Can a Virginia locality enact an ordinance letting a volunteer fire department bill an individual's home or auto insurance for responding to a fire?

Plain-English summary

This opinion is a follow-up to [[11-052]], which concluded that volunteer fire and rescue squads lack the statutory authority or contractual right to bill home or auto insurance for fire-call responses. Delegate Phillips asked whether § 27-14, the general locality grant of power over fire/EMS organizational matters ("a 'governing body may make such ordinances in relation to the powers and duties of fire/EMS departments, companies, chiefs or directors and other officers as it may deem proper'"), provided a workaround. The AG said no.

Cuccinelli's analysis rested on the Dillon Rule and on reading the Code as one body of law. Section 27-14 does not expressly authorize fee-billing ordinances. Whether the authority can be inferred required asking whether the legislature intended the express grant to also confer the implied. Two related statutes show the General Assembly knew how to allow fee billing in specific circumstances: § 32.1-111.14(B) (EMS vehicle charges, including billing insurers for ambulance services) and § 15.2-1716 (cost recovery after a conviction for specified crimes). Section 27-47 authorizes a locality to levy a property tax to fund fire/EMS, and § 15.2-953(B)/(D) authorizes certain payments to volunteer fire companies. Reading § 27-14 broadly enough to authorize a billing ordinance would render those statutes superfluous. The AG noted that § 27-14 generally authorizes ordinances governing organizational and operational matters (training, equipment, personnel), not revenue collection from insurance policies.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2011. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Why isn't § 27-14's broad language enough?
Because the Dillon Rule restricts local authority to powers expressly granted, fairly or necessarily implied from express grants, or essential and indispensable. Section 27-14 grants authority over fire/EMS organizational matters, not over fee collection from third parties. The General Assembly has used express language elsewhere when it intended to authorize insurance billing.

Does this leave volunteer fire departments without any cost recovery?
No. They can still bill insurers for actual ambulance services under § 32.1-111.14(B), and the locality can adopt cost-recovery ordinances under § 15.2-1716 (recovery via restitution or civil suit after a conviction for specified crimes). The locality can also fund the volunteer department through property taxes (§ 27-47) or per-response payments (§ 15.2-953(D)).

What's the practical takeaway?
Local boards considering such ordinances should not rely on § 27-14. To allow routine fee billing tied to fire calls, the General Assembly would need to amend the Code.

Background and statutory framework

Section 27-14 authorizes a governing body to enact ordinances regarding "the powers and duties of fire/EMS departments, companies, chiefs or directors and other officers as it may deem proper." A 1987-88 AG opinion confirmed this includes setting training requirements.

The Dillon Rule requires that local governments have only powers expressly granted, fairly or necessarily implied, or essential and indispensable. To find implied authority from express, "it must be found that the legislature intended that the grant of the express also would confer the implied." Any doubt as to the existence of a power must be resolved against the locality.

Specific cost-recovery statutes show the General Assembly's preferred method: § 32.1-111.14(B) (ambulance/EMS vehicle charges), § 15.2-1716 (cost recovery after conviction), § 27-47 (property tax funding), § 15.2-953(B)/(D) (locality payments). Reading § 27-14 to permit a billing ordinance would render those statutes superfluous, and where one power is expressed another will not be inferred, so § 27-14 is read narrowly.

Citations

• Va. Code § 2.2-505 (authority for official advisory opinions)
• Va. Code § 27-14 (locality power over fire/EMS departments)
• Va. Code § 32.1-111.14(B) (EMS vehicle charges to insurers)
• Va. Code § 15.2-1716 (cost recovery after conviction)
• Va. Code §§ 27-47, 15.2-953 (funding volunteer fire companies)
• 1987-88 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 361 (locality authority over training requirements)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2011/11-082-Phillips.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II

July 22, 2011

Attorney General

The Honorable Clarence E. Bud Phillips
Member, House of Delegates
Post Office Box 36
Castlewood, Virginia 24224

900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1

Dear Delegate Phillips:
I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia.

Issue Presented
You ask whether § 27-14 of the Code of Virginia permits a locality to adopt an ordinance authorizing a volunteer fire department to assess and charge a fee to an individual's homeowners' or automobile insurance policy for responding to a fire emergency.

Response
It is my opinion that § 27-14 does not permit a locality to adopt an ordinance authorizing a volunteer fire department to assess and charge a fee to an individual's homeowners' or automobile insurance policy for responding to a fire emergency.

Applicable Law and Discussion
A previous opinion of this office addresses the question whether volunteer fire departments may assess and charge a fee to an individual's homeowners' or automobile insurance policy for responding to a fire emergency. That opinion concludes that there is "no statutory basis upon which to bill an individual's homeowners' or automobile policy for responding to a fire emergency."

Although the prior opinion does not specifically mention § 27-14, the analysis and conclusion remain the same. Section 27-14 provides, in pertinent part, that a "governing body may make such ordinances in relation to the powers and duties of fire/EMS departments, companies, chiefs or directors and other officers as it may deem proper." By its plain terms, the statute does not specifically accord localities the authority to permit fire departments to charge insurance policies for services rendered.

Under the Dillon Rule, localities have "only those powers which are expressly granted by the state legislature, those powers fairly or necessarily implied from expressly granted powers, and those powers which are essential and indispensable." As the previous opinion and the plain language of § 27-14 demonstrate, there is no legislation expressly enabling localities to adopt such measures. The question thus becomes whether such power can be inferred from § 27-14. To find a "particular power from a power expressly granted, it must be found that the legislature intended that the grant of the express also would confer the implied."

Because the Virginia Code constitutes one body of law, statutes are not to be read in isolation. As noted in the previous opinion, § 32.1-111.14(B) authorizes localities "to make reasonable charges for use of emergency medical services vehicles, including charging insurers for ambulance services" and § 15.2-1716 permits localities to provide for recovery of expenses incurred in responding to certain calls when a conviction for specified crimes has occurred. Moreover, § 27-47 expressly provides that a locality can levy a property tax to fund the fire/EMS departments serving designated fire/EMS zones or districts, and §§ 15.2-953(B) and (D) authorize localities to make certain payments to volunteer fire companies. Reading § 27-14 so broadly as to permit a locality to authorize a volunteer fire department to assess the fee would render these statutes superfluous.

As evidenced in these other statutes, the legislature knows how to express its intention with regard to permitting charges assessed against insurers and the financing of volunteer fire departments, and chose not to include such language in § 27-14. Further, where one power is expressed, another will not be inferred, and any doubt as to the existence of a power must be resolved against the locality. I therefore cannot conclude that the grant of power provided in § 27-14 includes the ability to adopt an ordinance authorizing a volunteer fire department to assess and charge a fee to an individual's homeowners' or automobile insurance policy for responding to a fire emergency.

Section 27-14 generally authorizes ordinances governing the organizational and operational needs of a department, such as training requirements, equipment, and personnel issues. See 1987-88 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 361 (concluding that a governing body has authority to establish training requirements).

Conclusion
Accordingly, it is my opinion that § 27-14 does not permit a locality to adopt an ordinance authorizing a volunteer fire department to assess and charge a fee to an individual's homeowners' or automobile insurance policy for responding to a fire emergency.

With kindest regards, I am
Very truly yours,

Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II
Attorney General