Jacobs Field Services North America

Read the official release (oshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

A Jacobs employee volunteered to help a chemical-plant operator replace a leaking valve, and a flange failure released about 750 pounds of butylene oxide. The Commission agreed that lockout requirements applied to that valve-replacement work because the release caused burns, chemical pneumonia, and fire or explosion risks. It nevertheless vacated three items because no Jacobs supervisor knew or should have known that the employee would perform the unassigned work. A fourth item was vacated because OSHA did not identify the tasks covered by three other energy-control procedures, so it failed to prove that those instances involved servicing or maintenance within the lockout standard.

Decision snapshot

• Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(c)(4)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(c)(4)(ii); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(d)(3); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(d)(4)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(d)(5)(i).
• Outcome: Judge reversed as to the four reviewed items; all four serious lockout items vacated and the assessed $13,000 eliminated.
• Key point: Even when lockout applies to an incident, OSHA must prove employer knowledge of the employee's specific work and must identify covered servicing or maintenance for each alleged instance.

Full text (OSHRC public release)

Jacobs Field Services North America, Docket No. 10-2659

Walter, J. David
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2018-08-03T16:33:00Z
2018-08-03T16:33:00Z
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EN-US
X-NONE
X-NONE

United
States of America

OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

1120
20 th Street, N.W., Ninth Floor

Washington,
DC 20036-3457

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v.

OSHRC Docket No. 10-2659

JACOBS FIELD SERVICES NORTH AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON BRIEFS:

Scott Glabman,
Senior Appellate Attorney; Charles F. James, Counsel for Appellate Litigation; Joseph
M. Woodward, Associate Solicitor; M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor; U.S. Department
of Labor, Washington, DC

For
the Complainant

Darren S.
Harrington, Esq.; Key Harrington Barnes, P.C., Dallas, TX

For
the Respondent

DECISION

Before: ROGERS, Chairman; ATTWOOD and MacDOUGALL , Commissioners.

BY THE COMMISSION:

Jacobs Field
Services North America is a contractor that was engaged to perform maintenance
in Conroe, Texas, at a chemical production plant owned and operated by Huntsman
Petro-Chemical, LLC. In May 2010, Jacobs and Huntsman were engaged in a process
known as a “Test and Inspect turnaround” (“T&I”),
which required the shutdown of certain equipment for maintenance purposes. As
part of the T&I, a Jacobs crew was assigned to remove eight emergency
shutdown devices (“ESDs”) on some chemical lines and replace them
with new ESDs. This required that the ESDs first be isolated pursuant to the
plant’s energy control procedures.

During the
isolation process, a gate valve on a butylene oxide line was found to be
leaking and had to be replaced before the ESD work could continue. Huntsman did
not assign this particular work to Jacobs and indicated that Huntsman would
perform the work itself. Nevertheless, after a Huntsman operator mentioned the
job task over the radio, a Jacobs employee offered to assist. Before removing
the leaking valve, the Huntsman operator disconnected utility hoses from the butylene
oxide line and began to depressurize the line, at which time the Jacobs
employee arrived. As the two employees started removing bolts from the top of
the leaking valve a flange either separated or broke, and approximately 750
liquid pounds of butylene oxide sprayed into the air in an area where employees
were working. A video of the incident shows that the release lasted twelve to
fifteen minutes.

Following an
inspection of the plant, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
issued Jacobs a five-item serious citation, alleging violations of the
lockout/tagout (“LOTO”) standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147,
and proposed a penalty of $7,000 for each item. Administrative Law Judge Sharon
D. Calhoun vacated one of the citation items and affirmed the four remaining
items as serious, assessing a total penalty of $13,000. Only the four affirmed
items are at issue on review. For the reasons that follow, we vacate all four
items.

DISCUSSION

I.         Serious
Citation 1, Items 1, 3, and 4

To prove
that Jacobs violated the LOTO provisions at issue under these citation items, the Secretary must show that the LOTO standard applies, Jacobs failed
to comply with the cited LOTO provisions, Jacobs employees had access to the
violative conditions, and Jacobs either knew or should have known of these
conditions with the exercise of reasonable diligence. See Astra Pharm.
Prods., Inc. , 9 BNA OSHC 2126, 2129, 1981 CCH OSHD ¶ 25,578,
pp. 31,899-900 (No. 78-6247, 1981), aff’d in pertinent part ,
681 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1982). The only issues in dispute on review are whether
the LOTO standard applies to the cited conditions and whether Jacobs knew or
should have known of those conditions.

Applicability

The LOTO
standard “covers the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment
in which the unexpected energization or start up of the machines or
equipment, or release of stored energy could cause injury to employees.”
29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(a)(1)(i). Here, there is no dispute that the
attempted valve replacement was a maintenance activity, and that there was an
unexpected release of stored energy resulting in the discharge of a large
quantity of butylene oxide. On review, the parties offer differing theories
regarding whether this was a “release of stored energy” that
“could cause injury to employees.” Id. But these theories
unnecessarily complicate an issue that is readily resolved by the record before
us.

The evidence
shows that when the flange failed during the performance of the maintenance
activity and butylene oxide discharged from the line, stored energy was
released. This release caused chemical burns and chemical pneumonia to several
employees. The butylene oxide produced a burning sensation on the skin of the
Jacobs employee until he was able to wash it off in the plant’s safety
shower. Likewise, the Huntsman operator testified that after his skin was
exposed to the butylene oxide, he felt “like [he] was literally on fire
burning” and that the burning sensation lasted until approximately the
next day. See Dayton Tire, Bridgestone/Firestone , 23 BNA OSHC 1247,
1256, 2009-12 CCH OSHD ¶ 33,098, p. 54,820 (No. 94-1374, 2010)
(rejecting infeasibility defense and finding LOTO standard applicable to
certain machinery because unexpected release during servicing activity could
have caused burns to employees), aff’d in relevant part , 671 F.3d
1249 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Further, a Jacobs crane operator, who was working about
65 to 75 feet from the release, breathed in butylene oxide vapors and was taken
to the hospital where he was diagnosed with chemical pneumonia.

Jacobs
employees were also exposed to fire and explosion hazards as a result of the
release. The OSHA mechanical engineer who conducted the inspection of the
worksite testified that given the flashpoint and lower explosive limit of
butylene oxide, and the concentrations of the chemical in the plant’s
environment, “it was very likely” a catastrophic fire or explosion
could have occurred. The mechanical engineer further testified that potential ignition
sources for an explosion included a running engine, a dropped wrench, or
anything else that could cause a spark. Indeed, both the Jacobs employee and
the Huntsman operator admitted to being concerned at the time of the accident that
the release would result in an explosion. Additionally, immediately following
the release, other Huntsman employees “ran around” telling workers
to evacuate the area, then turned on a fire monitor and opened a fire water
deluge located near the crane’s motor to drown it and eliminate it as an
ignition source.

Based on
these facts, we conclude that the LOTO standard applies to the valve
replacement work at issue under these citation items. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(a)(1)(i) (scope provision).

Knowledge

To establish
knowledge, the Secretary must prove that the employer knew or, with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the conditions
constituting the violation. Contour Erection & Siding Sys., Inc. , 22
BNA OSHC 1072, 1073, 2004-09 CCH OSHD ¶ 32,943, p. 53,787 (No.
06-0792, 2007). Reasonable diligence is based on several factors, including an
employer’s obligation to inspect the work area, anticipate hazards, take
measures to prevent violations from occurring, adequately supervise employees,
and implement adequate work rules and training programs. See General Motors
Corp. , 22 BNA OSHC 1019, 1030, 2004-09 CCH OSHD ¶ 32,928, pp.
53,611-12 (No. 91-2834E, 2007) (consolidated); N. Landing Line Constr. Co. ,
19 BNA OSHC 1465, 1472, 2001 CCH OSHD ¶ 32,391, p. 49,814 (No.
96-0721, 2001).

The actual
or constructive knowledge of a supervisor is imputable to the employer. Rawson
Contractors Inc. , 20 BNA OSHC 1078, 1080-81, 2002-04 CCH OSHD
¶ 32,657, p. 51,326 (No. 99-0018, 2003); Dover Elevator Co. ,
16 BNA OSHC 1281, 1286, 1993-95 CCH OSHD ¶ 30,148, p. 41,480 (No.
91-862, 1993). Here, the judge concluded that Jacobs had knowledge of the
violative conditions through three of its supervisors working at the plant: the
Site Safety Manager, who the judge found had actual knowledge, and the General
Foreman and another supervisor, who the judge found had constructive knowledge.
For the following reasons, we find that the record does not support the
judge’s findings.

The record
does not establish that any of the Jacobs supervisors knew or had reason to
know the Jacobs employee would assist the Huntsman operator with replacing the
gate valve. The judge concluded that the Site Safety Manager had actual
knowledge, finding that he was present when the Jacobs employee checked out a
respirator from the plant’s safety office and that the employee told the
Site Safety Manager at that time that he was going to help the Huntsman
operator replace the valve. On review, Jacobs contends that the judge erred in
finding that the employee told the Site Safety Manager the specific nature of
the tasks he would be performing.

We agree
with Jacobs that the judge mischaracterized the testimony. As Jacobs notes, the
record shows that the Jacobs employee told the Site Safety Manager simply that
he “was getting a respirator to help” the Huntsman
operator—he never specified what work he was going to help the Huntsman
operator perform. There is nothing in the record to show that the Site Safety
Manager knew what task the Huntsman operator was engaged in at that time or
even what the Jacobs employee’s duties were that day. In addition, there
is no evidence to support the Secretary’s assertion that reasonable
diligence required that the Site Safety Manager ask the Jacobs employee what
work he would be performing.

With regard
to the General Foreman and the other Jacobs supervisor, the judge found what
she characterized as constructive knowledge of the cited conditions because
both supervisors had radios in their possession and all Jacobs maintenance
employees used the same radio channel. Therefore, the judge concluded, the
supervisors were able to hear a radio conversation in which the Huntsman
employee said he intended to replace the valve and the Jacobs employee radioed
back to offer his assistance. In reaching this conclusion, the judge relied on
testimony from the Huntsman operator, who speculated that “anybody that
has a radio” in maintenance, including the two Jacobs supervisors,
“would have heard” the conversation he had with the Jacobs
employee.

We disagree
with the judge’s conclusion. There is no evidence that either supervisor
actually heard the conversation. The General Foreman, whose testimony is
unrebutted, stated that although his radio was on, he was “in [his]
office doing some paperwork” and did not hear the conversation. The other
supervisor did not testify at all. Thus, the record does not establish that these supervisors had actual
knowledge of the violative conditions, nor does it show that they should have
known of those conditions under the circumstances.

We also find
no merit to the Secretary’s contention on review that the General Foreman
should have made further inquiries when the Jacobs employee told him that he
was going to get some tools for the Huntsman operator to do some work. We find
it was reasonable for the General Foreman to believe, as he testified, that the
employee’s assistance would be limited to providing the Huntsman operator
with tools, particularly after the Huntsman operator told both supervisors that
morning that he was going to replace the leaking valve himself. In these
circumstances, we conclude the judge erred in finding that Jacobs had both
actual and constructive knowledge of the violative conditions. Accordingly, we
vacate Items 1, 3, and 4.

II.       Serious Citation 1,
Item 5

Under this
item, the Secretary alleges a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(d)(5)(i),
which states: “Following the application of lockout or tagout devices to
energy isolating devices, all potentially hazardous stored or residual energy
shall be relieved, disconnected, restrained, and otherwise rendered
safe.” According to the Secretary, stored hazardous energy was not
properly relieved on four occasions when different energy control procedures
were used to allow Jacobs employees to “engage[] in maintenance and
servicing activities.” The judge affirmed the violation as to three of these
four alleged instances.

To establish
a violation of the cited provision, the Secretary must first show that Jacobs
was performing a servicing or maintenance activity covered by the LOTO
standard. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(a)(1)(i) (scope
requirement). The Secretary has failed to meet this burden. As Jacobs argued
before the judge, the Secretary has provided no evidence identifying what work
tasks were being performed when these energy control procedures allegedly
failed to properly relieve stored hazardous energy. Regarding Instance 1, while it is undisputed that the identified
energy control procedure was used to isolate a particular vessel in the plant,
there is insufficient evidence to find a covered activity. A Jacobs supervisor
stated only that the procedure covered Jacobs’ entry into the vessel to
make repairs inside of it—he did not explain, and the Secretary did not
ask, what those repairs entailed. Regarding Instances 2 and 3, the record shows
nothing more than the energy control procedure in question and the job
location; there is no other information regarding the tasks performed by
Jacobs.  

Without such
information, we cannot determine whether any one of the three energy control
procedures at issue pertained to covered servicing or maintenance activities.
Accordingly, we find that the Secretary has failed to establish that the LOTO
standard applied in any of the alleged instances and therefore, vacate this
citation item.

ORDER

We
vacate Serious Citation 1, Items 1, 3, 4, and 5.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ 

Thomasina
V. Rogers

Chairman

/s/ 

Cynthia L. Attwood

Commissioner

/s/ 

Heather L. MacDougall

Dated: March 4,
2015                                                Commissioner

“ Some
personal identifiers have been redacted for privacy purpose”

United States of America

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW
COMMISSION

1924 Building - Room 2R90, 100
Alabama Street, S.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3104

Secretary of Labor,

Complainant

v.

OSHRC Docket No.
10-2659

Jacobs Field Services North America,

Respondent.

Appearances:

Tina D. Juarez, Esq., and Elizabeth Kruse, Esq., U. S.
Department of Labor,

Office
of the Solicitor, Dallas, Texas

For
Complainant

Darren Harrington, Esq., Key Harrington Barnes, P.C.,
Dallas, Texas

For
Respondent

Before: Administrative Law Judge Sharon
D. Calhoun

DECISION
AND ORDER

Jacobs
Field Services North America (Jacobs) was a maintenance contractor at a facility
owned by Huntsman Petro-Chemical, LLC, in Conroe, Texas. Huntsman produces
specialty chemicals. On May 31, 2010, Jacobs employees [redacted] and
[redacted] were injured by an accidental release of butylene oxide while
[redacted] was assisting a Huntsman employee.

As
a result of the butylene oxide release, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) representative Richard Hartung conducted an inspection of
Huntsman’s facility from June 7 to November 29, 2010. On November 30,
2010, the Secretary issued a Citation to Jacobs alleging five serious
violations of the lockout/tagout (LOTO) standard, 29 C. F. R. § 1910.147.
The Secretary proposed a penalty of $7,000.00 for each of the five items, for a
total penalty of $35,000.00.

Jacobs
timely contested the Citation. A hearing was held in this matter on
April 27 and 28, 2011, in Houston, Texas. Jacobs stipulates the Commission
has jurisdiction over the proceeding under § 10(c) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act), and that it is a covered business under
§ 3(5) of the Act. The parties have filed post-hearing briefs.

Jacobs
argues that LOTO standard does not apply to the cited conditions. The company
contends the process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals standard
(PSM standard), 29 C. F. R. § 1910.119, is the applicable standard. If the
LOTO standard does apply, Jacobs argues the Secretary failed to establish
Jacobs violated the terms of the cited sections, or knew of the violative activity.
Jacobs also asserts the affirmative defense of employee misconduct, arguing
that [redacted] was engaged in an unauthorized activity when the chemical
release occurred.

For
the reasons discussed below, the undersigned affirms Items 1, 3, 4, and 5 of
the Citation, and vacates Item 2. A penalty of $3,500.00 each is assessed for
Items 1, 3, and 4. A penalty of $2,500.00 is assessed for Item 5 .

Background

Jacobs
was a maintenance contractor at Huntsman’s facility in Conroe, Texas,
where Huntsman produces specialty chemicals. To do this, Huntsman processes, among other chemicals, ethylene oxide,
propylene oxide, butylene oxide, ammonia, and isopropyl alcohol. The facility
consists of several different units. The unit at issue in this case is the
G-Kettles Unit (Tr. 348-350).

In
May of 2010, Huntsman implemented a Test and Inspect (T & I) turnaround,
during which a unit is shut down for maintenance and for inspection to check
the mechanical integrity of the unit. It was Jacobs’s job to replace
eight emergency shutdown device (ESD) valves in the G-Kettles Unit during the
turnaround.

On May 25 or
26, 2010, a leak was discovered in one of the valves on the butylene oxide
line. (The leaky valve was a gate valve, not one of the eight ESD valves that
Jacobs was assigned to replace.) Jacobs postponed its replacement of the ESD
valve on the butylene oxide line until Huntsman could replace the faulty valve
(Tr. 117-118, 124-126). At the time of the hearing, Huntsman employee
[redacted] had worked at the Huntsman facility for 26 years. He was an operator
specialist, whose duties included backing up the production supervisor,
maintaining the LOTO database, and trouble-shooting (Tr. 190). [redacted] was
overseeing the May 2010 turnaround and was acting as the operator liaison for
Huntsman (Tr. 191, 293). [redacted] decided to replace the leaking valve
himself, and chose to do it on Memorial Day, Monday, May 31, when fewer workers
would be in the plant (Tr. 226).

Butylene
oxide is highly flammable, with a flashpoint of approximately 10 degrees
Fahrenheit and a Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) of approximately 1.5 % in the air.
It can ignite in liquid or vapor form. Butylene oxide can catch fire or explode
when exposed to ignition sources such as running engines or a metal tool
falling and creating a spark (Tr. 180-183, 352-353).

[redacted]
enlisted the help of Huntsman employees Charles James and Loretta Kelly. James,
a chemical operator, and Kelly, a G-Kettle operator, worked together to purge
and isolate the butylene oxide line. Kelly hooked up the nitrogen to blow out
the line to the tank. It was James’s job to place the block at the tank
once the line blew through with the nitrogen (Tr. 293-294, 326-328).

Huntsman did
not intend for Jacobs to participate in the replacement of the leaky valve. No
one from Jacobs walked the line with James and Kelly. James saw no locks or
tags belonging to Jacobs on the valves he isolated. Kelly did not follow an
emergency control procedure (ECP) for the work she was doing. Neither
[redacted] nor James had an ECP for the valve replacement (Tr. 221, 296,
327-328).

The
defective valve weighed approximately 25 pounds. [redacted] needed help lifting
the line up to pull out the valve without damaging the valve flanges (Tr. 229,
232). All Huntsman and Jacobs maintenance personnel carried radios. [redacted]
requested help over the open channel of the radio. Although Jacobs’s
employees were not supposed to participate in the valve replacement, Jacobs
employee [redacted] radioed back to volunteer his assistance (Tr. 227).
[redacted] was hoping to obtain a position at Huntsman, and [redacted] had
given him “a recommendation to get his foot in the door to at least get
him an interview” (Tr. 281).

Before
assisting [redacted], [redacted] checked out a respirator from the safety
office, telling James Eric Fisher, site safety manager for Jacobs, that he
needed it while helping [redacted] with the valve replacement (Tr. 130-132).
[redacted] also brought his tools, including wrenches, a gaseous scraper, and
channel locks with him (Tr. 135).

When
[redacted] arrived at the G-Kettles Unit, [redacted] was in the process of
depressurizing the line. [redacted] then disconnected the valve from the pipe
by removing the bolts on the down stream side. As [redacted] loosened the
bolts, butylene oxide released from the line, spraying both [redacted] and
[redacted]. [redacted] and [redacted] were momentarily stunned. [redacted]
grabbed [redacted] by the arm and pulled him toward the safety showers so they
could wash off the chemical. [redacted] also used his radio to alert others in
the building of the release. (Exh. C-3; Tr. 149-150, 241). [redacted] and
[redacted] both felt a burning sensation where they were sprayed with the
butylene oxide. They continued to feel the effects the next day (Tr. 246).
Emergency care attendants arrived by ambulance, and treated [redacted] and
[redacted]. They did not go to the hospital (Tr. 272).

At
the time of the release, Jacobs equipment supervisor [redacted] was running a
crane approximately 75 feet from the site of the release. As he was sitting in
the crane cab filling out his daily paperwork, he smelled something similar to
the smell of high octane paint thinner. When he looked around, he saw people
rushing out of the G-Kettle unit, and his rigger yelled at him to shut the
crane down, to eliminate it as an ignition source (Tr. 171-172). [redacted]
shut down the crane, took a deep breath, and climbed down from the
crane’s cab. [redacted] held his breath for 30 to 40 seconds as he walked
approximately 200 feet before he could get another breath. [redacted] showered
at the facility. He was taken by ambulance to a hospital, where he was
diagnosed with “chemical pneumonia” (Tr. 176-180).

At
the time of the release, Kelly was spotting [redacted]. When she saw the
butylene oxide spray, she shouted to people in the area to get out, and she
triggered the fire monitor. She then doused the motor of an 80-ton crane, using
the fire water deluge (Tr. 241-242, 296-298).

It
was later determined that James failed to isolate the line at the tank (Tr.
280). The release of the butylene oxide lasted for approximately 12 minutes.
Approximately 750 liquid pounds of butylene oxide sprayed out before the release
was contained (Exh. C-3; Tr. 347). [redacted] was terminated by Jacobs
several days after the May 31 release (Tr. 116). Huntsman terminated [redacted]
a few days later (Tr. 548).

Richard
Hartung is a mechanical engineer on OSHA’s Houston North Office PSM team
(Tr. 335). OSHA hired him, based on his specialized knowledge in the chemical
industry, to work on process safety management inspections (Tr. 335).
Hartung’s supervisor asked him to accompany the two OSHA compliance
officers originally assigned to do the inspection at Huntsman’s facility
following the May 31, 2010, incident. Hartung eventually took over the
inspection (Tr. 345).

The Citation

The
Secretary has the burden of establishing the employer violated the cited
standard.

To prove a violation of an OSHA standard, the
Secretary must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the cited
standard applies; (2) the employer failed to comply with the terms of the cited
standard; (3) employees had access to the violative condition; and (4) the cited
employer either knew or could have known with the exercise of reasonable
diligence of the violative condition.

JPC
Group Inc., 22 BNA OSHC 1859, 1861 (No. 05-1907, 2009).

Applicability
of the Cited LOTO Standard

The
Secretary cited Jacobs under § 1910.147, the LOTO standard. Jacobs argues
§ 1910.119, the PSM standard, is the correct standard, and the cited
LOTO standard does not apply to the cited conditions.

Section 1910.147(a)(i) of the
LOTO standard provides (emphasis in original):

This standard covers the servicing and maintenance of
machines and equipment in which the unexpected energization or start up
of the machines or equipment, or release of stored energy could cause injury to
employees.

The
PSM standard at § 1910.119 states:

This section contains requirements for preventing or
minimizing the consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, reactive,
flammable, or explosive chemicals. These releases may result in toxic, fire or
explosion hazards.

Jacobs
points out that the Citation alleges that each of the five charged violations
exposed employees to “chemical burns, fire and explosion hazards.”
Jacobs contends that these hazards arise from the characteristics of the
butylene oxide itself, and are not a function of unexpected energization or
stored energy in machines or equipment.

In
support of its position, Jacobs quotes from the Preamble to the final rule for
§ 1910.147:

The identification of “energy sources,” as
defined in this proposal, is complicated by three very important
considerations: (1) Energy is always present in machinery, equipment or
processes; (2) energy is not necessarily dangerous; and (3) danger is only
present when energy may be released in quantities or at rates that would harm
an employee.

54 Fed.
Reg. 36,664 (Sept. 1, 1989).

In
quoting this language, Jacobs omits the sentence immediately following it,
which is relevant here: “Generally speaking, however, potentially
hazardous energy sources are defined as those that can cause injury to
employees working in, on, or around machines or equipment.” Id.

In
the present case, the release of the butylene oxide did cause injuries to
[redacted], [redacted], and [redacted]. [redacted] and [redacted] were working
on the butylene oxide line, and [redacted] was working around it. The LOTO
includes chemicals as potentially hazardous energy sources in its definitions.
Section 1910.147(b) defines “energy sources” as:

Any source of electrical, mechanical, hydraulic,
pneumatic, chemical, thermal, or other energy.

It is undisputed that the release of butylene oxide was unexpected.
Exhibit C-3 is a video of the May 31, 2010, incident. The butylene oxide spews
from the line suddenly, momentarily stunning [redacted] and [redacted]. A total
of 750 liquid pounds of the chemical was released. The chemical energy of the
butylene oxide was released in a quantity that harmed the exposed employees.

The
Secretary has established that she cited the correct standard. The LOTO
standard applies to the cited conditions.

Item 1:
Alleged Serious Violation of § 1910.147(c)(4)(i)

The
Citation alleges:

G-Kettles unit; a procedure for controlling the
hazardous energy in the 1-2 Butylene Oxide line was not developed and utilized where employees were exposed to
the unexpected release of the chemicals while engaged in the removal of a
valve. This condition exposed employees to chemical burns, fire and explosion
hazards.

Section
1910.147(c)(4)(i) provides:

Procedures shall be developed, documented and utilized
for the control of potentially hazardous energy when employees are engaged in
the activities covered by this subsection.

Noncompliance with
the Terms of the Standard

[redacted]
was engaged in assisting [redacted] replace a valve on the butylene oxide line,
a maintenance activity. This activity is covered by § 1910.147(c), which
requires energy control procedures to be implemented “before any employee
performs any servicing or maintenance on a machine or equipment where the
unexpected energizing, start up or release of stored energy could occur and
cause injury.”

Huntsman
and Jacobs had developed a system implementing energy control procedures as
required by §1910.147(c)(4). When assigning a project to Jacobs that
required isolation of valves or pipes, Huntsman created an emergency control
procedure (ECP). Jacobs would verify the ECP, meaning Jacobs would physically
check to see that Huntsman’s locks were in place and that Jacobs’s
locks had been installed (Tr. 120).

The ECP has
tag numbers so that the tag in the field can be matched directly to the ECP
(Exh. C-1; Tr. 206). The ECP is dated and it lists the unit location and the
number of printings. For example, in ECP tag GKET05-22-2010-00003-24,
“GKET” stands for the G-Kettles unit, “05-22-2010” is
May 22, 2010, “00003” is the third printing of the tag, and
“24” indicates it is tag 24 (Tr. 206-208). With this information,
an employee can verify he or she is in the correct place and has the correct
LOTO procedure for the project.

Neither
Huntsman nor Jacobs created an ECP for replacing the valve on the butylene
oxide line (Tr. 291, 296, 327-328). [redacted], who made the decision to
replace the valve, testified he did not create an ECP before he began replacing
the leaky valve (Tr. 221). After the incident, another Huntsman operator
“reminded” [redacted] that an ECP was required for the valve
replacement. [redacted] printed up and approved, post hoc, an ECP
(Tr. 247-248).

Jacobs does
not dispute the failure to create an ECP, but argues that Jacobs did not have
“authorized employees” on the job under the LOTO standard, but only
“affected employees.”

Section
1910.147(b) defines the relevant categories:

Affected employee. An employee
whose job requires him/her to operate or use a machine or equipment on which
servicing or maintenance is being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose
job requires him/her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance
is being performed.

Authorized employee. A person
who locks out or tags out machines or equipment in order to perform servicing
or maintenance on that machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an
authorized employee when that employee’s duties include performing
servicing or maintenance covered under this section.

Jacobs
contends that because it “only had ‘affected employees’ and
had no ‘authorized employees’ on this particular job, each and
every citation item should be vacated” (Jacobs’s brief, p. 11).
This argument is rejected. [redacted] volunteered to assist [redacted] in
replacing the leaking valve. Jacobs’s supervisors knew he was assisting
[redacted], and tacitly consented to his assumption of this duty (as analyzed
in the “Knowledge” section below). Replacing a defective valve is
maintenance covered by § 1910.147. Once [redacted] assumed the duty of
assisting [redacted] with maintenance of the butylene oxide line, his status
changed to that of an authorized employee. (“An affected employee becomes
an authorized employee when that employee’s duties include performing
service or maintenance covered under this section.”)

Jacobs
failed to create an ECP for replacing the leaky valve. The Secretary has
established Jacobs violated the terms of § 1910.147(c)(4)(i)

Employee
Access to the Violative Condition

[redacted]
and [redacted] were exposed to two different hazards created by the release of
the butylene oxide. The chemical sprayed on [redacted] in liquid form, causing
burning and irritation to his skin (Tr. 149). [redacted] testified the butylene
oxide on his skin “felt like I was literally on fire burning” (Tr.
241). [redacted] inhaled butylene oxide in vapor form, and suffered from
chemical pneumonia (Tr. 179-180). In addition to [redacted] and [redacted],
there were approximately four other Jacobs employees in the G-Kettles unit. The
employees were also exposed to an explosion hazard. Butylene oxide vapors are
highly flammable, and they were working in an area that contained several
ignition sources (Tr. 143, 241). The Secretary has established Jacobs’s
employees had access to the unexpected release of butylene oxide.

Knowledge

Jacobs
contends it had neither actual nor constructive knowledge that [redacted] was assisting
[redacted] replace the leaky valve on the butylene oxide line. The record,
however, establishes that two of Jacobs’s supervisors had constructive
knowledge of [redacted] activity, and one supervisor had actual knowledge.
Their knowledge is imputed to Jacobs. Dover Elevator Co., 16 BNA OSHC
1281, 1286 (No. 91-862, 1993) (“[W]hen a supervisory employer has actual
or constructive knowledge of the violative conditions, that knowledge is
imputed to the employer, and the Secretary satisfies [her] burden of proof
without having to demonstrate any inadequacy or defect in the employer’s
safety program.”)

Jose Garcia
was Jacobs’s maintenance general foreman on May 31, 2010 (he no longer
worked for Jacobs at the time of the hearing) (Tr. 555). Garcia testified he
was not aware [redacted] was planning to assist [redacted]. Garcia stated
[redacted] told him “he was going to get some tools for [redacted] to do
some work. . . . To me I understood he was going to take some tools to
[redacted] to do work. That’s all” (Tr. 571). Garcia was in his
office completing paperwork during the time [redacted] was assisting [redacted]
(Tr. 572). He testified he had his radio with him that day, stating, “I
always try to keep my radio on” (Tr. 583).

G. W.
McBride was also a supervisor for Jacobs, and Jacobs’s liaison with
Huntsman for the turnaround. McBride was also listening to the open radio channel during the time
[redacted] and [redacted] were communicating over it. [redacted] testified
regarding his communications with [redactged]:

Q. At any point did you have anybody
help you with that process for changing out the valve?

[redacted]: [redacted] volunteered to
give me hand.

Q. Okay. How did that come about?

[redacted]: I mentioned on the radio,
I think it was channel 8 at the time. I’m not sure if it is to this day.
I talked to him via radio and told him that this—that before we removed
this exchange overhead, which is EG44, I wanted to replace that valve first. So
he said, “Okay.”

. . .

Q.
Now, when you had that conversation with Mr. [redacted] over the radio, who
else uses that channel that you were talking with him on?

[redacted]:
Anybody that’s been issued a radio in maintenance. So that’d be G.
W. [McBride]. He would have heard it. Joe Garcia and anybody that has a radio.

Q.
Okay. And from that conversation that you had with Mr. [redacted] on the radio,
did you understand he was going to give you a hand with changing out the valve?

[redacted]:
He was going to assist me. As for as actually changing out the valve himself,
no.

Q.
What does that mean to you that he was going to assist you? What—what did
you think he was going to help you with?

[redacted]:
With that valve and the line sitting on there, I knew I was going to need some
help lifting that line up to be able to pull that valve out because you
don’t want to mess up the valve flange on the line side upstream or
downstream, the flange surface.

. . .

When I went up there I told [redacted] on the radio
that I’m getting ready to go in and replace that valve. He said
that—“just a minute.” He’s going to go get a full face
respirator. I said, “Okay.” I told him I still had to get mine.

(Tr. 227-230).

In
addition to the conversation broadcast over the radio, [redacted] personally
told James Eric Fisher, Jacobs’s site safety manager, that he was going
to assist [redacted]. [redacted] went to the safety office to check out a
respirator. In order to check out a respirator, an employee must sign a
checkout sheet listing the number of the respirator and verify he or she has a
fit card. Fisher was in the safety office, sitting at his desk and doing
paperwork when [redacted] went in. [redacted] told Fisher he “was getting
a respirator to help [redacted]” (Tr. 133). Fisher did not ask [redacted]
any questions about his statement (Tr. 133).

Despite
Jacobs’s protestations that it was not aware [redacted] was assisting
[redacted] with the valve replacement, the evidence establishes that the
conversation between [redacted] and [redacted] was broadcast over the open
channel of the maintenance radios, which maintenance personnel kept on at all
times. Furthermore, [redacted] actually told Fisher that he was going to help
[redacted]. The Secretary has established knowledge.

Employee
Misconduct Defense

“To establish the unpreventable employee
misconduct defense, an employer must show that it established a work rule to
prevent the violation; adequately communicated the rule to its employees,
including supervisors; took reasonable steps to discover violations of the
rule; and effectively enforced the rule.”

Schuler-Haas
Electric Corp., 21 BNA OSHC 1489, 1494 (No. 03-0322, 2006).

In
addition, the employer has the burden of showing “that the violative
conduct of the employee was idiosyncratic and unforeseeable.” L. E.
Myers Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1037, 1040 (No. 90-945, 1993). Jacobs had
established work rules covering LOTO procedures (Exh. C-13). The company
communicated the LOTO rules to its employees. There was some evidence of
[redacted]’s safety training (Exh. R-9; Tr. 175). Jacobs has failed,
however to establish that it took reasonable steps to discover violations of
the LOTO rules or effectively enforced the rules, and that [redacted]’s
assistance to [redacted] was idiosyncratic or unforeseeable.

Jacobs’s
safety program requires it to receive a “start work permit” for
jobs at Huntsman’s facility. Jacobs is not supposed to engage in certain
kinds of work without a permit (Tr. 565). Garcia admitted that it had been Jacobs’s practice to sign work
permits in advance, verifying that isolation had been done, and only later
check to see if isolation had been completed (Tr. 579-581). Exh. C-19 is a copy
of a start work permit to remove an ESD, dated May 28, 2010, and signed by
McBride, [redacted], and two other Jacobs employees. The employees have checked
off the boxes verifying the isolation was completed for that job. Garcia
testified, “There was no work done on this job. So the ESD was never
removed. They never worked on this system”(Tr. 580). When asked if the
Jacobs’s procedure was to sign off on permits before verifying the
isolation, Garcia replied, “Yeah. At that time, yes” (Tr. 581). If
the permits verifying isolation cannot be relied upon as accurate,
Jacobs’s ability to takes steps to discover violations is compromised.

[redacted]
testified he had assisted Huntsman operators without getting a permit, and knew
of other Jacobs employees doing the same thing. Jacobs never reprimanded
[redacted] for working without a required permit (Tr. 163). [redacted]
testified numerous Jacobs employees had assisted him without a permit. When
asked who helped him, [redacted] stated, “ [redacted] has helped me
before. G. W. McBride, [Jacobs supervisor] Bobby Joe Franklin, Donald Salters,
. . . Martin Taylor. There’s another guy named B[redacted] and I
can’t remember his last name” (Tr. 288).

None
of the supervisors who knew or should have known that [redacted] was assisting
[redacted] intervened. Fisher allowed [redacted] to walk out of his office with
a respirator after he told Fisher he was getting ready to help [redacted].
Jacobs’s enforcement of its safety program was lax. It was commonplace,
and not unforeseeable, that a Jacobs employee would assist a Huntsman employee
without obtaining the required ECP or permit. It was part of the
companies’ shared culture to bypass paperwork when a quick hand was
needed. [redacted] admitted to manufacturing the ECP for the leaky valve
replacement after the butylene oxide release occurred. As [redacted] testified,
“[Jacobs employees] don’t mind helping me and I don’t mind
helping them. We—we—we work together. That was my idea of—of what
Huntsman was preaching. Working together” (Tr. 289).

The company
has failed to establish [redacted] engaged in employee misconduct.

Item 2:
Alleged Serious Violation of § 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)

The
Citation alleges:

G-Kettles unit; the energy control procedures written
for activities including, but not limited to, the change out of emergency shut
down valves did not include specific steps for employees to follow in shutting
down and isolating the process equipment. This condition exposed employees to
chemical burns, fire, and explosion hazards.

Section
1910.147(c)(4)(ii) provides:

The procedures shall clearly and specifically outline
the scope, purpose, authorization, rules, and techniques to be utilized for the
control of hazardous energy, and the means to enforce compliance[.]

Noncompliance
with the Terms of the Standard

Item
1 of the Citation addressed Jacobs’s failure to have any ECP for
the replacement of the leaky valve. Item 2 addresses alleged deficiencies in
various ECPs that did exist for the turnaround being performed in May 2010.
Item 2 is, therefore, not duplicative of Item 1, as Jacobs claims.

Exhibit
C-1 is a copy of ECP GKET 05-22-2010-00003. The Secretary contends this is the
ECP issued for the replacement of the eight ESD valves. Hartung testified he
based this information on interviews he conducted with Huntsman personnel
following the incident.

Jacobs
argues the Exhibit C-1 ECP was not issued for the ESD valves. [redacted],
[redacted], and Garcia were consistent and straightforward in insisting that
Exhibit C-1 is not an ECP for the May turnaround ESD valve replacement.
[redacted] testified Exhibit C-1 had “nothing to do” with either
the ESD valves or the leaking gate valve (Tr. 124-125). [redacted] stated that
Exhibit C-1 was not intended to cover the eight ESD valves, but rather was for
the FG reactor. [redacted] actually completed the ECP (Tr. 210, 270). Garcia
testified Exhibit C-1 was “for tank entry to do some repairs inside the
tank” (Tr. 557).

Hartung’s
testimony on this point was less certain:

Hartung:
[W]e were told that this [Exhibit C-1] ECP was also used to do some of the
–the ESDs that were actually replaced.

Q.
Who told you that?

Hartung:
We were told that by the production supervisor. We were also told—Heather
Braren and then the operations manager I think was Patrick Fleming told
us—and—and the S&H manager, Bill Swain, told us this was it.
And we pursued that several times because we were told by different employees
this isn’t the ECP that was used, but they insisted that it was the one
that was used.

(Tr. 380-381).

On
its face, Exhibit C-1 appears to cover the FG51 reactor. [redacted],
[redacted], and Garcia were matter-of-fact and assured when they stated the ECP
did not relate to the replacement of the ESDs. They were the witnesses who were
in the best position to know what Exhibit C-1 covered. There is no obvious
reason why [redacted] and [redacted], who were both terminated over the May
incident, would mislead the court on this issue. The Huntsman personnel whom
Hartung spoke with were not signatories on the ECP, and were not assigned the
task of completing it. Their statements to Hartung are not as reliable as the
sworn testimony of [redacted], [redacted], and Garcia. It is determined Exhibit
C-1 is not an ECP for the ESD valve replacement, and is, therefore, not
evidence supporting the Secretary’s proof of noncompliance.

Although
the alleged violation description refers to “emergency shutdown
valves” in the plural, Hartung acknowledged Item 2 actually deals only
with the one ESD located near the leaking gate valve involved in the May 31
incident (Tr. 477, 479). The Secretary in her post-hearing brief points to
other ECPs (Exhs. C-7, C-9, and C-11) that are purportedly deficient. Hartung,
however, had trouble recalling which ESDs these ECPs referred to, or whether
they even referred to ESDs or to some other pieces of equipment (Tr. 476).

The
Secretary has failed to establish Jacobs was in noncompliance with the terms of
the standard. She failed to adduce an ECP directly related to the replacement
of a specific ESD valve. Item 2 is vacated.

Item 3: Alleged
Serious Violation of § 1910.147(d)(3)

The
Citation alleges:

G-Kettles unit; the employer did not ensure that each
isolation device was located and operated to isolate the process equipment
prior to employees removing a leaking valve in the 1-2 Butylene Oxide line.
This condition exposed employees to fire and explosion hazards.

Section
1910.147(d)(3) provides:

All energy isolating devices that are needed to
control the energy to the machine or equipment shall be physically located and
operated in such a manner as to isolate the machine or equipment from the
energy source(s).

Noncompliance
with the Terms of the Standard

[redacted]
did not physically locate all of the energy isolating devices that were
required to be locked or blocked in order to replace the valve (Tr. 131, 414).
[redacted] testified he did not “walk the line.” He stated
“walking the line” means, “[Y]ou start from where
you’re working at and follow the line back to make sure you point tags
into it to see if it’s locked out or tagged out or no other chemicals can
get to you” (Tr. 131-132). [redacted] stated he failed to perform this
step (Tr. 131). [redacted] testified that when a Jacobs employee was assigned a
maintenance job, it was Huntsman’s policy to take the employee out and
show him or her how the isolation points are set up. The Jacobs employee then
signs off on a form, “saying they agree with the isolation” (Tr.
252). When asked if he followed this procedure with [redacted] on May 31,
[redacted] replied, “No, he trusted me” (Tr. 247).

The
Secretary has established Jacobs failed to comply with § 1910.147(d)(3).

Employee
Access to the Violative Condition

As
discussed above, [redacted], [redacted], and the other Jacobs employees located
in the G-Kettles unit were exposed to the hazards created by the violative
condition, which included chemical burns, lung damage caused by inhaling
chemical vapors, and explosions. The Secretary has established employee access
to the violation of § 1910.147(d)(3).

Knowledge

It
has been established [redacted]’s supervisors knew [redacted] was
assisting [redacted] in replacing the leaky valve. Garcia testified he would
have walked the line himself if he had received a start work permit and an ECP
for the replacement. Garcia did not do so (Tr. 573). With reasonable diligence,
Garcia would have followed up on [redacted]’s statement that he was going
to assist [redacted]. Garcia’s constructive knowledge is imputed to Jacobs.

The
Secretary has established a violation of § 1910.147(d)(3).

Item 4:
Alleged Serious Violation of § 1910.147(d)(4)(i)

The
Citation alleges:

G-Kettles unit; a lockout device was not affixed to
the isolation devices to isolate process equipment including, but not limited
to, the 1-2 Butylene Oxide line where employees were removing a leaking valve.
This condition exposed employees to chemical burns, fire, and explosion
hazards.

Section
1910.147(d)(4)(i) provides:

Lockout or tagout devices shall be affixed to each
energy isolating device by authorized employees.

Noncompliance with
the Terms of the Standard

It
has been established that neither [redacted] nor Garcia placed any locks on the
isolation points for the replacement of the leaking gate valve (Tr. 132).
Jacobs was required to lock out the devices even if Huntsman had already done
so (Tr. 420).

Jacobs
also failed to lock out another device. As previously noted, Exhibit C-1 is an
ECP for the FG51 reactor. Under this ECP, Jacobs was required to lock out the
valve identified by tag number 16. Jacobs failed to do so. Garcia told Hartung
that he had placed a lock on another butylene oxide line. Hartung speculated
Garcia may have mistakenly put the lock on the wrong line (Tr. 424).

The
valve tagged with number 16 was the leaky valve at issue in this case. Hartung
explained that if plans to lock out a valve change due to circumstances, then
the ECP should reflect that change:

[T]heir energy control procedure defined that valve as
part of the energy control plan for FG51. And so therefore I would expect to
see a lock on—on all of these devices that were on the energy control
procedure. [If a valve cannot be isolated], there is a mechanism and it would
be to—to not do any work until it was properly isolated, blocked in, etc.
The other option could have been to change the energy control procedure to go
back further where there wasn’t a –a leaking valve, to block it
there.

(Tr. 425).

The
Secretary has established Jacobs was in noncompliance with
§ 1910.147(d)(4)(i).

Employee
Access to the Violative Condition

Jacobs’s
employees located in the G-Kettles unit were exposed to the hazards created by
the violative conditions, which included chemical burns, lung damage caused by
inhaling chemical vapors, and explosions. The Secretary has established
employee access to the violation of § 1910.147(d)(4)(i).

Knowledge

Garcia
had constructive knowledge the isolation devices with which [redacted] was
working were not locked out, and he had actual knowledge of his failure to lock
out the valve identified by tag 16. Garcia’s knowledge is imputed to
Jacobs.

The
Secretary has established a violation of § 1910.147(d)(4)(i).

Item 5:
Alleged Serious Violation of § 1910.147(d)(5)(i)

The
Citation alleges:

In the following instances stored energy was not
relieved, disconnected, restrained or otherwise rendered safe potential
hazardous energy while employees were engaged in maintenance and servicing
activities. The conditions exposed employees to chemical burns, fire and
explosion hazards:

2.   Energy Control Procedure
GKET-05-22-2010-00003, the energy was not relieved between HVG274 (Solenoid
Valve) and the block valve item #16      

4.   Energy Control Procedure
GKET-05-21-2010-00007, the energy was not relieved between XVG93 (Solenoid
Valve) and the block valve item #1      

6.   Energy Control Procedure
GKET-05-22-2010-0001, the energy was not relieved between HVG273 (Solenoid
Valve) and the block valve item # 15      

8.   Energy Control Procedure
JAU-06-26-2010-00001, the energy was not relieved inside E-G-56 resulting in
exposure to maintenance employees while opening
equipment.          

Section 1910.147(d)(5)(i) provides:

Following the application of lockout or tagout devices
to energy isolating devices, all potentially hazardous stored or restricted
energy shall be relieved, disconnected, restrained, and otherwise rendered
safe.

Noncompliance with
the Terms of the Standard

Instance
1 —Exhibit C-6 is a copy of a drawing referred to as a
“P&ID,” which shows the G-Kettles unit. A highlighted segment
marked “1” shows the area of the butylene oxide line referred to in
Instance 1. Jacobs did not ensure the segment of the line between the solenoid
valve (tag 16) and the ESD was relieved. The ESD valve was fail closed, which
means when the power to the system is shut down, the ESD valve would go into a
closed position as its safe position. There is no bleed valve that would allow
that portion of the line to be bled. If a chemical substance was left in the
line, there would be no way to flush the material. If the ESD valve were
opened, employees in the area could be exposed to an unexpected hazardous
release (Tr. 285, 430-435).

Instance
2— Highlighted segment “2” of Exhibit C-6 shows the area
between the blocked valve and another ESD valve that would fail close. Jacobs
did not ensure this segment was relieved (Tr. 285, 430-435).

Instance
3— Highlighted segment “3” of Exhibit C-6 shows the area
of the line between the blocked valve and the ESD valve, as well as the portion
of the line between the control valve and a second block valve. Jacobs did not
ensure this segment was relieved (435-437).

The
Secretary has established Jacobs failed to comply with § 1910.147(d)(5)(i)
with respect to Instances 1through 3 of Item 5.

Instance
4— This instance refers to an incident that occurred on June 26, 2010.
Exhibit C-15 is a copy of a P&ID where Jacobs was performing work on an
exchanger. Jacobs’s employees believed the highlighted line had been
isolated and started to open the line. When they opened the flanges between the
exchanger (EG56) and the connecting pipe, the material inside sprayed out with
pressure (Tr. 451-452). The Secretary contends Jacobs failed to fully relieve
the line.

Garcia
testified that neither he nor Huntsman missed any isolation points when he
verified the ECP (Exh. C-14). Garcia stated, “Everything was isolated,
locked out, and tagged out. I had my safety men and myself. We walked it out.
My guy, before he started to work, he walked it out. And then we did the work.
We barricaded the area where we worked” (Tr. 566). It is Garcia’s
theory that the release was due to a plug in the line. Although Huntsman purged
and flushed the line, the plug prevented all of the material from bleeding out.
Hartung testified that he was not certain that Garcia missed an isolation point
(Tr. 544).

With
respect to Instance 4, the Secretary has failed to establish Jacobs failed to
comply with the cited standard. The evidence is insufficient to establish
Jacobs missed an isolation point or points.

Employee
Access to the Violative Condition

Jacobs’s
employees located in the G-Kettles unit were exposed to the hazards created by
the violative conditions, which included chemical burns, lung damage caused by
inhaling chemical vapors, and explosions. The Secretary has established
employee access to the violation of § 1910.147(d)(5)(i).

Knowledge

Garcia
testified he reviewed the ECPs and walked the lines. With reasonable diligence,
he could have detected the deficiencies in the lines. Garcia’s knowledge
is imputed to Jacobs.

The
Secretary has established a violation of § 1910.147(d)(4)(i).

Penalty
Determination

The
Commission is the final arbiter of penalties in all contested cases. “In
assessing penalties, section 17(j) of the OSH Act, 29 U. S. C. § 666(j),
requires the Commission to give due consideration to the gravity of the
violation and the employer’s size, history of violation, and good
faith.” Burkes Mechanical Inc., 21 BNA OSHC 2136, 2142 (No.
04-0475, 2007). “Gravity is a principal factor in a penalty determination
and is based on the number of employees exposed, duration of exposure,
likelihood of injury, and precautions taken against injury.” Siemens
Energy and Automation, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 2196, 2201 (No. 00-1052, 2005).

Jacobs
employs approximately 30,000 people worldwide. It had been cited for OSHA
violations within the three years previous to the May 31, 2010, incident.
Jacobs demonstrated good faith during this proceeding (Tr. 369-370).

The
gravity of the violations affirmed in Items 1, 2, 4, and 5 is high. At least
six Jacobs employees were exposed to hazards of skin irritation, lung damage,
and explosions. The May 31, 2010, incident resulted in injuries to three
employees. The toll could have been much worse had it not been for the combined
efforts of Huntsman and Jacob employees in sounding the alarm for employees to
evacuate and in dousing the ignition points. The gravity is somewhat mitigated
by the conscientious use of personal protective equipment worn by the
employees. Jacobs employees are required to wear fire retardant clothing at
work. [redacted] and [redacted] were both wearing gloves and were using
respirators. Significantly, they suffered no lung damage even though they were
at ground zero for the butylene oxide release.

It
is determined that a penalty of $3,500.00 is appropriate for each of Items 1,
3, and 4. A penalty of $2,500.00 is appropriate for Item 5.

Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law

The
foregoing decision constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law in
accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

ORDER

Based
upon the foregoing decision, it is ORDERED that:

1. Item 1 of
   the Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147(c)(4)(i), is
   affirmed, and a penalty of $3,500.00 is assessed;

2. Item 2 of
   the Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147(c)(4)(ii), is
   vacated, and no penalty is assessed;

3. Item 3 of
   the Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147(d)(3), is
   affirmed, and a penalty of $3,500.00 is assessed;

4. Item 4 of
   the Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147(d)(4)(i), is
   affirmed, and a penalty of $3,500.00 is assessed; and

5. Item 5 of
   the Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147(d)(5)(i), is
   affirmed, and a penalty of $2,500.00 is assessed.

SO
ORDERED.

/s/
Sharon D.
Calhoun                       

Sharon
D. Calhoun

Judge

Date:     September
20, 2011

Atlanta,
Georgia