposures to varying noise levels in the manner stated
by the footnote to the table.  When the dosimeter is read, it gives the total of
those ratios in percentage form.  An employee might, for example, be exposed to sound
levels of 110 dBA for 1/2 hour, 97 dBA for 1 hour, and no sound over 89 dBA for 6 hours,
resulting in a dosimeter reading of 133%.  One can calculate that exposure to a
constant noise level of 92.1 dBA over 8 hours would result in a dose of 133%.  
However, because a dosimeter does not retain each sound level and its duration, one cannot
determine from a dosimeter reading what each sound level was and how long it lasted.

[[8]] Although the compliance officer recommended other steps, some were
shown to be technologically infeasible, such as coating the metal conveyor belt.  Of
the others, the compliance officer supplied no estimate of the possible benefit.  
Therefore, the discussion is confined to the compliance officer's proposal for a muffler
on the air exhaust of the pneumatic lifter.

[[9]] New England was required to implement engineering changes following the
1976 inspection--changes which did not reduce employee exposure to within Table G-16
levels.  The Secretary cannot now seek to impose additional engineering requirements
without demonstrating that the control will accomplish its intended purpose of bringing
New England into compliance without the need for earplugs.  Any different result
opens the door for the Secretary to revisit New England's facility and find a violation
until such times as the amalgam of controls does achieve its purpose.

[[10]] The record indicates that the compliance officers who conducted the
1976 inspection, the compliance officer who conducted the 1978 inspection, and Aetna, New
England's insurer, all identified exhaust from the pneumatic lifter as the primary noise
source. New England's vice-president disagreed with this view.  However, New England
never conducted a noise survey until after it installed the disputed muffler on the
pneumatic lifter following the 1978 inspection.  Although the record is silent on the
results of New England's noise survey, Commissioner Cleary would infer from the
installation of the muffler that it was a feasible engineering control.  Cf .
Fed. R. Evid. 407.

[[11]] As established by the Act, the Commission is composed of three
members.  Section 12(a), 29 U.S.C. � 661(a).  Presently, the Commission has two
members as a result of a vacancy.

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