Sam Houston Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Plain-English summary

Two Sam Houston Electric linemen volunteered to assist Rusk County Electric with storm-damaged lines and worked under a Rusk County supervisor. The combined group operated at separated locations without tags or effective direct communication, and an employee of another company was electrocuted after the line was reenergized. The judge found that the workers constituted more than one crew and that the tagging standard was violated. She also found the Sam Houston employees had access to the untagged-line hazard. However, the Secretary did not prove that Sam Houston knew or reasonably could have known its off-site employees were working without tags while under another employer's supervision. The citation was vacated and no penalty was assessed.

Decision snapshot

• Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. § 1910.269(m)(3)(iv)
• Outcome: Serious power-line tagging citation vacated; no penalty assessed.
• Key point: The violation and employee exposure were established, but the off-site employer lacked proven actual or constructive knowledge while its linemen worked under another utility's supervisor.

Full text (OSHRC public release)

                                              United States of America
                OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
                               1924 Building - Room 2R90, 100 Alabama Street, SW
                                           Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3104

Secretary of Labor,
Complainant,
v. OSHRC Docket No. 01-1253
Sam Houston Electric Coop., Inc.,
Respondent.

Appearances:

      Christopher V. Grier, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U. S. Department of Labor, Dallas, Texas
      For Complainant

      Tony R. Rosenstein, Esq., Baker Botts, LLP, Houston, Texas
      For Respondent

Before: Administrative Law Judge Nancy J. Spies

                                          DECISION AND ORDER

      Sam Houston Electric Coop., Inc. (SHECO), contests a one-item citation issued by the Secretary

on June 12, 2001. SHECO is a rural electric cooperative chartered by the state government to provide
electricity to its members. In December 2000, a severe ice storm in eastern Texas caused extensive damage
to several power lines, resulting in outages in that part of the state. Two of SHECO’s employees
volunteered to assist Rusk County Electric Cooperative, Inc. (RCEC), in restoring power to RCEC’s
approximately 17,000 members. On December 19, 2000, a lineman for another electric service company
also assisting RCEC, Texas Electric Utility Construction, Inc. (TEUC), was electrocuted while working
on a power line at a location near Longview, Texas. The Secretary investigated the fatality and issued
citations to SHECO, RCEC, and TEUC.
The citation alleges that SHECO committed a serious violation of § 1910.269(m)(3)(iv), because
its employees failed to use tags to ensure the protection of employees against re-energizing power lines on
which they were working.
 A hearing in this matter was held on December 3, 2001, in Houston, Texas. SHECO argues that
it did not violate the terms of the cited standard; that it was not an employer within the meaning of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) at the fatality site; that its employees were not exposed
to a hazardous condition; and that the lineman’s electrocution was the result of unpreventable employee
misconduct. The parties have filed post-hearing briefs.
For the reasons discussed below, it is determined that the Secretary failed to establish that SHECO
had actual or constructive knowledge of the violative condition. The citation will be vacated.
Background
In December 2000, RCEC was experiencing emergency operational problems in Rusk County due
to downed power lines resulting from a severe ice storm. The ice storm did not affect power lines serviced
by SHECO, whose service area is in Livingston, Texas, located approximately 80 miles southwest of Rusk
County. RCEC asked area electric service companies for assistance in repairing the lines. Two SHECO
linemen, Larry Horn and Ronnie Hindsman, volunteered to help, as did TEUC linemen Bryan Hale and
Shane Freeman. RCEC also arranged for Brock Contractors to cut fallen tree branches that had become
entangled in the power lines.
Ronnie Spencer, a staking engineer for RCEC, supervised the emergency power restoration effort
(Tr. 55). His crew on December 19 consisted of SHECO employees Horn and Hindsman, TEUC
employees Hale and Freeman, and two employees from Brock Contractors (Tr. 56-57). Their last job on
December 19 was repairing power lines located along Highway 349, approximately 4 miles from Kilgore,
Texas (Tr. 56). Spencer assigned the employees from TEUC to replace a damaged insulator, and he
assigned the Brock Contractors employees to accompany them and to trim some branches around the
power lines. The employees from TEUC and Brock Contractors did not have walkie-talkies or any other
means of communicating with Spencer once he left their assigned site. Spencer, Horn, and Hindsman
drove to another location along the road, approximately ¼ mile away, where a pine tree had fallen across
the power lines (Tr. 64-65, 112-113).
The bucket truck operated by the TEUC employees became stuck in a ditch by the side of the road
as Hale and Freeman attempted to untangle two power lines. Spencer learned of their predicament from
some RCEC employees who had driven by to deliver lunch to the TEUC and Brock employees. Spencer
sent Horn and Hindsman to pull them out of the ditch with their SHECO truck. After doing so, Horn

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radioed Spencer that Hale and Freeman were clear of the power lines. Spencer re-energized the lines
(Tr. 66-70, 168-171).
RCEC contends that Horn mistakenly thought that Hale and Freeman were finished with their task
and prematurely signaled that they were clear of the line. The Secretary contends that Horn correctly
signaled Spencer that the TEUC employees were clear of the line, but for some reason (not explored at the
hearing) Hale returned to the bucket and began working on the power line again. In any event, when
Spencer re-energized the line, Hale was electrocuted (Tr. 11).
The Citation
The Secretary has the burden of proving her case by a preponderance of the evidence.
In order to establish a violation of an occupational safety or health standard, the Secretary
has the burden of proving: (a) the applicability of the cited standard, (b) the employer’s
noncompliance with the standard’s terms, (c) employee access to the violative conditions,
and (d) the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of the violation (i.e., the employer
either knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known, of the violative
conditions).

   Atlantic Battery Co., 16 BNA OSHC 2131, 2138 (No. 90-1747, 1994).
                    Item 1: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1910.269(m)(3)(iv)
   The Secretary charges SHECO with a serious violation of § 1910.269(m)(3)(iv), which provides:
   Tags shall prohibit operation of the disconnecting means and shall indicate that employees
   are at work.

   The citation alleges:
   On or about December 19, 2000, tags were not used at work site to ensure the protection
   of employees against the re-energizing of the power lines on which they were working.

   (1) Applicability of Cited Standard
   Section 1910.269(a)(1) provides that § 1910.269 (Electric power generation, transmission, and

distribution) “covers the operation and maintenance of electric power generation, control, transformation,
transmission, and distribution lines and equipment.” Section 1910.269(m) (1) provides: “Paragraph (m)
of this section applies to the deenergizing of transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the
purpose of protecting employees.” SHECO employee Horn testified that he was working on a distribution
line on December 19, 2000 (Tr. 52). Section 1910.269(m)(3)(iv) applies to the cited condition.

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(2) Violation of Terms of the Cited Standard
None of the seven employees working on the Rusk County power lines on December 19, 2000,
used tags to indicate that employees were working on deenergized power lines (Tr. 51, 61-62). SHECO
argues that the seven employees working on the power lines comprised a single crew, and thus were not
required to use tags under an exception provided in § 1910.269(m)(2)(iii).
Section 1910.269(m)(2)(i) provides:
If a system operator is in charge of the lines or equipment and their means of disconnection,
all of the requirements of paragraph (m)(3) of this section shall be observed, in the order
given.

   Thus, if there is a system operator, the standard requires that tags be used. However, the

Secretary’s own witness, OSHA assistant area director Stephen Boyd, testified that there was no system
operator working on December 19, 2000 (Tr. 216). This brings into play § 1910.269(m)(2)(ii), which
provides:
If no system operator is in charge of the lines or equipment and their means of
disconnection, one employee in the crew shall be designated as being in charge of the
clearance. All of the requirements of paragraph (m)(3) of this section apply, in the order
given, except as provided in paragraph (m)(2)(iii) of this section. The employee in charge
of the clearance shall take the place of the system operator, as necessary.

   Spencer testified that, as supervisor, he was the member of the crew designated as being in charge

of the clearance (Tr. 80-81). As noted, if a crew member is designated as being in charge of clearance, the
requirements of paragraph (m)(3) (including the use of tags) apply, except as provided in
§ 1910.269(m)(2)(iii), which provides:
If only one crew will be working on the lines or equipment and if the means of
disconnection is accessible and visible to and under the sole control of the employee in
charge of the clearance, paragraphs (m)(3)(i), (m)(3)(iii), (m)(3)(iv), (m)(3)(viii), and
(m)(3)(xii) of this section do not apply. Additionally, tags required by the remaining
provisions of paragraph (m)(3) of this section need not be used.

   SHECO argues that only one crew was working on the power lines at the time of the fatality, and

thus tags were not required. In support of its argument, SHECO introduced an OSHA Standard
Interpretation and Compliance Letter addressing the subject of “Clarification of single and multiple crews

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for purposes of deenergizing lines” (Exh. R-2). The pertinent part of the letter states (Exh. R-2; emphasis
in original):
Question #1: At what point do we no longer have a single crew working on this single
transmission line which may be as much as 100 miles long and instead have independent
crews needing separate clearance as required by 29 CFR 1910.269(m)(3)(iii)?

    Reply: Paragraph 1910.269(m)(3)(viii) requires each independent crew to follow steps
    outlined in § 1910.269(m)(3) separately to ensure that a group of workers does not make
    faulty assumptions about what steps to de-energize lines or equipment have been or will
    be taken by another group. The preamble summary and explanation section to this rule
    (Federal Register, 59(20), Monday, January 31, 1994, p. 4391.) contains the following
    paragraph (m)(3)(iii) discussion on multiple crews:

    Additionally, this paragraph does not apply to work performed by two crews working
    on lines or equipment controlled by the same disconnecting means. (A group of
    employees made up of several ‘crews’ of employees who are under the direction of a
    single employee and who are working in a coordinated manner to accomplish a task
    on the same lines or equipment are considered to be a single crew, rather than as
    multiple independent crews. . .)

    Therefore, for purposes of paragraph 1910.269(m), workplace scenarios with two or more
    crews that do not meet this test are independent crews. The employee in charge of the
    single crew must have sole control of the work and must coordinate the activities of all
    employees involved in the job. In addition, the employee in charge must be responsible for
    the clearance for the entire job and must be the only person communicating with the system
    operator, unless responsibility has been transferred under § 1910.269(m)(3)(ix). The
    procedures must include effective visual or verbal (e.g., radio) communications with all
    crew members. In addition, the employee in charge, in accordance with § 1910.269(c),
    must conduct a single job briefing with all the employees involved before they start the
    job.

    Under this interpretation, the seven employees working on the Rusk County power lines on

December 19 were not a single crew. The record establishes that Spencer was the employees’ supervisor
and had sole control of the work, but he did not have effective visual or radio communications with all
crew members. While it is not the purpose of this proceeding and decision to determine the cause of the
fatal accident, it is apparent from the record that the TEUC employees’ lack of direct communication with
Spencer resulted in the miscommunication of vital information.
TEUC employee Freeman testified as follows (Tr. 112-113):

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Freeman: [W]hen [Spencer] told me to clear up the line, he did tell me, “Send the tree
trimmers down there when you all are finished,” and I never did send the tree trimmers
down there. They were standing right there beside me.

   Q.: Were you in communication with anyone when the line was energized?

   Freeman: The only person would have been when the tree trimmers were there, and they
   were standing right there besides me.
   ...
   Q.: Were they in communication with anyone?

   Freeman: No, they would have to drive down there to the breaker pole.

   Horn testified that shortly after he and Hindsman had pulled the TEUC vehicle out of the ditch, he

received a call on the radio from Spencer, wanting to know if the lines were clear to be re-energized. Horn
stated (Tr. 171-172):
One of the gentlemen--I don’t know if it was Shane or Brian, I couldn’t tell you which
individual it was, we were all dressed in cold-weather gear. The gentlemen looked very
similar, very similar height--indicated to me that they were in the clear. And, I was still
walking towards him. I said, “You all have already cleared the lines?”
And he verified by saying, “Yes, we are clear,” and he gave me, I call it a old
lineman’s signal in the clear [motioning hands with thumbs and forefingers up].

   It is the Secretary’s theory that one of the TEUC employees told Horn that they were clear, and

then, for reasons unknown, started working on the lines again. However the miscommunication occurred,
if the TEUC employees had had their own radio to communicate directly with Spencer, there would have
been less likelihood of a fatal accident. Hale or Freeman could have radioed Spencer to tell him they were
clear, and if they believed it necessary to continue working on the line, they could have radioed him and
let him know of the change. Reliance on a third party resulted in confusion that may have contributed to
Hale’s death.
Based on the guidelines set out in the compliance letter, the seven workers comprised more than
one crew, and were therefore required to use tags. In failing to use tags, the employees violated
§1910.269(m)(3)(iv).

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(3) Employee Exposure
SHECO claims that Horn and Hindsman were not exposed to hazardous condition because they
followed safe work practices, including using insulated gloves and a hot stick, while working on the Rusk
County power lines (Tr. 157). This argument is rejected.
“Exposure to a violative condition may be established either by showing actual exposure or that
access to the hazard was reasonably predictable.” Phoenix Roofing, Inc., 17 BNA OSHC 1076
(No. 90-2148, 1995). SHECO contends that Horn and Hindsman’s safety precautions eliminates their
exposure to the violative condition. But the SHECO employees’ access to the untagged power lines was
reasonably predictable. Reasonable predictability is established by showing “that employees either while
in the course of their assigned working duties, their personal comfort activities while on the job, or their
normal means of ingress-egress to their assigned workplaces, will be, are, or have been in a zone of
danger.” Giles & Cotting, Inc., 3 BNA OSHC 2002, 2003 (No. 504, 1976). Horn and Hindsman were
assigned to work on the power lines, which were in the zone of danger. “The zone of danger is determined
by the hazard presented by the violative condition, and is normally that area surrounding the violative
condition that presents the danger to employees which the standard is intended to prevent.” RGM
Construction Co., 17 BNA OSHC 1229, 1234 (No. 91-2107, 1995).
Regardless of the safety precautions taken by Horn and Hindsman, they were in the zone of danger
of the untagged lines. The Secretary has established their exposure to the violative condition.
(4) Employer knowledge
The final element that the Secretary must prove is that SHECO had actual or constructive
knowledge that its employees did not use tags on December 19. On this element the Secretary has failed
to make her case.
Horn and Hindsman responded to a call for volunteers from RCEC. At the time in question, they
were both linemen; neither of them were supervisors. Horn and Hindsman worked on restoring the power
in Rusk County for several days. During that time they stayed in a hotel in Longview, Texas, at RCEC’s
expense (Tr. 152-152).
RCEC engineer Spencer supervised Horn and Hindsman, as well as the TEUC and Brock
employees. Horn testified that he and Hindsman “did nothing unless we were directed to do so” (Tr. 20).

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During the period that they worked on the Rusk County power lines under Spencer’s supervision, neither
Horn nor Hindsman had any contact with SHECO’s management personnel (Tr. 154, 189).
The Secretary did not show that SHECO had actual knowledge of the violation. It did not know
that its employees worked in separate crews or failed to tag out while doing so on December19, 2000. The
record establishes that SHECO received no information regarding its employees’ work activities during
the time in question.
The Secretary argues that SHECO had constructive knowledge that its employees would be exposed
to the hazard of working with untagged power lines. She cites the digest of an unreviewed ALJ case,
Charles T. Driscoll Masonry Restoration Company, Inc., 6 BNA OSHC 1657, 1658 (No. 77-2320, 1978),
in support of her position: “An employer cannot avoid liability for violation of safety standards by merely
failing to authorize any employee to act in a managerial or supervisory capacity. The employer could have
known of the violative conditions had it carried out its duty to oversee the operation.”
In Driscoll, the employer argued that its president had not seen the cited scaffolds prior to the
OSHA inspection, and therefore did not know of the violations. The employer had never designated one
of the workers to be the supervisor in the president’s absence, and so all of the workers were of equal
status. Driscoll is easily distinguishable from the present case, where SHECO’s employees volunteered
to work for another employer under the supervision of an engineer. SHECO had no duty to oversee the
emergency operation at a remote worksite for which its employees volunteered.
The Secretary also contends that SHECO had constructive knowledge that its employees were not
using tags because the company failed to train them in the use of tags. Horn testified that he did not use
tags and had not received training in their use (Tr. 52, 190). SHECO maintains that it trained all of its
employees in the safety requirements of § 1910.269.
SHECO introduced a copy of Horn’s safety training classes. Included among the many courses
Horn took is “OSHA Working Energy ‘95,” a one-day course apparently taught by OSHA personnel on
the subject of § 1910.269 (Exh. R-1; Tr. 201-202). SHECO employs a full-time training and safety
instructor, and it holds weekly safety meetings during which its safety manual is reviewed (Tr. 150-151,
200). Horn’s admission that he did not use tags does not establish that SHECO failed to train its
employees on this requirement, or that it had constructive knowledge that its employees would fail to use
tags if ever working in separate crews with RCEC. Horn’s lack of awareness of the tagging requirement

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may have resulted from his own inattention to the safety training. In any event, the citation of
§ 1910.269(a)(2)(i) would be more applicable for a lapse in training, which SHECO would be wise to
address. Section 1910.269(a)(2)(i) provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall be trained in and familiar with the safety-related work practices, safety
procedures, and other safety requirements in this section that pertain to their respective job
assignments.

   The Secretary is attempting to use an alleged safety training violation to establish the constructive

knowledge element of her case. The Secretary’s evidence is too slender to support a finding of
constructive knowledge for the off-site employer. Some training was provided in tagging, even if SHECO
did not ordinarily use tags for its own work. It is determined that the Secretary has failed to prove that
SHECO knew its employees were not using tags while working under the supervision of a RCEC
supervisor on December 19, 2000. Horn and Hindsman were out of contact with SHECO’s management
personnel, and SHECO had no supervisory personnel on the site. Because of the disposition of this case,
it is unnecessary to address any other legal arguments.
Item 1 is vacated.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The foregoing decision constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
Order
Based upon the foregoing decision, it is hereby ORDERED that item 1 of citation no. 1 is vacated,
and no penalty is assessed.

                                                                  /s/

                                                          NANCY J. SPIES
                                                          Judge

Date: May 13, 2002

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