🧪 TEST MODE ACTIVE Use test card: 4242 4242 4242 4242
VA 22-028 July 26, 2022

Can I cross a Virginia public highway on my ATV using the most direct route, or do I need special authorization first?

Short answer: Yes. Clause (ii) of Va. Code § 46.2-915.1(A)(1) is independent of clauses (i) and (iii). An ATV operator may cross a public highway by the most direct route without needing authorization from proper authorities or being a first responder. The three clauses (authorized by proper authorities; crossing by most direct route; first responder responding to emergency) are separate exceptions joined by the disjunctive 'or', and reading them conjunctively would lead to irrational results.

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2022. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Virginia law, with citations.

Disclaimer: This is an official Virginia Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Virginia attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Subject

Whether the three exceptions in Va. Code § 46.2-915.1(A)(1) (proper authorities, crossing by most direct route, first responder response) are independent of each other, so that an ATV operator may rely on the crossing exception without satisfying the other two.

Plain-English summary

Virginia Code § 46.2-915.1(A)(1) generally prohibits operating an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on a public highway or other public property, with three exceptions: (i) "as authorized by proper authorities," (ii) "to the extent necessary to cross a public highway by the most direct route," or (iii) by law enforcement, firefighters, or EMS personnel responding to emergencies. The Town of Cedar Bluff's attorney asked whether the three clauses are independent (any one of them is sufficient) or whether they must be read together (all three required).

The AG concluded the three are independent. The word "or" between the clauses is presumed to be disjunctive (Patterson v. Commonwealth; SE Public Service Corp.). Reading the word as conjunctive would lead to absurd results: first responders responding to an emergency would have to first ask "proper authorities" for authorization before driving an ATV on a highway. ATV owners crossing from one side of a road to the other would similarly need pre-authorization. Neither is plausible legislative intent.

The practical result: a private ATV owner can cross a public highway from one private property to another (for example, from a farm field on one side of a road to a field on the other), using the most direct route, without needing local government authorization or being a first responder.

The opinion was limited to clause (ii) (crossing by the most direct route) and did not opine on what constitutes "most direct route" in particular circumstances. That is a fact question for each situation.

What this means for you

ATV owners and rural landowners

The opinion holds that clause (ii) stands on its own: an ATV operator may cross a public highway by the most direct route even when neither clause (i) (authorization by proper authorities) nor clause (iii) (first responder responding to an emergency) applies. The holding is confined to crossing. The opinion does not address operating an ATV along the highway corridor, which still falls under clause (i) or clause (iii), and it does not define what counts as the "most direct route."

Farm operators

The opinion's holding lets an ATV cross a public highway by the most direct route without authorization, which reaches the common rural situation of land split by a road. The opinion also notes, without analyzing, that subsection (F) contains a separate exception for ATVs used in conjunction with farming activities and that subsection (B) adds exceptions for Buchanan and Tazewell counties. It does not address signage, safety conditions, or repeated-crossing situations.

Law enforcement officers

The opinion holds that the three clauses are independent, so a first responder may operate an ATV on a public highway when responding to an emergency under clause (iii) without first obtaining authorization or limiting use to a crossing. It distinguishes a clause (ii) crossing (briefly on the highway to get from one side to the other) from travel along the highway, which clause (ii) does not cover. Whether a given path was the "most direct route" is a fact question the opinion does not resolve.

Local government officials

The opinion holds that § 46.2-915.1(A)(1)(ii) provides a state-law basis for crossing a public highway by the most direct route, independent of the other clauses. It does not address local authority to regulate ATV use generally, or any conflict-preemption question about local crossing permits.

Common questions

Q: What counts as the "most direct route"?
A: The opinion does not define this phrase. As a practical matter, "most direct route" suggests crossing at a right angle (or close to it) rather than diagonally, and at the shortest distance between the two sides. Each situation is fact-specific.

Q: Can I cross at a sharp curve in the highway?
A: The crossing right does not address sightlines or safety conditions. Section 46.2-915.1 does not preclude crossing at curves, but standard ATV safety practice (and probably common sense) suggests choosing locations with good visibility. A reckless crossing might still expose you to other liability (negligence, reckless driving, etc.).

Q: Can I tow an ATV across a highway with my truck instead of riding it across?
A: A trucked ATV is a different scenario; you would be driving the truck legally on the highway with the ATV as cargo. The crossing exception in § 46.2-915.1 is about ATV operation. Trucking is unaffected.

Q: Does this opinion apply to UTVs (utility task vehicles, side-by-sides)?
A: The opinion addresses "all-terrain vehicles" under § 46.2-915.1 and does not discuss UTVs or side-by-sides. Whether a particular UTV is an "all-terrain vehicle" turns on Virginia's statutory definition, which this opinion does not interpret.

Q: Do I need a license or registration for my ATV to cross a highway?
A: ATVs in Virginia are generally not titled or registered for highway use. The crossing right does not require registration. If you ride beyond the crossing (in a way not authorized by another exception), you may violate other parts of § 46.2-915.1.

Q: What if I'm crossing on private property where the road also runs?
A: If the road is a public highway (state or local), § 46.2-915.1 applies regardless of whether you are also on private property at the moment. Public highway means the legal status of the road, not just the physical location.

Q: Are there exceptions for Buchanan or Tazewell County?
A: Yes. Section 46.2-915.1(B) contains additional ATV operation exceptions for highways in Buchanan County and Tazewell County, reflecting local policy choices in those rural Southwest Virginia counties. The Cedar Bluff inquiry came from Tazewell County, where ATV use is locally prevalent.

Background and statutory framework

Section 46.2-915.1 reflects Virginia's general policy that public highways are for licensed motor vehicles, with limited exceptions for vehicles like ATVs that do not meet road safety standards. The crossing exception in clause (ii) is a practical accommodation for the reality of rural land use: properties are often split by roads, and farmers and landowners need to be able to move equipment from one parcel to another.

The disjunctive reading the AG adopted is consistent with Virginia statutory interpretation norms. "Or" is presumed disjunctive unless the context clearly requires otherwise. The AG cited Patterson v. Commonwealth (1975) and SE Public Service Corp. v. Commonwealth (1935) for this principle, both Virginia Supreme Court decisions.

The opinion is a small but useful clarification of a recurring rural-Virginia question. ATV use is widespread in Southwest Virginia, the Shenandoah Valley, and other rural areas, and the crossing exception affects everyday farm and recreational operations. The disjunctive reading avoids the absurd result of requiring farmers and ATV owners to seek government permission for every brief road crossing.

The Buchanan and Tazewell County provisions in subsection (B) reflect a legislative recognition that some rural Southwest Virginia communities use ATVs as significant local transportation. Those provisions are separate from the general crossing rule and apply only within those two counties.

Citations and references

Statutes:

Cases:

  • Patterson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 306 (1975) (Virginia Supreme Court; "or" is disjunctive)
  • South East Public Service Corp. v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 116 (1935) (Virginia Supreme Court; disjunctive "or")

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

Office of the Attorney General

Jason S. Miyares
Attorney General
202 North Ninth Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
Fax 804-786-1991
July 26, 2022
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1

Bradley C. Ratliff, Esquire
Attorney for the Town of Cedar Bluff
c/o The Reliance Law Group
Post Office Box 33
Cedar Bluff, Virginia 24609

Dear Mr. Ratliff:

I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia.

Issue Presented

Your question relates to the use of all-terrain vehicles ("ATVs") on the public highways of the Commonwealth. Specifically, you ask whether clause (ii) of § 46.2-915.1(A)(1) is independent of the other two clauses of that provision, clauses (i) and (iii), such that an individual operating an ATV is permitted to cross a public highway by the most direct route, even if the circumstances present in clauses (i) and (iii) are not present.

Applicable Law and Discussion

Virginia Code § 46.2-915.1(A)(1) provides that no ATV shall be operated

[o]n any public highway, or other public property, except (i) as authorized by proper authorities, (ii) to the extent necessary to cross a public highway by the most direct route, or (iii) by law-enforcement officers, firefighters, or emergency medical services ["EMS"] personnel responding to emergencies[.]

Additional exceptions for ATV use relating to highways in Buchanan County and Tazewell County are found in subsection B of the statute. A further exception relating to ATVs being used in conjunction with farming activities is found in subsection F of the statute.

The three clauses above are separated by the word "or." "Generally, courts presume that [the word] 'or' is used in a statute disjunctively unless there is clear legislative intent to the contrary."

The provision at issue does not reflect an intent for the word "or" to be treated in the conjunctive. To the contrary, reading the word "or" in the conjunctive would lead to the irrational result of requiring that first responders (law enforcement, firefighters, or EMS personnel) seek permission from "proper authorities" before operating ATVs on public highways when responding to emergencies. It would additionally limit the authority of those same first responders when operating ATVs in emergency situations to use of a public highway only by "crossing," rather than full use of the highway corridor itself. This could not have been the intent of the legislature in providing certain exceptions whereby ATVs could be used on public highways in Virginia. Therefore, in my opinion, the most clear and natural reading of the provision is that the three clauses are independent.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is my opinion that clause (ii) of § 46.2-915.1(A)(1) is independent of the other two clauses of that provision, such that an individual operating an ATV is permitted to cross a public highway by the most direct route, even if the circumstances present in clauses (i) and (iii) are not present.

With kindest regards, I am,

Very truly yours,

Jason S. Miyares
Attorney General

Get today's answer for your situation

You just read a 2022 opinion on this question. Ezel checks the current Virginia statutes and case law and answers your specific situation, with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer cites the law it relies on.