Can Virginia's budget bill raise a fee set by a Code section without re-enacting and republishing that Code section, or does Article IV, § 12 of the state constitution forbid it?

Plain-English summary

Section 18.2-270.01(A) of the Virginia Code imposed a $50 Trauma Center Fund fee on repeat DUI-related offenders. The 2011 budget bill (House Bill 1500), at § 3-6.03, provided that "[n]otwithstanding § 18.2-270.01 of the Code of Virginia, the driver's license reinstatement fee payable to the Trauma Center Fund shall be $100." Delegate Marshall asked whether using the budget bill to displace a Code-set fee violated Article IV, § 12 of the Virginia Constitution, which requires that any amended section be reenacted and published at length.

Cuccinelli concluded that § 3-6.03 was constitutional. Article IV, § 12 prohibits amendments by reference, where a bill purports to alter words in a named statute without republishing the full text. Section 3-6.03 did not literally amend § 18.2-270.01(A); it enacted a parallel provision that operated alongside it. Courts have long allowed the legislature to enact a separate statute that neutralizes or modifies the operative effect of another law, as long as the new statute does not directly edit the older statute's text. Cuccinelli cited Beale v. Pankey to illustrate what would have been unconstitutional (a bill expressly titled "An act to amend and reenact" that failed to republish the underlying law) and pointed to a long line of out-of-state authority confirming that practical effect on another statute is not the same as formally amending it.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2011. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What did Article IV, § 12 of the Virginia Constitution require?
That "no law shall be revived or amended with reference to its title, but the act revived or the section amended shall be reenacted and published at length." The clause forces the legislature to print the full amended text of a section, not just describe the change.

Why was it constitutional for a budget bill to override a Code-set fee?
Because § 3-6.03 was a separate, complete enactment. It did not splice new words into § 18.2-270.01(A). Courts have consistently distinguished between a bill that formally amends another section's text (which must republish at length) and a later, freestanding act that has the effect of modifying or overriding earlier law (which does not).

What case did the AG use to illustrate what would violate Article IV, § 12?
Beale v. Pankey, 107 Va. 215 (1907), where the General Assembly passed "[a]n act to amend and re-enact" a prior statute incorporating Pamplin City but did not republish the prior statute. That bill ran afoul of the constitutional requirement because it expressly purported to amend a named law without printing the full text.

Did the AG see any tension with the spirit of the clause?
He acknowledged the concern: a citizen reading § 18.2-270.01(A) would still see $50, when in fact the budget bill had set the fee at $100. But existing case law allowed it, and the practical alternative (requiring the legislature to republish every Code section indirectly affected by a budget bill) would make appropriations bills unwieldy.

Background and statutory framework

Section 18.2-270.01(A) directs the court to order a $50 payment to the Trauma Center Fund for any defendant convicted of certain repeat DUI-related offenses (§§ 18.2-36.1, 18.2-51.4, 18.2-266, 18.2-266.1, or 46.2-341.24) who has a prior similar conviction within ten years. The fund defrays emergency medical costs for victims of alcohol- and drug-related crashes.

Section 3-6.03 of the 2011 Appropriations Act (HB 1500) raised the equivalent reinstatement fee to $100 by operating "notwithstanding" the Code section. The AG analyzed it under Article IV, § 12, which has two distinct clauses: the "single object" rule (every act must embrace only one object expressed in its title) and the republish-at-length requirement for amendments. The second clause is procedural rather than substantive: it tells the legislature how to amend, not what it may amend.

The Virginia Supreme Court has long held that the "single object" rule of Article IV, § 12 should be "liberally construed and treated, so as to uphold the law, if practicable." Justice Cooley of the Supreme Court of Michigan, interpreting a similar clause, described the original mischief: amendatory bills "in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effect." That concern targets reference-style amendments, not parallel enactments.

The AG also noted an abundance of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions confirming that an act complete and intelligible on its face does not violate a republish-at-length clause merely because it modifies the effect of an earlier statute.

Citations

• Va. Const. art. IV, § 12 (single-object and republish-at-length clauses)
• Va. Code § 18.2-270.01 (Trauma Center Fund fee)
• 2011 House Bill 1500, § 3-6.03 (raising fee to $100)
• Beale v. Pankey, 107 Va. 215, 57 S.E. 661 (1907) (express amendment without republication unconstitutional)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2011/11-049-Marshall.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II
Attorney General

May 13, 2011

The Honorable Robert G. Marshall
Member, Virginia House of Delegates
Post Office Box 421
Manassas, Virginia 20108-0421

900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1

Dear Delegate Marshall:
I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia.

Issue Presented
You inquire whether § 3-6.03 of House Bill 1500 is consistent with the requirements of Article IV, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia.

Response
It is my opinion that the enactment of § 3-6.03 of House Bill 1500 is consistent with Article IV, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia.

Applicable Law and Discussion
Section 18.2-270.01(A) imposes a $50 fee for persons convicted of certain crimes. It provides that

[T]he court shall order any person convicted of a violation of §§ 18.2-36.1, 18.2-51.4, 18.2-266, 18.2-266.1 or § 46.2-341.24 who has been convicted previously of one or more violations of any of those sections or any ordinance, any law of another state, or any law of the United States substantially similar to the provisions of those sections within 10 years of the date of the current offense to pay $50 to the Trauma Center Fund for the purpose of defraying the costs of providing emergency medical care to victims of automobile accidents attributable to alcohol or drug use.

Section 3-6.03 of the 2011 House Bill 1500, the Appropriations Act, provides that "[n]otwithstanding § 18.2-270.01 of the Code of Virginia, the driver's license reinstatement fee payable to the Trauma Center Fund shall be $100."

In reviewing the constitutionality of laws duly enacted by the General Assembly,

[e]very presumption is made in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. A reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be solved in favor of the validity of the law ... and it is only in cases where the statute in question is plainly repugnant to some provisions of the Constitution that the courts can declare it to be null and void.

The second clause of Article IV, § 12 of the Virginia Constitution specifies that no law shall "be revived or amended with reference to its title, but the act revived or the section amended shall be reenacted and published at length." In examining a Michigan constitutional provision similar to Virginia's Article IV, § 12, Justice Cooley of the Supreme Court of Michigan explained the purpose behind the adoption of such clauses:

The mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory statutes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effect, and the public, from the difficulty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to but not republished, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps sometimes drawn in that form for that express purpose. Endless confusion was introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely prohibited such legislation.

The Supreme Court of Virginia has noted that the "single object" rule of Article IV, § 12 is "to be liberally construed and treated, so as to uphold the law, if practicable," and the same logic applies to the second clause of Article IV, § 12. Article IV, § 12 is not a substantive modification on the power of the General Assembly. Rather, it imposes a procedural requirement, when it applies.

Section 3-6.03 plainly does not "revive" a law. The question then is whether it "amends" a particular law. As you note, by its plain text, § 3-6.03 does not purport to amend § 18.2-270.01(A). The language in the budget bill, however, unquestionably does have an impact on the application of § 18.2-270.01(A) by effectively raising the fee from $50 to $100. The net effect of § 3-6.03 is to neutralize the $50 fee imposed in § 18.2-270.01(A) and substitute for it a higher fee. To fall within the constitutional prohibition, however, the statute must literally amend a specific Code provision.

One could argue that, by displacing the fee imposed in § 18.2-270.01(A), and replacing it with a different fee, § 3-6.03 violates the spirit animating Article IV, § 12. Citizens reading § 18.2-270.01(A) may conclude that the fee is $50, when, in fact, a separate enactment makes the fee higher. Under existing case law, however, courts have allowed legislatures to enact a separate statute that neutralizes or modifies another law, so long as it does not literally amend the actual text of the previously enacted statute, in this case § 18.2-270.01(A).

Beale v. Pankey illustrates the difference between what is prohibited and the scenario at issue here. In Beale, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the General Assembly had infringed upon the predecessor to Article IV, § 12 when it voted to pass "[a]n act to amend and re-enact" a prior statute incorporating the town of Pamplin City. The act at issue, however, did so without republishing the prior statute. In other words, the act expressly set about to amend and re-enact a specific prior law, and ran afoul of Article IV, § 12 when it did not republish the entire law being amended. It did not, as here, enact a separate law that has the effect of altering a separate provision of the Code.

One reason for the broad latitude courts have afforded to legislatures in this area is a practical concern: if the General Assembly were required to "publish at length" a statute that is greatly impacted by another statute, bills would become unwieldy and voluminous. As the Supreme Court of Illinois remarked,

[a]ny new law may, in a sense, be said to change the prior system of laws, and wherever there is a conflict between two acts, the rule is that the later act prevails, and if not amendatory in form it is not within the prohibition of the constitution. Were it to be held that whenever a new act is passed all prior acts indirectly modified or affected by it shall be re-enacted and published at length, such rule would require that at each session of the legislature a large part of the entire statute must be re-published, some parts many times.

Finally, I note that an abundance of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions supports the conclusion that the enactment of § 3-6.03 does not violate Article IV, § 12, because § 3-6.03 is not expressly amendatory of § 18.2-270.01(A). In other words, to fall within the Constitutional prohibition, the General Assembly would have had to modify the actual text of § 18.2-270.01(A) without republishing it "at length."

Conclusion
Accordingly, it is my opinion that the enactment of § 3-6.03 of House Bill 1500 is consistent with Article IV, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia.

With kindest regards, I am
Very truly yours,

Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II
Attorney General