If a West Virginia local police department uses an unmarked vehicle without tinted windows to run radar and pull people over for speeding, does the law banning unmarked-vehicle traffic stops apply?

Plain-English summary

Marshall County's prosecuting attorney asked AG John McCuskey to settle a dispute among local agencies. A municipal police department was using a gold Dodge Charger (no lightbar, no side decals, but with front and rear police license plates and untinted windows) to run radar on West Virginia Route 2 and issue speeding tickets. Other county-level law enforcement officers were arguing this violated W. Va. Code § 17C-15-36a, which prohibits "unmarked law-enforcement vehicles" from making routine traffic stops.

The AG broke the statute down. Section 17C-15-36a is a window-tint statute. It bans tinted windows that fall outside the regulatory specs, and then it carves out an exception for "unmarked law-enforcement vehicles primarily used for covert or undercover enforcement." Right after granting that exception, the statute says: "No unmarked law-enforcement vehicle, herein exempted, may engage in routine traffic stops."

The phrase "herein exempted" is the key. The routine-traffic-stop ban applies only to vehicles that fall within the preceding tint exemption, that is, vehicles that have tinted windows and are primarily used for covert or undercover work. A vehicle without tinted windows never reaches the exemption, so the routine-traffic-stop ban does not apply. The opinion concludes the gold Charger can lawfully be used for radar enforcement and speeding stops.

What this means for you

Municipal police chiefs and operations commanders

Under the opinion, § 17C-15-36a does not prohibit unmarked vehicles from conducting routine traffic enforcement (speed enforcement, radar, standard moving violations) so long as the vehicle's windows are not tinted past the legal limit. The opinion reads the statute's "routine traffic stop" prohibition as applying only to vehicles that fall within the preceding tint exemption: vehicles that have tinted windows and are primarily used for covert or undercover work.

Covert or undercover unit commanders

The opinion reads the statute as conditioning the tint exemption on staying out of routine traffic enforcement. A vehicle that qualifies for the tint exemption (tinted to a degree that would normally violate § 17C-15-36a but allowed because the car is primarily for covert work) is barred under the opinion from conducting routine traffic stops. The opinion does not address non-routine stops (such as a stop for an offense observed during covert operations) in detail.

Defense attorneys with a client stopped by an unmarked car

The opinion concludes that a § 17C-15-36a-based challenge to an unmarked-car stop requires two facts: the vehicle was tinted past the legal specs, and the vehicle was primarily used for covert or undercover enforcement. The opinion treats stops by unmarked vehicles with legal-spec windows as outside the statute's coverage.

County prosecutors advising local agencies

The opinion adopts a plain-text reading of § 17C-15-36a's "herein exempted" clause: only unmarked vehicles within the tint exemption are barred from routine traffic stops. The opinion notes that the federal Murphy decision (S.D.W. Va. 2024) reads the statute the same way, treating the routine-traffic-stop ban as triggered by tinted, covert-use vehicles.

Drivers pulled over by an unmarked car for speeding in West Virginia

Under the opinion, an unmarked-car traffic stop is not barred by § 17C-15-36a so long as the vehicle's windows are not tinted past the legal limit. The opinion does not address other potential challenges to a stop (probable cause, scope, or constitutional theories).

Common questions

Q: What is "routine traffic stop"?
A: The opinion does not define the term in detail, but the statute itself uses the phrase to distinguish ordinary traffic enforcement (speeding, equipment violations, standard moving violations) from non-routine stops in support of an active investigation. The key practical question is whether the stop was for ordinary traffic enforcement or for something else.

Q: Does the car need a lightbar to be considered "marked"?
A: The statute uses "unmarked" but does not list specific markings. The vehicle in the Marshall County case had no lightbar and no side decals, but had front and rear police license plates. The AG treated it as unmarked for purposes of the analysis without deeply engaging with that question, because the lack of tint disposed of the case.

Q: Why is the routine-traffic-stop ban in a window-tint statute?
A: Because the legislature was creating a quid pro quo. Vehicles that need tinted windows for covert or undercover work get an exemption from the general window-tint ban, but in exchange they are barred from doing routine traffic stops. The legislature did not want covert vehicles flipping over to ordinary speeding enforcement (and the public would have a hard time identifying a tinted unmarked car as a real police vehicle).

Q: Can a covert-use car ever pull someone over?
A: The opinion focuses on "routine" traffic stops. A non-routine stop, for example, an arrest on probable cause for a felony observed during the covert operation, or a stop incident to executing a warrant, is not what the statute targets. But this opinion does not draw the precise line, so consult counsel before deploying a tinted covert vehicle for any stop.

Q: What happens if an officer in a tinted, covert-use car does a speeding stop?
A: The statute is violated. Under the federal Murphy decision (S.D.W. Va. 2024), evidence from such a stop has been challenged, and there are at least colorable arguments about suppression. The AG opinion does not weigh in on remedies; it only addresses the underlying authority question.

Q: Does the same rule apply to State Police, DNR, or other state-level agencies?
A: The statute is written generally and applies to "law-enforcement vehicles." The opinion is specifically about a municipal police department, but the statutory text reads broadly. State agencies should apply the same analysis to their unmarked fleet.

Background and statutory framework

Section 17C-15-36a regulates "[s]un-screening devices," better known as window tinting, on motor vehicles. The general structure is:

1. A general ban. No person may operate a vehicle with sun-screening devices on the windshield, front side windows, or driver-side windows that fail to meet specified standards.
2. A law-enforcement exemption. "Unmarked law-enforcement vehicles primarily used for covert or undercover enforcement" are exempt from the general ban. So a covert vehicle can have tinted windows even if a private citizen could not.
3. A condition on the exemption. "No unmarked law-enforcement vehicle, herein exempted, may engage in routine traffic stops."

The textual key is "herein exempted." The AG reads this as a limitation that ties the routine-traffic-stop ban to the tint exemption it follows. The ban applies only to vehicles that needed the exemption. Vehicles without tinted windows do not need the exemption and so do not fall under the ban.

The federal Murphy opinion (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 17, 2024) reads the statute the same way. Murphy described an "unmarked law-enforcement vehicle with tinted windows" that the court assumed was involved in "a 'routine traffic stop within the meaning of [West Virginia] Code § 17C-15-36a.'" The combination of unmarked, tinted, and routine-stop is what triggers the prohibition.

The AG also applies a basic interpretive canon: every word of a statute should have meaning. Reading the routine-stop ban to apply to all unmarked vehicles, regardless of tint, would render the phrase "herein exempted" meaningless. W. Va. Auto. v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) confirms that "every section, clause, word or part of the statute" must be given "significance and effect."

The policy logic underneath this analysis: covert vehicles need tinted windows to do covert work; tinted windows reduce a citizen's ability to identify the driver as a police officer; therefore covert vehicles should not be doing routine traffic stops where citizen identification matters. Untinted unmarked vehicles, by contrast, allow normal driver-officer visual identification and pose no such concern.

Citations and references

Statute:

• W. Va. Code § 17C-15-36a (Sun-screening devices)
• W. Va. Code § 5-3-2 (AG advice)

Cases:

• Raymond H. v. Cammie H., 242 W. Va. 640, 837 S.E.2d 701 (2019) (begin with text)
• $7,850 in U.S. Currency v. State, No. 13-0499, 2013 WL 6283823 (W. Va. Dec. 4, 2013) (general window-tint criminalization)
• United States v. Murphy, No. 2:24-CR-00101, 2024 WL 4518292 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 17, 2024) (statute applies where vehicle is unmarked, tinted, and engaged in routine stop)
• W. Va. Auto. v. Ford Motor Co., 251 W. Va. 352, 913 S.E.2d 534 (2025) (give every word significance)

Source

• Landing page: not separately published (the PDF is the official record)
• Original PDF: https://ago.wv.gov/media/37686/download?inline

Original opinion text

State of West Virginia
Office of the Attorney General
John B. McCuskey
Attorney General

Phone: (304) 558-2021
Fax: (304) 558-0140
February 10, 2026

The Honorable Joseph R. Canestraro
Marshall County Prosecuting Attorney
Marshall County Courthouse
600 7th Street
Moundsville, West Virginia 26041

Dear Prosecutor Canestraro:

You have asked for an Opinion of the Attorney General about whether police may use an unmarked law enforcement vehicle without tinted windows to conduct radar enforcement and issue speeding citations.

We are issuing this Opinion under West Virginia Code § 5-3-2, which provides that the Attorney General "may consult with and advise the several prosecuting attorneys in matters relating to the official duties of their office." When this Opinion relies on facts, it depends solely on the factual assertions in your correspondence and discussions with the Office of the Attorney General.

You explain that a local police department within Marshall County is using a gold Dodge Charger to "run radar and conduct routine traffic stops," including stops for "speeding offenses," on a stretch of West Virginia Route 2. The vehicle has no lightbar or side decal but bears front and back police license plates. The vehicle's windows are not tinted. A dispute has arisen between "law enforcement officers of other [county] agencies" and the municipality's police officers about whether West Virginia Code § 17C-15-36a bars the use of this vehicle.

With these facts in mind, your letter raises the following legal question:

Does West Virginia Code § 17C-15-36a prohibit the local police department from using its vehicle to run radar and issue citations to speeders?

We conclude that West Virginia Code § 17C-15-36a does not prohibit the patrol activity you described, in the vehicle you described. Section 17C-15-36a restricts only unmarked law enforcement vehicles used primarily for covert or undercover enforcement with tinted windows from engaging in routine traffic stops. Because the gold Charger does not have tinted windows, the routine traffic stop prohibition does not apply. Local police may use the vehicle to stop speeders.

DISCUSSION

Our analysis must "begin with the text" of West Virginia Code § 17C-15-36a. Raymond H. v. Cammie H., 242 W. Va. 640, 644, 837 S.E.2d 701, 705 (2019). The statute regulates "[s]un-screening devices," commonly known as "window tint," and provides penalties for noncompliance. See W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-36a; see also $7,850 in U.S. Currency v. State, No. 13-0499, 2013 WL 6283823, at *3 (W. Va. Dec. 4, 2013) (memorandum decision) (describing how the statute generally criminalizes "window tinting"). It first lays out a broad prohibition: "no person may operate a motor vehicle" with "a sun-screening device" on the windshield, front side windows, and windows adjacent to the driver that does not comply with certain enumerated requirements. W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-36a(a). But "unmarked law-enforcement vehicles primarily used for covert or undercover enforcement" are "exempt." Id. And the statute includes a limitation on that exemption: "No unmarked law-enforcement vehicle, herein exempted, may engage in routine traffic stops." Id.

The key phrase is "herein exempted." This language limits the "routine traffic stop" prohibition to vehicles that fall within the preceding sun-screening exemption. In other words, the statute bars only unmarked law-enforcement vehicles that (1) have tinted windows and (2) are primarily used for covert or undercover enforcement, from conducting routine traffic stops. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, No. 2:24-CR-00101, 2024 WL 4518292, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 17, 2024) (holding that vehicle violated the statute where it was "an unmarked law-enforcement vehicle with tinted windows" that was assumed to be involved in a "routine traffic stop within the meaning of [West Virginia] Code § 17C-15-36a" (emphasis added)).

A vehicle without tinted windows never reaches the exemption. Such a vehicle is not exempted from the statute's sun-screening device requirements; it simply satisfies them. Reading the routine traffic stop prohibition to apply to all unmarked vehicles, regardless of window tint, would render the phrase "herein exempted" meaningless. And it is a "cardinal rule of statutory construction" that "every section, clause, word or part of the statute" must be given "significance and effect." Syl. pt. 6, W. Va. Auto. v. Ford Motor Co., 251 W. Va. 352, 913 S.E.2d 534 (2025) (citation omitted).

More, the sun-screening exemption is limited to "unmarked law-enforcement vehicles primarily used for covert or undercover enforcement," operations that may require the concealment that tinted windows provide. W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-36a. In exchange for that privilege, the statute bars those same vehicles from conducting routine traffic stops. Extending the prohibition to all unmarked vehicles would untether it from the exemption for vehicles "primarily used for covert or undercover enforcement." Id. And it would transform a narrow limitation on a specific exemption into a sweeping regulation of unmarked police vehicles generally. If the Legislature were interested in barring all uses of unmarked vehicles for traffic stops, then we expect it would not bury such a broad prohibition in an anti-sun-screening statute.

Because the vehicle you describe does not have tinted windows, it is not "herein exempted," and the prohibition on routine traffic stops does not apply. We therefore need not reach whether the car, as described, is "unmarked."

We conclude that West Virginia Code § 17C-15-36a does not prohibit municipal police departments from using an unmarked vehicle without tinted windows to run radar and issue citations for speeding and other traffic offenses. The statute's restriction on "routine traffic stops" applies only to unmarked law-enforcement vehicles that are "herein exempted" from the sun-screening requirements, namely, those with tinted windows primarily used for covert or undercover enforcement.

Sincerely,

John B. McCuskey
West Virginia Attorney General

Holly J. Wilson
Principal Deputy Solicitor General

Mattie F. Shuler
Assistant Solicitor General