Can a Virginia city or county impose adoption requirements stricter than the state's minimum rules at an animal pound?

Plain-English summary

Delegate Morgan Griffith asked AG William Mims a clean Dillon Rule question. Section 3.2-6546(D) of the Virginia Code lists the ways a pound may dispose of an animal: euthanasia plus five categories of adoption (residents of the locality, residents of adjacent localities, others, with various conditions including signed cruelty-history affidavits and sterilization for non-local adoptions of dogs and cats). Could a locality go beyond those minimum rules and authorize the pound to add its own restrictions on adoption, perhaps stricter screening, mandatory home visits, or limits on certain dog breeds going home with certain adopters?

The AG read the statute alongside § 3.2-6543(A), which expressly authorizes a local governing body to adopt an ordinance "more stringent" than the parallel state requirements. The word "stringent" was not defined in the Code, so the AG used its ordinary meaning ("marked by rigor, strictness, or severity especially with regard to rule or standard"). Section 3.2-6546(D) uses "may" ("Such animal may be euthanized … or disposed of by the methods set forth"), which is permissive language indicating the listed methods are a floor, not a ceiling. Read together, the two sections give localities the room to add their own restrictions.

The AG also worked through the Dillon Rule and the preemption question. Localities have only the powers expressly granted, fairly implied, or essential and indispensable. The General Assembly did not occupy the field of animal regulation; on the contrary, it expressly invited localities to enact leash laws (§ 3.2-6539) and nuisance/running-at-large laws (§ 3.2-6538) and to be "more stringent" than the state baseline. That signaled legislative intent for layered regulation. So an ordinance that authorizes the pound to enforce additional adoption restrictions sits comfortably within both the express delegation of § 3.2-6543(A) and the broader policy of letting localities tailor animal-welfare rules to local needs.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2009 (released January 2010). Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current §§ 3.2-6543 and 3.2-6546 texts before relying on any specific rule.

Common questions

Q: What does § 3.2-6546(D) require at minimum?
A: That an adopter has read and signed a statement that they have never been convicted of animal cruelty, neglect, or abandonment. For dogs and cats adopted by non-residents of the locality (or adjacent locality), the animal must be sterilized first, and the pound can require that to happen at the adopter's expense.

Q: What can a locality add?
A: Whatever its governing body chooses, so long as the ordinance is more stringent (not less) than the state minimum and does not conflict with state law in a way that would defeat the legislative scheme. Common examples: home visits, application interviews, breed-specific policies, age-of-adopter rules.

Q: What is the Dillon Rule's role here?
A: Dillon limits localities to powers expressly granted, fairly implied, or essential. Section 3.2-6543(A) is the express grant. Without it, a locality could not freelance on animal-welfare ordinances. With it, the locality has clear authority for "more stringent" rules.

Q: Could a locality go in the other direction (less stringent than the state minimum)?
A: No. Section 3.2-6543(A) only authorizes "more stringent" local rules. The state floor is just that: a floor.

Background and statutory framework

Article 6, Chapter 65 of Title 3.2 (§§ 3.2-6537 to 3.2-6554) covers regulation of dogs and other animals and the operation of pounds. Section 3.2-6543(A) is the local-authority hook: cities and counties may adopt parallel ordinances that are more stringent than the state baseline. Section 3.2-6546(D) sets the disposal-of-impounded-animals rules. Sections 3.2-6538 and 3.2-6539 specifically authorize nuisance/running-at-large and leash ordinances. The opinion combines plain-statutory-construction, the "may" canon, and the principle that statutes on the same subject are read in pari materia.

The Dillon Rule analysis here is unremarkable because the General Assembly already provided the express authority. The opinion's contribution is reading "stringent" broadly enough to cover pound adoption policies that add restrictions beyond the state list.

Citations

• Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6543(A) (locality authority for more stringent ordinances)
• Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6546(D) (state minimum rules on adoption)
• Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6539 (leash law authority)
• Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6538 (nuisance and running-at-large authority)
• Va. Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217 (1999) (Dillon Rule)
• King v. County of Arlington, 195 Va. 1084 (1954) (harmonizing statute and ordinance)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2010/09-100-Griffith.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
William C. Mims

900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071

Attorney General

January 13, 2010

The Honorable H. Morgan Griffith
Member, House of Delegates
P.O. Box 406
Richmond, Virginia 23218

Dear Delegate Griffith:

I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia.

Issue Presented

You ask whether a locality may enact an ordinance authorizing a pound to initiate and enforce policies that place restrictions or requirements upon the adoption of animals beyond those required by § 3.2-6546.

Response

It is my opinion that a locality may adopt an ordinance that authorizes a pound to initiate and enforce policies that place restrictions or requirements upon the adoption of animals beyond those required by § 3.2-6546.

Applicable Law and Discussion

Article 6, Chapter 65 of Title 3.2, §§ 3.2-6537 through 3.2-6554, governs the authority of local governing bodies regarding regulation of dogs, certain animals, and pounds. Section 3.2-6546(D) enumerates the ways for disposing of an animal, including adoptions, and provides that:

2. Adoption by a resident of the county or city where the pound is operated and who will pay the required license fee, if any, on such animal, provided that such resident has read and signed a statement specifying that he has never been convicted of animal cruelty, neglect, or abandonment;

3. Adoption by a resident of an adjacent political subdivision of the Commonwealth, if the resident has read and signed a statement specifying that he has never been convicted of animal cruelty, neglect, or abandonment;

4. Adoption by any other person, provided that such person has read and signed a statement specifying that he has never been convicted of animal cruelty, neglect, or abandonment, and provided that no dog or cat may be adopted by any person, who is not a resident of the county or city where the pound is operated, or of an adjacent political subdivision, unless the dog or cat is first sterilized, and the pound may require that the sterilization be done at the expense of the person adopting the dog or cat[.]

When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the rules of statutory construction dictate that the statute is interpreted according to its plain language.[1] In addition, when a statute creates a specific grant of authority, the authority exists only to the extent specifically granted in the statute.[2] Section 3.2-6546(D) provides that "[s]uch animal may[3] be euthanized … or disposed of by the methods set forth in subdivision 1 through 5." However, § 3.2-6543(A) authorizes a local governing body to adopt a more "stringent" ordinance that parallels § 3.2-6546. The General Assembly has not defined the term "stringent" in this context. In the absence of a statutory definition, the plain and ordinary meaning of a term is controlling.[4] The term "stringent" means "marked by rigor, strictness, or severity esp. with regard to rule or standard."[5]

Statutes that pertain to the same subject matter are to be construed as in pari materia.[6] Where possible, the two should be harmonized in order to give effect to both.[7] "If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and be given effect, it is the duty of the courts to harmonize them and not nullify the ordinance."[8] Consistent with Dillon's Rule, the local ordinance must be supported by adequate enabling legislation.[9] An ordinance is inconsistent with state law if state law preempts local regulation in the area, either by expressly prohibiting local regulation or by enacting state regulations so comprehensive that the state may be considered to occupy the entire field.[10] In this matter, the statutory language is clear that localities are not preempted in the regulation of animal law. The General Assembly authorizes localities to regulate animal law in their jurisdictions by enacting regulations concerning leash laws[11] and nuisance and running at large laws.[12] Further, in enacting § 3.2-6543(A), the General Assembly has demonstrated its intent to allow localities to regulate animal law by specifically providing that a locality may adopt more stringent standards than that provided by state law in certain circumstances.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that a locality may adopt an ordinance that authorizes a pound to initiate and enforce policies that place restrictions or requirements upon the adoption of animals beyond those required by § 3.2-6546.

Thank you for letting me be of service to you.

Sincerely,

William C. Mims

1. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive Return Serv., Inc., 271 Va. 304, 309, 626 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006).
2. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed. 2007) (explaining maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius"); Op. Va. Att'y Gen.: 2002 at 109, 111; 1992 at 145, 146; 1989 at 252, 253; 1980-1981 at 209, 210.
3. "Unless it is manifest that the purpose of the legislature was to use the word 'may' in the sense of 'shall' or 'must,' then 'may' should be given its ordinary meaning–permission, importing discretion." Masters v. Hart, 189 Va. 969, 979, 55 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1949), quoted in Bd. of Supvrs. v. Weems, 194 Va. 10, 15, 72 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1952); see also Op. Va. Att'y Gen.: 2000 at 29, 32 n.2, 1999 at 193, 195 n.6, 1997 at 10, 12, (noting that use of "may" in statute indicates statute is permissive and discretionary, rather than mandatory).
4. See Sansom v. Bd. of Supvrs., 257 Va. 589, 594-95, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999); Commonwealth v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980).
5. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1162 (10th ed. 2001).
6. See Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405, 100 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1957); Op. Va. Att'y Gen.: 1983-1984 at 135, 135; 1982-1983 at 343, 344; 1981-1982 at 273, 274.
7. Id.
8. King v. County of Arlington, 195 Va. 1084, 1091, 81 S.E.2d 587, 591 (1954).
9. Va. Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217, 221, 518 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1999) (holding that, under Dillon's Rule, local governing bodies have only those powers expressly granted by legislature, "those powers fairly or necessarily implied from expressly granted powers, and those powers which are essential and indispensible"; where legislature grants power to local government, but does not specify method of implementing power, local government's choice regarding implementation of conferred power will be upheld, provided method chosen is reasonable).
10. See Lynchburg v. Dominion Theatres, Inc., 175 Va. 35, 40, 7 S.E.2d 157, 159 (1940); Op. Va. Att'y Gen.: 2007 at 59, 60; 1983-1984 at 86, 87; see also Hanbury v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 182, 185, 122 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1961) (noting that ordinance conflicting with state law of general character and state-wide application is invalid); cf. King, 195 Va. at 1089-90, 81 S.E.2d at 591 (noting that state did not occupy enter field; therefore, locality could govern by ordinance).
11. See VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6539 (2008).
12. See § 3.2-6538 (2008).